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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN CRISIS

IN THE YEARS since World War II the American political system has been subjected to a series of recurrent, almost chronic challenges whose implications may well cause thoughtful men to question the capacity of that system to survive. Two superficially dissimilar examples of these challenges are supplied by the crisis following the failure of our China policy in the late 1940's and the "Sputnik" crisis of October 1957.

The chief political significance of these events, perhaps, is that they were incomprehensible in terms of established American expectations—the China débâcle because our experiences have given us little opportunity to reckon with honest, unintended, and perhaps even unavoidable failure, and Sputnik because we were utterly unprepared to confront the fact that this could be a Soviet achievement, one not easily equaled by the United States.

Like any major event in human experience that is unexpected and, more important, lacks meaning—that is, cannot adequately be accommodated to established conceptions of reality—these produced a variety of responses, a good many of which were inappropriate in the sense that they were not adequately based on reality and hence could lead to entirely unintended consequences. Rapid, unpredicted change is always the enemy of stable and accurate perceptions, of established attitudes and loyalties. It leads to efforts, often at best frantic, to impose meaning on events and to grasp at compensating changes that are comforting because they seem plausible, that are psychologically useful though they may be realistically inappropriate.

Other events like Sputnik and the fall of China lie ahead of us for the indefinite future. The system that opposes us, while not our superior and probably not even our equal in basic

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capacity, appears capable for the time being, more than any despotism faced by us before, of an unrestrained concentration of energy and resources at particular points—such as rocketry and its associated technologies but not only in this realm—at which our vulnerabilities and the likelihood of embarrassment will be greatest.

The response of the United States to these events will be critically important in at least two respects. First, if our reactions are sufficiently inappropriate, they can lead to the disintegration and the destruction of the alliance that we lead. This is a prime target; the preferred objective of Soviet power is not the physical destruction of this country but the elimination of the leadership of the United States. The second respect in which our responses will be critically important is closely related but distinguishable, and it is the central concern of this essay. It is the danger of self-destruction, the danger that our reactions to frustrating and unexpected events will be so inappropriate to reality and their consequences so inadequately perceived that, in our efforts to increase our military strength and to fend off the intercontinental missiles, we may destroy the democratic system by which we live. Presumably one need not argue that this land as a prison of the human spirit would have lost its beauty as surely as if its cities had been laid waste and its population decimated.

This danger of self-destruction has often been pointed to, though perhaps of late a little less frequently than would be desirable. In any case, the present purpose is not to elaborate on it, but rather to look more narrowly at some misconceptions about the sources of the danger of self-destruction and about their character. The reason for this emphasis is that a number of eloquent and influential contemporary observers who seem to share this anxiety about the survival of our political system have adopted and publicized seriously mistaken views of where the danger lies and, consequently, of what is necessary to guard against it.

These views are best illustrated in Walter Lippmann's *Essays in the Public Philosophy,* which, upon its publication in 1955, caused considerable stir among readers of books and which one finds constantly cited as a source of confirming authority.[1] This

[1] Walter Lippmann, *Essays in the Public Philosophy* (Boston, 1955). References are to the Mentor edition (New York, 1956).

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book is not to be dismissed lightly. Lippmann's mind has always been an honestly troubled one, dealing with real questions; in this little book he is no less honest, and he is in such degree troubled that one may more accurately refer to him as tortured. Moreover, there is something in the substance of his argument, but that something has been so simplified analytically and so located philosophically that the result is at best unconvincing and at worst grossly misleading.

Lippmann's central thesis is a Spenglerian argument that the Western liberal democracies have been steadily declining both as powers in the world and as viable systems for conducting their own affairs. They are in serious danger both of being overwhelmed by totalitarian governments on the international scene and of being displaced within their own jurisdictions by counter-revolutionary dictatorships. The source of this "sickness" of the democracies he finds in the Jacobin surges of the nineteenth century that destroyed the authority of an educated governing class and, through the creation of large electorates, produced a domination of the government by mass opinion. This domination, first evident in the third year of World War I, reflects "a morbid derangement of the true functions of power."[2] "Prevailing mass opinion" prevents flexibility in making "hard decisions" by prohibiting changes in existing courses of action. "The people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials", and, "at the critical junctures," he argues, "prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong."[3]

The chief institutional consequence of this mass domination has been "to devitalize, to enfeeble, and to eviscerate" the "congenitally" weaker executive power through the instrumentality of the representative assembly. Enormous expenditures, required primarily for war and reconstruction, have made the executive "elaborately dependent" on the assembly. At the same time "the growing incapacity of the large majority of the democratic peoples to believe in intangible realities" has "stripped the government [and chiefly the executive] of that imponderable authority with is derived from tradition, immemorial usage, consecration, veneration, prescription, prestige, heredity, hierarchy."[4]

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 43 and 49.

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The result has been disaster in the affairs of the democratic nations and a "practical failure to govern" which, if continued, will lead to "counterrevolutionary measures for the establishment of strong government."[5]

The only remedy for these difficulties, Lippmann declares, is a return to the public philosophy, by which he means the natural law doctrine that reason can discover eternal and objectively true principles of justice by which the public interest can be validly determined in concrete situations. These, and not merely the positive laws of statute and constitution, are the laws to which all men, governors and governed, must be subject. Restoration of the public philosophy requires not simply an increased awareness of the social consequences of individual conduct and governmental policy. Rather it depends upon a "return" to the view that ideas and beliefs concerning "what man is and should be . . . , how he should hold himself in the scheme of things, what are his rightful ends and the legitimate means" are matters of public concern. By a process of subtle transformation we have moved, Mr. Lippmann thinks, from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century denial "both to the state and to the established church [of] a sovereign monopoly" in this realm to the view that these matters are "private and subjective and publicly unaccountable." In consequence, "the liberal democracies of the West became the first great society to treat as a private concern the formative beliefs that shape the character of its citizens." This has led to the destruction of "a consensus on the first and last things." The prudential policy of placing outside of the public domain the "theological, moral, and ideological issues which divide the Western society" could work only in a society such as the Victorian, "which was secure, progressive, expanding, and unchallenged." In face of the "hard decisions" of the twentieth century, "the liberal democratic policy of public agnosticism and practical neutrality in ultimate issues" is impossible.[6]

But the return to the public philosophy, to the view that there is "a body of positive principles and precepts which a good citizen cannot deny or ignore", is not directly a matter for the mass of the population. "The public philosophy is addressed to the government of our appetites and passions by the reasons of a

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

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second, civilized, and, therefore, acquired nature. Therefore, the public philosophy cannot be popular."[7] It must be adopted by the "men of light and leading," who are most likely to be found in the executive and judicial branches of government, if they are to have the moral courage to make the hard decisions. It must also be taught to the masses if their governors are to recapture the authority of imponderables, the confidence and respect that will hold mass opinion in check.

It may seem inappropriate to challenge Lippmann's analysis and prescription exclusively on the American scene, since his critique is applied to the Western democracies as a whole. However, since he includes the United States and, indeed, seems at times to single it out for special attention, it is not unreasonable to argue that, if one can reject his observations as they apply to this country, his entire position stands undemonstrated. It may well be, in fact, that a crucial flaw in his indictment is precisely that he has drawn no distinctions among the Western democracies but has treated them as essentially identical systems suffering from a common disease.

One must grant, as I have already indicated, some validity to Lippmann's concerns. The problem of securing far-sighted leadership in a representative government is admittedly persistent; it may also be that this problem has been seriously complicated by the movement in the past century from a limited to a mass electorate, although one suspects that this is an excessively simple explanation and that changes associated with industrialization may be of greater relevance. One may also concede that the survival of a constitutional system requires some degree of consensus on required and permissible forms and purposes of political action and that the troubles of some democracies can be traced to the weakness of such consensus. The fear expressed in this article, in fact, is that essential elements of the constitutional consensus in the United States may be lost from view in the throes of convulsive response to external challenge.

But it does not follow that this consensus, to turn to that matter first, must find its sanction in a doctrine of transcendental natural law which can or should be a positive guide to determining the "public interest" in concrete situations. Natural law doctrines, even if widely shared by Mr. Lippmann's giants of the

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have never provided precise determinations of particular issues. Surely it is not for the want of adherence to a public philosophy, for the absence of loyalty to the higher-law propositions of the Constitution, or for the lack of judicial virtuosity that nine honorable men on the Supreme Court have normally been unable to agree on precisely what must be regarded as, in Mr. Justice Cardozo's words, "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."

To insist that such doctrines can and must give positive meanings over the full range of public policy necessarily leads, as Lippmann rightly but rather blindly admits, to the impossibility of a "policy of public agnosticism and practical neutrality in ultimate issues." But the abandonment of this policy of neutrality not only means that these matters are of public rather than private concern but also easily leads to authoritative determination of all such issues. By adopting his view we are likely to find the baby missing after the bath water has been disposed of. Lippmann does not go so far explicitly. He asserts, for example, that state and church must remain "separate, autonomous, and secure." But when he goes on to say that "on all the issues of good and evil" the two "must also meet" (the context not making it clear whether this verb means "to come into conflict" or "to agree"), he is dangerously close to asserting that these issues must be settled in terms of official doctrine, not on the basis of a careful assessment of empirical consequences.[8]

In his strictly political analysis, especially in his insistence upon the executive prerogative, he is also approaching advocacy of a kind of benevolent despotism in the guise of a set of Platonic guardians unhappily subject to the vagaries of popular election. He declares himself a "liberal democrat" who has no wish to disenfranchise his fellow citizens, and of the sincerity of this declaration one can have not the slightest doubt. Yet his Burkeian insistence on a "ruler" whose "duty is to the office and not to his electors," taken in the context of his portrait of the Western democracies as debauched and enfeebled by a willful, short-sighted and dominant mass electorate, comes close to a rejection of his liberal democratic faith.[9]

Why should this be? Why should a man whose life richly

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 18 and 46.

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deserves the respect of his fellow citizens, whose conduct amply testifies to his faith as a liberal democrat, be found confronting an unacknowledged dilemma between populism and authoritarianism? The question proposes no psychoanalytic examination of Mr. Lippmann, though one might be revealing, for the concern is with him as an example, not as an individual.

The answer, or at least a large segment of it, lies in his conception—if one were to be malicious, one might say "stereotype"—of American society. In *The Public Philosophy* this conception contains only two terms: the governors, the "men of light and leading," and the mass, the people. Except for an occasional pejorative reference to "party bosses, the agents of pressure groups, and the magnates of the new media of mass communications," there is nowhere in the book a discussion of any intervening structure, of ranks of power and responsibility. Given his profound doubts—not in the slightest diminished since the publication of his *Public Opinion* more than thirty years ago—of the political capabilities of the ordinary citizen, his oversimplified social structure leaves him nowhere to turn, as the twentieth-century crisis deepens, except to his beleaguered executive as a source of authoritative myths and bold decisions. Curiously enough, he ends up in the same analytical position, though a very different prescriptive one, as some of the contemporary exponents of a conspiracy theory of American social structure, of whom C. Wright Mills is perhaps the most conspicuous example. Here too there are only a cohesive elite and a mass, with an inconsequential structure intervening. Power, to be sure, is ominously concentrated at opposing poles in the two conceptions of society, so that each observer fears the concentration that he sees, Lippmann the mass and Mills the "power elite".[10] Both cannot be correct. Neither can be more than partly so because each is working from a grossly oversimplified conception of the society.

The question is not whether one can share some of Mr. Lippmann's anxieties about the contemporary scene; the twin dangers, that inappropriate reactions to unexpected challenges might destroy our leadership in the free world and might equally destroy our democratic polity, are real. The crucial difference with him is rather with respect to the importance that should be attached to the intermediate social and political structure

[10] *Cf.* C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956).

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which he entirely omits from his analysis. This structure—which in simplest terms includes at least the great array of interest or pressure groups, corporations, trade unions, churches, and professional societies, the major media of communication, the political parties, and, in a sense, the principal state and local governments—this pluralistic structure is a central fact of the distribution of power in the society. It is a structure that is intervening between government at the national level and the rank and file of the population, intervening rather than subordinate or dominating. Within and among these groups, or rather their leading elements, a large fraction of the strengths and weaknesses of the American system is to be found. If one is disposed to engage in criticism and homilies, this structure must be a principal target. Much less is known about it than would be desirable, but enough is evident to indicate that it constitutes not only a distinctive feature of the American political scene but also a functional element of crucial importance in the system. In rough outline that system has for its frame the expedient of federalism, plus a few other formal arrangements, including the separation of powers and especially the less directly structural libertarian guarantees of the first eight amendments to the Constitution. New diversities of loyalty have developed to overlay, to reinforce, or to supplant those that faced the Philadelphia convention when the federalist compromise was drafted. Fragmentation, pluralism and structural complexity have been encouraged by the basic framework and by a politics that was sheltered by the Hundred Years' Peace following 1815 and that for half a century after Reconstruction operated at the low temperatures friendly to the development of a complex industrial economy based on private initiative. The resulting political system is flexible, complicated, and peculiarly sensitive to the specialized demands emerging from its pluralistic base—specialized, however, in ways that may not be functional for the survival of the system.

The leading positions in the groups that make up the structure intervening between the government and the ordinary citizen obviously are centers of power, varying in importance, to be sure, but in the aggregate overwhelming. Less obvious but equally important, they are, in this kind of society, positions of responsibility and of privilege. One need not entirely share Lippmann's disbelief in the political capacities of the rank-and-

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file citizen to accept the axiom that a mass of people cannot act except through organization and in response to the initiatives of small numbers of leaders. Those who occupy leading positions within the groups constituting the intervening structure of American society are, in the technical and neutral sense of the term, elites. Being more influential, they are privileged; and, being privileged, they have, with few exceptions, a special stake in the continuation of the political system on which their privileges rest.

That stake, however, and those privileges may be apparent only to the analyst. For some elites this lack of awareness may derive from the relatively narrow range within which they are influential; for others, their positions not being overtly political, there may be no evident connection with the system of governing; and for still others, lack of awareness of their stake may be more a consequence of the fact that, though, as elites, they wield significant powers, the interests for which they speak are not yet granted full legitimacy in the larger society. Taken as a whole, these privileged leaders are not drawn from a single segment of the class structure, and, like other elite elements in American society, as Edward Shils has pointed out in his essay on *The Torments of Secrecy,* the geographic mobility that has attended their movement into positions of influence characteristically has denied them the security and the awareness that may be provided by traditional ties.[11] For these and other reasons, collectively they have few of the qualities of a self-conscious governing class. Moreover, many leaders in the intervening structure, perhaps especially those whose advancement has been rapid, have gained and held their positions only through an intense specialization, a single-minded concentration on the requirements of power within the group, that hardly encourages awareness of the larger system on which their power and privileges ultimately depend.

The hazards are great for any system that is chronically exposed to challenge and rapid change. But a system so exposed in which also a large proportion of the holders of power and privilege are unaware of their positions has special vulnerabilities. Foremost among these is the possibility that the members of these elites will not see a threat to the system for what it is.

[11] Edward A. Shils, *The Torments of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies* (Glencoe, 1956), p. 79.

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In such a scheme the substantive content of action—policies advocated and defended—is relatively close to the surface and easily perceived, especially by those elite elements whose specializations are closely related to the policies in question. Concern with that content, with the introduction and alteration of policy, necessarily involves conflict and struggle for substantial stakes. This conflict is inherent in the process, and it follows from the diversities within the society. Risk does not lie in the conflict as such, however, but in the possibility that the means by which it is carried on may violate the requirements of the system. For at bottom the system is a matter of procedure, not merely the formal procedures of adjudication or of legislative deliberation, but equally those involved in the free expression of demands and criticisms, in the legitimacy of dissent, and in unrestricted assembly and organization within the society at large. If, in the heat of controversy, some contestants, concerned more with substance than with process, deny the validity of these procedures for their opponents, and if other elements in this elite structure, preoccupied with the substance of their own specializations, acquiesce in this denial, the system as a whole is weakened. For, if the procedures may be arbitrarily denied to some, they cannot be assumed with assurance by any. Confidence in their availability is essential to the system; arbitrary and unpredictable denial has as its consequence a creeping loss of this confidence, encouraging a further resort to unstandardized and illegitimate means.

To expect a mutual esteem among all the elements of a loose and heterogeneous elite structure is probably unreasonable in a society where those elements are not based on the traditions of a common class. If those traditions are absent, a mutual attachment to the requirements of the system and a common concern for their protection become imperative. This attachment and this concern, however, need not rest upon the acceptance of Mr. Lippmann's public philosophy or its equivalent. They do not need to be derived from a set of eternal principles of justice. The word "need" is emphasized because it is not the intention to imply that anyone who *for himself* finds the authority for the system and his attachment to it in what he regards as eternal principles cannot as well as another identify a threat to it. But he cannot claim that his principles must be acknowledged before others can perform in the same way. Obviously the system rests at bottom on a respect for the dignity of man. This much is

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imperative; this much indispensable. But beyond that no more is required than a pragmatic, humanist assessment of consequences. Rather than upon authoritative rules deduced from a transcendental doctrine, attachment to the system's requirements and concern for their protection can more easily and more hopefully rest upon understanding the nature of the system as it is, upon perception of the consequences for the system that are likely to follow from the actions of elite elements within it, and upon a willingness to act upon those perceptions in its defense.

A second vulnerability of an unself-conscious and loosely integrated elite structure is that, even if threats to the system are perceived, they may not be appropriately acted upon. The heart of this danger, as Gabriel Almond has pointed out in his discussion of elite behavior in the realm of foreign policy, is that looseness of the elite structure leaves unclear and unspecified, by formal prescription or established tradition, where the initiative in these matters must be taken.[12] This is evident enough in many areas of substantive policy. It is even more pertinent in those situations where the need is less for substantive policy than for resistance to encroachments upon the procedures on which the process rests. The two are interconnected, however; for the lack of a strong governmental initiative in the wake of unanticipated events, such as those referred to at the outset of these remarks, may invite its seizure by demagogic leaders whose actions may constitute a threat to the system of procedures. This is the point at which Mr. Lippmann's unstable public opinion becomes a problem, but not as a ruthless force dominating helpless legislatures and trampling on wise executives. A mood of anxiety, focused by unexpected change but unguided by customary instruments of leadership, is an invitation to initiative from novel sources not contained within the system and not restrained by its unwritten rules. An initiative thus boldly taken in matters of substance, moreover, especially when it is widely applauded, is more difficult to restrain if it reaches the point of challenging the system at its procedural heart. An initiative that has been lost in connection with substantive matters that are merely awkward and perplexing is not likely to be easily recaptured when to awkwardness must be added considerable unpopularity.

[12] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), pp. 144 *et seq.*

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In this connection it is important to bear in mind that, though we are accustomed, and properly, to rely upon the executive and legislative branches of the national government to take the initiative both in the most important issues of substantive policy and in defense of the system's underlying procedures, this does not entirely take care of the matter. The total scheme, of which these governmental institutions are merely a part, is, as noted earlier, flexible, complicated, and highly reflective of specialized demands. Threatened conflicts between those demands, especially in the absence of a general elite consensus, can, even with an aggressive government, invite dangerous temporizing. It was not astonishing, for example, that Franklin Roosevelt, after the hostile reception given his "Quarantine" speech in 1937 by the press and other elite elements, was a good deal less eager to assume bold initiative in foreign policy matters. It may be less obvious that when an Administration-sponsored Senate investigation in 1950 into Senator McCarthy's charges against the State Department was followed by mercilessly unjust accusations against its chairman, Senator Tydings, and by his defeat in the election of that year, without significant repudiation of these tactics by the leaders of organized labor, especially in Maryland, of business groups, and of most of the press, there was little disposition in the executive or elsewhere in the government in this or the subsequent Administration to offer concerted and open challenge to the reckless demands of Senator McCarthy and his associates. Yet the explanations for these two political developments are strikingly parallel, and they do not lie within the government itself.

Ill-considered responses from within the intervening structure to an exploratory initiative from a major governmental source may lead to its relinquishing the initiative and to disastrous inaction capitalized upon by destructive leadership from another source. One of the hazards, and also potentially one of the strengths of the system as a whole, is that initiative can come from almost anywhere within it; one need not go through a long and elaborate period of training and seasoning in order to get a public hearing; coöptation, though increasingly common perhaps, is still not the characteristic method of recruitment throughout the system. But the possibility for rapid ascent and the diversity of paths to power within the system mean that any of several positions may provide the basis for an irresponsible

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initiative that under certain conditions may be parleyed into a force of monstrous destructiveness.

The essential point is that the system, including its governmental parts, must be recognized as a totality of interdependent elements. Neither responsibility nor privilege is distributed evenly over it, of course. At the governmental center both may be considerable. For the isolated voter at the periphery who has no special standing in groups of consequence, both responsibility and privilege perhaps are minimal. But over the reaches of the intervening structure, the intermediate leadership not considered in Lippmann's conception, privilege and responsibility are in the aggregate very great. In times of crisis the fate of the system may turn on whether both privilege and responsibility are satisfactorily acknowledged, not alone, or even primarily, in the governmental segment, but also and especially at all those points in the intervening "private" sector where the price of position and privilege is acceptance of the responsibility for a sharp perception of consequences. One can here appropriately apply to the government as a whole what Learned Hand some years ago said of an independent judiciary: "a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; . . . a society where that spirit flourishes no court need save; . . . in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish."[13]

In events since World War II there is ample precedent for an anxious concern over the vitality of the elite structure in this country, specifically in that eruption recently so conspicuously associated with the name of the late Senator McCarthy. The word "associated" is used advisedly, for at its full flood this reactive movement was the creation, not so much of a single man, but of a society. Its parallels to what may lie ahead are frighteningly close. The movement was rooted in tensions that are deeply planted and its precipitating circumstances closely resembled the challenges to come: events at home and abroad that could not easily and comfortably be explained by established conceptions of reality, conceptions rooted in the worthy but dangerous assumption, not too much at variance with the history

[13] *The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand* (New York, 1952), p. 181.

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of this people, that all problems are soluble and that the solutions at which Americans arrive are inevitably superior. For the frustrations and miscarriages of American policy in the world this movement in effect offered the reassuring explanation that such failures were not the consequence of honest mistakes and circumstances beyond the control of the United States but were the result of treachery, especially from within the government. This view acquired a certain plausibility from events such as the Hiss affair, and it seemed to be confirmed by the disclosure, a few months after the McCarthy meteor first appeared over the horizon, that the Soviet Union had achieved an atomic explosion.

The McCarthy career itself illustrates the striking possibilities of the system for rapid shifts in the sources of initiative. In less than five years this man moved from the comparative obscurity of his native state, untrained in national affairs and untested by their complicated demands, to a position as one of the most important figures on the Washington scene. This sort of ascent was not unprecedented, and almost certainly it will happen again. It is to be expected unless we introduce alterations in the political scheme more sweeping than any that one can reasonably expect or that one should desire. For, if there are risks in an unstandardized, diversified system of recruitment to positions of influence such as ours, a system whose normal paths may be spectacularly shortened by the bold newcomer, there are also risks in a scheme of coöptation and long apprenticeship, the risks of a timid gerontocracy.

The immediate challenge of the McCarthy movement was not its explanations nor its inexperienced leadership, but its radical constitutional doctrines, colorfully summarized in the Senator's observation, dismissing criticisms of his methods, that "You don't wear a silk hat on a skunk hunt." The materials of the "silk hat", of course, were such things as the proposition that a man, responsible for his own actions, shall not be condemned until he has been found guilty by the orderly processes of the law and shall not be punished by the arbitrary action of any official, no matter how worthy his motives; and the "skunks" that were pursued in this sporting event were, for the most part, American citizens entitled by law to the presumption of innocence and to due process, rightful inheritors of the tradition, without which free government cannot exist, that opposition and dissent are not automatically to be regarded as equivalent to disloyalty.

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This was the challenge. The danger, however, lay less in the challenge than in the response, throughout the system but especially in that segment loosely referred to here as the intervening structure of elites. The response in that segment during the years 1950 through 1954 was not reassuring. Though the evidence is not beyond contradiction, it seems clear that among the elites the threat was not generally seen for what it was. Samuel A. Stouffer's researches indicate that, on the level of attitudes, "community leaders are more likely than the rank and file to give the sober second thought to the civil rights of the nonconformists," but it is still reasonable to conclude that "I do not approve of his methods, but . . ." was not only a familiar comment but in most cases also an operational code of elite behavior.[14]

There was, of course, active support of "McCarthyism" in some quarters, such as the leaders of some veterans organizations, of some para-religious groups, and even of some patriotic organizations whose purposes ostensibly dedicated them to constitutionalism. There was also support from individuals who were enjoying the material benefits of privilege without accepting its responsibilities. But more striking than these aspects of the response was, to put the matter in its best light, the slowness with which the elements of an unself-conscious elite mobilized in defense, even when the threat was accurately perceived. Four years may not ordinarily be a long time in the life of a people, but in a time of real crisis it may be just too long. In this instance it was very long. In fact, one may well question whether a significant mobilization of the elites ever took place. It is well to remember, as the Dean of one of our great law schools suggested in a recent address in which he called his profession to account for its inadequate public leadership, that these were days in which the organized bar of the United States "instead of setting an example of dedication to due process and providing guidance to the public as to the meaning of the Fifth Amendment was attempting to apply a severe sanction [disbarment] against the assertion by a member of the profession of his constitutional rights."[15]

[14] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1955), p. 57.

[15] Jefferson B. Fordham, *The Legal Profession and American Constitutionalism* (New York, 1957), p. 23.

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Small wonder that when Senator McCarthy was brought to book by his colleagues it was on the narrow ground of offense against the code regulating one Senator's conduct toward another rather than on the broader basis of disregarding constitutional limitations. Small wonder also that passage of the censure resolution was delayed until after the mid-term elections and that nearly a quarter of the Senators finally voting on the resolution opposed the action. Some Senators undoubtedly would not have given their assent under any conditions, but, in the absence of consensus among the nongovernmental elites on the nature of the challenge and the need for restraining action, it is astonishing that the Senate acted as vigorously as it did.

This kind of threat will come again, but it can never be more obvious than it was between 1950 and 1954. Precipitating events beyond our shores will perhaps be clearer and more insistent, but they will be no more easily understood than those that occurred in the five years after World War II. As they become more apparent, in fact, the danger increases that the response to frustration and anxiety will invite more strongly the threat of self-destruction.

Resistance to this threat cannot be expected from the mass of ordinary citizens, not because their "appetites and passions" are ungoverned by reason, and not because they are unattached to constitutional ideals when they know them to be threatened, but because the division of labor that exists in our political system does not locate among them the responsibility or even the opportunity directly to perceive the less obvious threats hidden in responses to events taking place in an unfriendly spot halfway around the world. The theory of the omnicompetent citizen, with which Lippmann frightened himself nearly forty years ago, is his theory. It is not essential to the system. Robert MacIver has paraphrased one version of this notion: "How could . . . [the democratic man] have an effective opinion about the situation in China today and about the sewers in Brooklyn tomorrow, and the next day about some deal with Yugoslavia, and so on without end? He gave it up. He was disillusioned about democracy. He could not live up to its demands." MacIver's reply cut the ground from under this complaint without insult to the ordinary citizen: "If any 'man in the street' holds these views about his democratic obligations it is quite proper that he be disillusionized. But not . . . about democracy. Only about his

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illusions about democracy. Representative democracy . . . does not put any such impossible strain on the citizen."[16]

Nor can we, even if we would, wait upon Mr. Lippmann's executive elite, guided by his public philosophy. Appearance of the executive authority he looks for would require changes in the whole political system of which no signs are evident. Indeed, if this is the only way to survival, as he seems to think, we are assuredly doomed. The public philosophy as he describes it would fit only a golden-age view of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; it is even more out of place in a secular and scientific age.

The system, if we omit the unpredictable consequences of violent upheaval, must be taken as it is and understood as it is, subject to gradual modification but not susceptible to rapid and major alteration; and it must be taken whole, not merely in its governmental features but in its reach throughout the entire society. Within that system, owing to pecularities of the governmental scheme proper, the challenge to political maturity and sophistication is peculiarly the lot of those in positions of privilege in the structure of elites intervening between the government as such and the ordinary citizen. The capacity of that structure to respond appropriately is the crucial matter. We can demand and with considerable assurance expect vision and initiative from within the governmental sector. But we cannot confidently expect to see these qualities of action governmentally unless they are supported from the ranks of the nongovernmental elites by a broad, consensual perception of the threats to the system that lie partially obscured in the responses to external events. Without that support the nation may survive, but the values embodied in its political system will be in constant jeopardy.

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[16] Robert M. MacIver, *The Ramparts We Guard* (New York, 1950), p. 27.

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WOODROW WILSON'S APPEALS TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE

BRITISH RADICAL INFLUENCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY

IT HAS long been apparent that there was a great deal in common between the ideals espoused by a number of liberals in Britain during the First World War and the program developed by Woodrow Wilson. Only recently, however, has it become possible to appreciate the degree to which some of these liberals succeeded in conveying their sympathy and support to Wilson and to which he, in turn, took account of their support and advice. Interchange of this kind, especially during the last months of American neutrality, seems to have given considerable encouragement to Wilson in his efforts to enlist foreign public opinion in his cause.

Wilson's practice of appealing to peoples "over the heads of their rulers" is an aspect of his diplomacy which has always attracted much attention. Perhaps the most noted instance was his ill-received plea to the Italians on the question of Fiume during the peace conference. This, however, was only one of the more striking incidents in a long series of efforts. The Fourteen Points themselves were an attempt to reach over the heads of government to the people of the enemy countries, of Bolshevik Russia and of the Allies also.

It is in no way surprising that Wilson should have had great faith in the peoples of the world and a rooted distrust of their governments. Such an attitude easily derived from the tradition of English and American liberalism which the President inherited in full measure. His own remarkable electoral successes in the face of entrenched political forces did nothing to sap his faith in public judgment. In the more specific field of foreign policy the examples of Fox, Cobden and Bright set precedents for resort to the good sense of the people as an antidote for the errors of governments. Moreover, the period in which Wilson rose to power was the heyday of liberal efforts to devise methods of democratic control of foreign policy so that the supposed wisdom of public opinion could exercise its due influence on international affairs.

There was thus every reason why Wilson should have had con-

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fidence in the capacity of the common people to form sound judgments on diplomatic issues. His Mexican policy rested to some extent on such a faith and in this connection it once occurred to him that he might present his policy to members of the British public in a manner calculated to make their government more coöperative.[1] What has been somewhat neglected is the extent to which specific incidents in Wilson's policy, and especially in his peace moves of 1916-1917, helped to crystallize this predisposition into a recurrent tactic of appealing to foreign peoples for support in driving toward a kind of peace settlement which their governments might otherwise refuse. It was in this process that certain sections of British liberal opinion played a noteworthy rôle.

One great reason for neglect of this British influence has been the fact that a large proportion of the relevant communications, especially during the important period of Wilson's mediation effort, passed through a single channel in the person of William H. Buckler, whose papers have only recently been made available.[2] Buckler, a half-brother to Henry White, was an American resident in England, who had been friendly with various prominent liberals while at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was a contemporary of Charles Trevelyan. He became attached to the United States Embassy in London as a special agent and, in 1916, Colonel House made arrangements for Buckler to send him regular reports on liberal and labor opinion and also to forward messages and copies of books and periodicals, some of them banned from foreign circulation by the British government. In this way the communications avoided the British censorship and also the passionately pro-British eyes of Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador.

This was important because it was a very special brand of liberal upon which House wished to be informed. The crisis of August 1914 had divided the Liberal party. A large section, including many of the leading members, had opposed participation in the war and rejected the arguments with which Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, justified a declara-

[1] Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era* (New York, 1954), p. 117, n. 25.

[2] The only fairly complete files of Buckler's papers were until recently still in his possession. They are now deposited with the House Collection in the Yale University Library.

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tion of war. But within a few days of the outbreak most of the party's press and parliamentary representatives reconciled themselves to belligerency. Some, indeed, were soon to be numbered among the leaders in depicting the war as a crusade against an exceptionally sinister German régime rather than as merely another phase in the history of European diplomacy.

There was, however, a small but eloquent section of the party who would not accept the new interpretation. This group, though not large, counted a remarkable number of distinguished names in its ranks, including Norman Angell, H. N. Brailsford, F. W. Hirst, editor of the *Economist,* J. A. Hobson, G. Lowes Dickinson, E. D. Morel and Bertrand Russell, together with several members of Parliament. Most of these had been associated with pre-war efforts to establish greater democratic control of foreign policy. Morel's *Morocco in Diplomacy* probably did more than any other single work to arouse suspicion of secret diplomacy, while Norman Angell's *Great Illusion* was an amazingly widely received attack on the common assumptions of European diplomacy.[3]

This group of dissentients acquired the name of radicals. They had many associates in the Labour party, notably Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden and Arthur Henderson. Between them they established the Union of Democratic Control as a focus for their activities. While they did not constitute a "Stop the War" movement, they developed the idea that there was blame on both sides of the contest and that the only satisfactory peace would therefore be a negotiated, not dictated, settlement of the issues in dispute. The first step toward such a settlement should be a general statement of war aims so that the points of difference could be clearly established. With pamphlets, meetings and such occasional parliamentary interventions as they could arrange, the radicals began an uphill campaign to create a favorable public attitude toward their proposals and to persuade their government to seize the first opportunity to begin negotiations.[4]

[3] E. D. Morel, *Morocco in Diplomacy* (London, 1912), reprinted as *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy* in 1915; Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (London, 1910). Hobson's *Imperialism* (London, 1902) was another pre-war work which enjoyed great success.

[4] For the radical movement in Britain see Laurence W. Martin, *Peace Without Victory* (New Haven, 1958), pp. 46-61; H. M. Swanwick, *Builders of Peace* (London, 1924); A. J. P. Taylor, *The Troublemakers* (London, 1957).

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To men set upon encouraging a negotiated peace the possibility of neutral mediation was always inviting, especially if the mediator were to be such a renowned progressive as Woodrow Wilson. From the very first, radicals made an effort to reach American opinion. Many radical journalists contributed to American periodicals, in particular to the *New Republic,* though they were increasingly hampered by British censorship. On their own side of the Atlantic, radicals spoke and wrote in defense of Wilson's policy.[5]

The radicals' first chance to establish reasonably direct communication with Wilson came when they aroused the interest of Colonel House during his first wartime visit to England at the beginning of 1915. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington, warned House against these compatriots of his, whom he termed "copperheads". But when House met some of them he felt that he had discovered "an entirely new kind of Englishman", and he confided to his diary that he found them "sane, reasonable, able men." He talked with Lord Loreburn, who had resigned from the government in 1914, and they went over the issues of the war. Loreburn's views, House concluded, "largely coincided with mine." On other occasions House talked with John Burns, the famous labor leader and member of Parliament, with F. W. Hirst, who was making the *Economist* increasingly critical of British policy, and with A. G. Gardiner, editor of the *Daily News,* which was wavering in its support of the government and was later to become an implacable enemy of Lloyd George. Hirst in particular assured House of the weight of opinion in Britain which would rally behind a peace move and expressed the hope that Wilson would take a stronger stand on foreign affairs with the idea of reestablishing the rule of international law. At the end of his visit House noted down his conclusion that these were the President's staunchest supporters in England.[6]

When House returned to England in January 1916 on the mission that was to result in the abortive House-Grey memorandum, he resumed his acquaintance with the radicals, although, aware of their unpopularity with the British government, he postponed his dealings with them until the memorandum had

[5] Martin, *op. cit.,* pp. 68-69, 114-15.

[6] "House Diary", i.e., typewritten diary of Colonel House, in House Collection, Feb. 9, 25, March 4, 7, 8, 1915.

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been completed. House was by no means wholly satisfied with the attitude of Grey and his colleagues and had a receptive ear for the misgivings of the radicals. Hirst took House back to see Loreburn again who "excoriated" Grey for his conduct at the beginning of the war and for his intransigence since then. Howard Whitehouse, a radical member of Parliament, visited House and urged that Wilson attempt mediation. House gathered "much information which I consider valuable" from Whitehouse and was particularly interested in his estimate that a mediation offer acceptable to Grey and A. J. Balfour, whom House counted among the more reasonable British leaders, would secure a parliamentary majority of over a hundred.[7] C. R. Buxton, another prominent radical, confirmed the opinion that there would be substantial popular support for a proposal for a moderate peace coming from any responsible quarter, belligerent or neutral. The pro-war press misrepresented the true state of public opinion, wrote Buxton, and he told House of the friendly reception he had received at a great many meetings in support of a negotiated peace. House responded that he agreed almost entirely with a pamphlet in which Buxton outlined the shape which such a peace might take.[8]

Gardiner also brought assurances of widespread good will toward Wilson. House briefed Gardiner for an article on Wilson's policy which was subsequently published as "Mr. Wilson's Policy and the Pact of Peace", in which form it met with strong approval from the President himself. In another effort to encourage favorable trends of opinion House urged Loreburn to attempt to counter unreasonable and extreme statements of war aims. House had tried to persuade Asquith and Grey to do this but he thought they might renege and therefore hoped his radical friends would also try.[9] This, of course, they were in fact constantly doing.

These exchanges doubtless occupied a larger place in the minds of the radicals, for whom they were the most promising avenue to an influence on policy, than in that of House, who was also

[7] "House Diary", Feb. 21, 22, 1916; partly in Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1926-28), II, 184-85, 192.

[8] C. R. Buxton to House, Feb. 19, March 2, 1916, House Coll. The pamphlet was probably *Terms of Peace* (London [?], 1915).

[9] "House Diary", Feb. 21, March 29, 1916; R. S. Baker to House, April 8, 1916, House Coll.

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engaged in negotiations with governments.[10] Nevertheless, after his visit to England in 1916, he was sufficiently impressed to set Buckler on his task of reporting radical opinion, and to pass more and more of it on to the President. The radicals offered evidence for two conclusions which Wilson even more than House was disposed to entertain seriously: that the British government and its allies were unreasonable in their aims and hostile to a moderate peace, and, secondly, that there nonetheless existed a large body of public opinion in Britain which would rally behind any strong lead which Wilson might give.

Despite somewhat optimistic exhortations from House during the crisis which followed the sinking of the *Sussex* in March 1916, Grey showed no eagerness to invoke the House-Grey memorandum and the agreement failed to yield the early fruit which the Colonel had hoped to harvest.[11] When Wilson again turned his mind to the possibility of ending the war, as he did with a new sense of urgency after the *Sussex* affair, he leaned toward methods of bringing public pressure to bear on the belligerent governments rather than another attempt to proceed by private arrangement. His famous speech to the League to Enforce Peace, on May 27, 1916, was the first of a series of efforts to enlist public opinion in the service of his purposes.[12] The President hoped to nudge the belligerents in the direction of negotiation by opening up a public debate on a program which it would be embarrassing for governments to oppose. "I cast the speech", he explained to House, "in a way that it would be hard for the Allies to reject, as well as for Germany."[13]

The British radicals gave Wilson direct assistance and encouragement in executing this strategy. Norman Angell, who had been in the United States for some time, lecturing, writing and advising House, heard of Wilson's intention and suggested that,

[10] It should be remembered, however, that most of the evidence available for these contacts is drawn from House's own comments and papers.

[11] Seymour, *Intimate Papers,* II, 175, 229-31.

[12] It may be noted here that William Jennings Bryan, Wilson's first Secretary of State, had toyed with a somewhat similar line of approach in the early months of the war. Bryan, *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan* (Philadelphia, 1925), pp. 389-92; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920* (Washington, 1938-40), I, 10-11.

[13] Wilson to House, May 29, 1916, House Coll.

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as a method of making it embarrassing for the Allied governments to reject his advance, the President should adopt a tactic employed by the Union of Democratic Control: that of quoting in his support the idealistic pronouncements which Allied statesmen had made at various times for their own ends. Angell sent Wilson a selection of such statements and Colonel House gave the President his own five-page draft of a speech embodying the extracts. Although the President did not employ any of the direct quotations, he adopted the general principle, and the influence of the material sent by Angell appeared most clearly when Wilson declared that "repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations." "Public right" was a term with which Asquith had made great play in some of the statements chosen by Angell from the early days of the war.[14]

The radicals received Wilson's speech enthusiastically. A special U.D.C. leaflet entitled *America and a Permanent Peace* hailed the President's declaration as one of the greatest events of the war. Radical and moderate Liberal papers gave the speech a hearty welcome.[15] Gardiner sent congratulations which House forwarded to Wilson. Noel Buxton, a Liberal member of Parliament then becoming more closely associated with the radicals, sent House a memorandum evaluating the British response to Wilson's speech and announcing his conversion to the idea of American mediation to secure a negotiated peace. A great part of the population was favorable to Wilson's ideas, said Buxton, and he cited the half million trade unionists affiliated with the U.D.C. as an example. If Wilson could do more to make his position understood, great bodies of opinion would certainly

[14] Angell to House, undated letter, "Tuesday" and May 19, 1916, House to Wilson, May 19, 21, 1916, House Coll. See folder of material used by Wilson, in the Woodrow Wilson Papers, File 2, Library of Congress. Wilson also drew his emphasis on the idea that America could no longer rely on isolation from world politics from several editorials written for the *New Republic* by Angell, especially that of May 20, 1916 and from an article in the same issue by James Bryce. See Wilson Papers and Angell, *After All* (London, 1951), p. 205; *New Republic*, Sept. 16, 1916.

[15] *Manchester Guardian*, May 29, 31, 1916; *Daily News*, May 29, 1916; *Nation*, June 3, 1916.

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emerge to give him open support. He urged that Wilson set about educating public opinion by speeches.[16]

But the comment of the government and its supporters was very chilly. Grey objected that a league could be founded only on a decisive defeat of Germany.[17] With questionable tact Walter Hines Page informed Wilson that the best British opinion assumed the President had aimed his words at the "gallery filled with peace cranks", and the Ambassador made it clear that he agreed with that judgment.[18]

Wilson had already been irritated by what he regarded as Page's hostility to liberal opinion and his subservience to the official British view. Just before his speech of May 27, Wilson had decided to recall Page temporarily to the United States to "get some American atmosphere into him."[19] But the visit was not a success and soon Wilson was on the verge of relieving the Ambassador of his post. By the end of 1916 the President no longer read most of Page's letters and what he did read irritated him.[20] Somewhat later Wilson told former President Taft that he had to "discount whatever Page says about the situation in Great Britain" and House confided to his diary that "we find it impossible to get information on the liberals from Page."[21] It is reasonable to believe that the low opinion Wilson and House formed of Page magnified the importance of the reports received from Buckler, which seemed by contrast to be the "real stuff" and, incidentally, more promising for the success of the President's policy.

By June 1916, then, Wilson and his adviser House had shown signs of some disillusionment with the British and Allied gov-

[16] Gardiner to House, June 15, Buxton to House, June 29, July 10, House to Wilson, June 16, July 3, 4, 1916, House Coll.

[17] Grey to House, May 29, 1916, Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (Garden City, 1927-39), VI, 225.

[18] Page to Wilson, May 30, 1916, Seymour, *Intimate Papers,* II, 302.

[19] Wilson to House, May 17, 1916, House Coll.

[20] "House Diary", Dec. 14, 1916.

[21] *Ibid.,* Dec. 12, 1917, Jan. 3, Feb. 22, 1918. An amusing example of lack of rapport between Wilson and Page is provided by a letter the Ambassador wrote on December 22, 1917, which must have arrived as Wilson was composing the Fourteen Points: "The cry continues here", wrote Page, "for some summary that the man in the street and the man in the trenches can understand. All this will pass with the New Year mood." Burton J. Hendrick, *Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page* (Garden City, 1922-26), III, 413.

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ernments[22] but they had also gained at least some impression that an active body of public opinion existed, at any rate in Britain, which would respond favorably and with effect to a declaration of the President's purposes. The British radicals had done a good deal to create this impression, which Wilson's faith in the soundness of public judgment disposed him to receive. Certainly it was to the peoples rather than to the governments of Europe that Wilson was soon to address his next, greatest and last effort to make peace as a neutral. So it was that on June 22, 1916, after he had received the responses to his speech of May 27, Wilson wrote to House: "it will be up to us to make an imperative suggestion, I mean a suggestion which they will have no choice but to heed, because the opinion of the non-official world and the desire of all peoples will be behind it."[23]

For the immediate future Wilson had to devote his attention to securing reëlection in November. The radicals made plain their support for Wilson and sent a series of congratulatory messages on his victory. House wrote to Gardiner: "You are one of the few who realize what it means."[24] Safe in office once more the President turned his full atttention to an effort to make peace, resting his hopes chiefly on the belief that there was "sufficient peace sentiment in the Allied countries to make them consent."[25]

By this time Wilson was receiving a steady stream of information and encouragement from the radicals to support his optimism. Most of this passed through Buckler's hands. As early as July, Wilson had received a letter from Loreburn promising cooperation whenever the President decided to make a move for peace.[26] A few days later House passed on Noel Buxton's account

[22] They were, of course, still more opposed to German policy. But after the *Sussex* settlement German-American relations did improve somewhat, thereby throwing into sharper relief the causes of friction between the United States and the Allies.

[23] Wilson to House, June 22, 1916, House Coll.

[24] House to Gardiner, Nov. 13, 1916, *ibid.*

[25] "House Diary", Nov. 14, 1916; Seymour, *Intimate Papers,* II, 391. At this time German diplomats were also strongly urging Wilson to mediate in the hope that they could get favorable terms without resort to the risky expedient of unrestricted U-boat war.

[26] House to Wilson, July 3, 1916, House Coll.

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of moderate elements in England and suggested that Page be replaced by someone more capable of encouraging this support. Following discussions with Buxton, House told Wilson that reactionaries were strong in Britain but that he believed the major part of public opinion would support a peace move if the President spelled out the nature of the settlement. "It may be necessary", House went on, "to arouse the latent feeling of the people in both England and France in such a way that they will compel their Governments to act."[27]

On August 19, Noel Buxton wrote recalling an earlier discussion as to whether a response could be built up to Wilson's speech of May 27 and whether Wilson should make a new peace move before November. House assured Buxton that this letter, with its account of public sentiment, "heartened us greatly. I read it to the President and he was pleased to know that 'there was a strong drift of opinion towards reasoned calculation' ". A further memorandum from Buxton on November 3, 1916, evoked a promise that Wilson would soon be "paying more attention to these things."[28] Throughout these months Buckler was sending his own regular reports. After the election the presence in America of Howard Whitehouse provided another channel for radical encouragement. "The most interesting caller", House noted on November 18, 1916, "was Mr. Whitehouse . . . he would like for the President to intervene." House sent Wilson a long account of their talk. "Whitehouse", he wrote, "is a pacifist, is perfectly reliable and is anxious for a move to be made for peace. He gave me as clear insight into the situation, I think, as it would be possible to get even if I were in England." The general tenor of Whitehouse's opinions was that although the war party might narrowly defeat those who supported an open American move for peace, it would soon be overthrown if it proved incapable of quickly winning a victorious peace. The next day House told Wilson of yet another memorandum by Buxton, adding that this represented an important body of British opinion. Wilson replied that the letter about Whitehouse and others "has given me a great deal to think about . . . corroborating in some degree the

[27] Buxton to House, June 29, July 10, House to Wilson, July 3, 5, 20, 1916, House Coll.

[28] Buxton to House, Aug. 19, Nov. 3, 20, House to Buxton, n.d. and Nov. 24, House to Wilson, Nov. 21, 1916, House Coll.

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impression I expressed to you, that this is very nearly the time, if not the time itself for our move for peace."[29]

In fact Wilson had now made up his mind to a move for peace which would rely upon the response of public opinion. As it turned out, the note that Wilson drafted not only appealed for support from the kind of opinion represented by the radicals, but paralleled radical thinking in its substance by taking the form of a request that the belligerents state their precise terms so that it could be seen exactly where differences remained. This had long before become the central theme of radical efforts to encourage a negotiated peace. In writing his message Wilson had taken particular note of an editorial in the *New Republic* of November 25, 1916, which stressed the desirability of discovering "the precise nature of the political objects" at stake in the war, an unmistakably radical sentiment. A copy of the editorial with this phrase underlined is still among Wilson's papers.

The first draft of Wilson's note proposed a conference or some other method of finding out what the various belligerents demanded in addition to a league of nations. When Wilson read the draft to House on November 27 and to Secretary of State Lansing a few days later, they both thought it somewhat bold. House suggested that perhaps more work should be put into preparing the background of opinion in both England and France.[30] The President did delay about three weeks in the hope that the Germans would cease some deportations from Belgium which were arousing a hostile reaction in America and the Allied countries. During this interim Lloyd George's accession to power at the head of a cabinet pledged to redouble the British war effort made it seem even more unlikely that Wilson would readily win a favorable reception from the Allied governments. House wrote to Wilson exclaiming that, with Lloyd George as prime minister, England would be under the reactionary régime that Whitehouse had prophesied.[31] This change of government may well have raised the hope of a favorable popular response to an even higher place in Wilson's calculations. House, still thinking of proceeding slowly, suggested that Whitehouse and his

[29] "House Diary", Nov. 18; House to Wilson, Nov. 20, 21, Wilson to House, Nov. 21, 1916, House Coll.

[30] Seymour, *Intimate Papers*, II, 393-95; Baker, *Life and Letters*, VI, 380-87. Wilson did not show House the final draft before its delivery.

[31] House to Wilson, Dec. 3, 6, 1916, House Coll.

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friends undertake the necessary preparation of British opinion and that Buckler be given the task of piloting the peace move in London, perhaps being called to America for briefing. Buckler, House reminded Wilson, was the one man in the London Embassy who "has not lost his bearings . . . he is friendly with Trevelyan, Massingham of the *Nation* and men of that kind."[32]

Meantime the radicals kept up their assurances that the time was ripe for action. Whitehouse sent Wilson several memoranda declaring the moment unusually favorable. On December 6, House wrote to Wilson that, when asked what should be done, Whitehouse suggested an open request that both sides state their terms: "The very thing you had in mind. . . . He thinks it would open up such a discussion in Parliament and in England that within a short time they would have to accept mediation." House told the President that he was persuading Whitehouse to return to England immediately to work on British opinion, adding, "I shall write to Lord Loreburn, Buxton and others like them, discreetly urging their cooperation."[33]

The Colonel also sent Wilson an assurance from Buxton that there was "a current of independent and reasoning opinion in this country" and a letter from Trevelyan which, House assured Buckler, "will be of especial interest to him at this time." Trevelyan told Wilson that many were "yearning for a great solution" and went on, earnestly: "However much you try to influence Prime Ministers and Chancellors, it is far more important that your great, sane policy should be heard and understood by the peoples." Buckler added his own observation that the radicals' prospects were "distinctly improving". "That was a most impressive letter from Mr. Trevelyan,—and a most interesting memorandum from Mr. Whitehouse", Wilson replied. "The time is near at hand for *something*."[34]

Wilson was not surprised by the cool reception accorded his note by the belligerent governments when it finally emerged on

[32] House to Buckler, Dec. 6, House to Wilson, Dec. 3, 4, 1916, House Coll.; *cf.* Gavit to Wilson, Dec. 2, 1916, Wilson Papers; Seymour, *Intimate Papers*, II, 397.

[33] Whitehouse to House, Dec. 5, 6, 7, House to Wilson, Dec. 4, 6, 7, 1916, House Coll.

[34] Buckler to House, Nov. 24, House to Buckler, Dec. 6, 1916, House Coll.; Trevelyan to Wilson, Nov. 23, House to Wilson, Dec. 6, 7, 1916, Wilson Papers; Wilson to House, Dec. 8, 1916, Baker, *Life and Letters*, VI, 395.

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December 18, 1916. He still hoped to make headway indirectly through the people. The radicals were indefatigable in their encouragement and in their efforts to win a favorable hearing for Wilson among their fellow countrymen. Whitehouse assured House that it would now be impossible to stifle peace talk and that the belligerent governments would be unable to carry on much longer. Buckler sent a copy of a petition to Lloyd George signed by over 200,000 supporters of negotiation. On December 29, 1916, Noel Buxton sent his impressions of the British state of mind and messages urging Wilson to continue his demand for terms. House also received a copy of a memorandum circulated to the Cabinet by Buxton, urging a respectful response to the President.[35] At House's invitation, Josiah Wedgwood, another radical member of Parliament then in America, supplied Wilson with an outline of a settlement and interested Wilson by insisting that only the President could lay down terms acceptable to the world.[36]

Buckler gave his opinion that the split in the Liberal party created by Lloyd George's advancement was widening under the impact of the peace moves. He predicted that the radical group would "be almost certain to gather strength like a snowball when peace once begins to crystallize and when the very large numbers of people who feel that to speak out their moderate sentiments would help the enemy become convinced that they can talk or vote frankly." There was no doubt, he affirmed, that the government knew peace sentiment was too strong to be taken lightly. On January 11, 1917, House assured Buckler that his reports and enclosures were reaching the President, who "is very much interested in all you send, for he appreciates as I do the good work you are doing. I hope you will continue to keep us informed." On a typical note of self-assurance the Colonel added: "Your viewpoint seems to be unprejudiced and quite similar to our own."[37]

[35] "House Diary", Dec. 28, 1916; Whitehouse to House, Jan. 12, 1917, Wilson Papers; Buxton to Buckler, Dec. 19, 25, 29, 1916, Jan. 4, 1917, Buckler to House, Dec. 16, 20, 1916, Jan. 5, 1917, House Coll.

[36] "House Diary", Dec. 28, 1916; House to Wilson, Dec. 27, 1916, Aug 4, 1917, House Coll.

[37] Buckler to House, Dec. 27, 30, 1916, House to Buckler, Jan. 11, 1917, House Coll.

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Thus encouraged, Wilson now proceeded to the climax and, as it turned out, the anticlimax of his campaign. He would provide a sketch of the principles of a just settlement round which liberal opinion might rally and thereby force the governments to make peace. "The President is not so much concerned about reaching the Governments," noted House, "as he is about reaching the people."[38] Wilson settled down to writing a speech which, while ostensibly a statement of conditions on which America would join a league, "actually would be a proposal of peace terms."[39] By January 11, 1917, he had completed his draft and called House into consultation. House brought letters from Buxton, Lord Bryce and Buckler. After hearing them read the President remarked meaningly that he did not intend to make any changes to satisfy Lansing's misgivings this time.[40]

President Wilson's famous "peace without victory" address to the Senate, as finally delivered on January 22, 1917, was first and foremost an appeal to peoples over the heads of their governments. To secure publicity he had had the full text cabled to London, Paris, Berlin and Petrograd several days earlier. The speech openly sought to mobilize peace hunger all over the world. Wilson claimed to speak for "liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty."[41] The radicals received Wilson's speech with the enthusiasm that was to be expected but in other quarters it was far from welcome. Members of the British government lost no time in rebuffing the overture. "What President Wilson is longing for," remarked Bonar Law tartly, "we are fighting for."[42] In point of fact the President's maneuver was doomed from the outset, for by the time he made his speech German U-boats were at sea with orders to resume unrestricted warfare on January 31, 1917.

[38] "House Diary", Jan. 11, 1917; David F. Houston, *Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913-1920* (Garden City, 1926), I, 226.

[39] "House Diary", Jan. 3, 1917.

[40] *Ibid.*, Jan. 11, 1917.

[41] Baker, *Life and Letters*, VI, 425; text, Baker and W. E. Dodd, eds., *Woodrow Wilson, The New Democracy: Presidential Messages, Addresses and Other Papers, 1913-17* (New York, 1926), II, 407-14.

[42] J. B. Scott, *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, Dec. 1916-Nov. 1918* (Washington, 1919), pp. 52-53.

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So ended the first full-fledged and on many counts the boldest of Wilson's efforts to use public opinion to bend governments to his will. The immediate result was disappointment but Wilson never regarded his attempt as a mistake. On the contrary, he repeatedly returned to both the method and the substance of his efforts during these weeks as a guide for future policy. In December 1917, for example, when struggling to bring the Allies to a joint endorsement of his program, it was not to his war message but to the "peace without victory" speech that he recurred for the essence of his principles.[43] As to method, the core of his diplomatic strategy against the Central Powers was a campaign to wean the peoples of the enemy countries away from their rulers. Nor did Wilson lose touch with the radicals: and each time this association entered a close phase it was in connection with some effort to use public opinion to win an advantage which he could not secure by conventional diplomacy alone.

During the early months of American war effort the President's efforts to mobilize the war potential of his country made many British radicals and their associates suspicious that he had shifted his ground and become infected by war fever. Brailsford, Buxton, Massingham and Whitehouse all told Buckler of their concern. Hobson wrote in the *Nation* of "An American Victory in 1920?" Trevelyan and MacDonald both gave Buckler long letters setting forth their views for House and the President. On May 29, 1917, the whole Executive Committee of the U.D.C. signed a long letter to Wilson. House hastened to allay these fears: "Do not let our liberal friends be fearful of the President's attitude", he wrote to Buckler. "You can assure them that when the time comes for action, they will find him on the right side."[44]

The radicals argued that if Wilson wished to weaken the enemy's resistance and thereby shorten the war, he must continue to expound the principles of a just peace and compel the Allies to endorse his position. Wilson was himself aware that the Allied governments did not share his views with regard to peace[45] and in the summer of 1917, with the peoples of the Central Powers showing signs of receptiveness to an appeal and those of Russia almost uncontrollably war-weary, Wilson decided to resume his

[43] Wilson to House, Dec. 1, 1917, Seymour, *Intimate Papers*, III, 279-85.

[44] House to Buckler, July 1, 1917, House Coll.

[45] See Wilson to House, July 21, Baker, *Life and Letters*, VII, 180-81.

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efforts to lead world opinion, taking advantage of the Pope's peace message issued on August 1, 1917, to reply with a fresh statement of American purposes. House had strongly advised this, assuring the President that "the Allies must succumb to your judgment" and that the enemy governments would be seriously embarrassed if Wilson made a speech "breathing a spirit of liberalism and justice that will make the people of the Central Powers feel safe in your hands."[46]

When House went to England as Wilson's representative in the autumn of 1917, he consulted radicals more intensively than ever before. With one voice they urged House to secure a joint statement of terms which would reinforce liberal opinion in the Allies, including Russia, and undermine the enemy.[47] But despite the added challenge of the Bolshevik peace offensive, House could not extract such a declaration from the inter-Allied conference and he returned to America convinced that the President should try to achieve the required effect by making a forthright declaration that would "knit together the best and most unselfish opinions in the world."[48] One of the reports of the Inquiry about this time also advised the President to "show the way to Liberals in Great Britain and France. . . . These Liberals will readily accept the leadership of the President if he undertakes a liberal diplomatic offensive. . . ."[49] Wilson was already disposed to do this and from his attempt emerged the Fourteen Points, an effort to win the allegiance of the peoples of the Central Powers, of Russia and of his allies as well.

Liberal opinion again loomed large in the President's mind in the summer of 1918 when the defeat of Ludendorff's offensive and the rising tide of Allied victory faced Wilson with the imminent task of making peace in association with governments which he suspected would raise strong opposition to the kind of settlement he desired. He believed that an appeal to liberal opinion would be one of his most powerful weapons in overcoming this resistance. In July he reportedly remarked: "I know that Europe is still governed by the same reactionary forces which

[46] Seymour, *Intimate Papers,* III, 317-19.

[47] "House Diary", Nov. 9-21, 1917.

[48] Seymour, *Intimate Papers,* III, 317-19.

[49] R. S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement* (New York, 1922), III, 33.

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controlled this country until a few years ago. But I am satisfied that if necessary I can reach the peoples of Europe over the head of their Rulers."[50] Consequently it was disturbing for Wilson to hear that while he had been concentrating upon repelling the German offensive he had again lost some of his grip on his old radical supporters, now joined by numerous recruits.

Reports of radical views still flowed in by way of House. Buckler had now fallen into the background as a source of information, chiefly because of opposition raised by Page. In August 1917, the American Ambassador, irritated by this informal channel of communication of views which he deplored, had required Buckler to stop sending his reports and not to tell House why he had done so. When Buckler had no choice but to tell the truth in response to House's prompt enquiries, the Colonel arranged for the reports to reach him circuitously by way of Henry White. This was an embarrassing ruse and in July 1918 House put an end to the reports.[51] He did not do so, however, before an alternative channel had been established. In February 1918, Ray Stannard Baker had been sent to take up the work. Ostensibly Baker represented the *New Republic* and New York *World,* but in reality his task was, as he wrote at the time, "to report fully for the information of the President and the State Department on the state of radical opinion and organization." His reports went to Frank Polk, Counselor of the State Department, who forwarded selections to Wilson and House.[52] Walter Lippmann, then in Europe, also provided several accounts of liberal opinion.

Baker relayed an anxious desire for the President to reassert his program. The "only group", wrote Baker, "which believes sincerely in the Wilson program is this labor and liberal group. . . . We ought never to let these liberal groups get away from us. Never was there such a need of constructive and idealistic leadership . . . the leadership must positively come from us—from Mr. Wilson." This estimate was confirmed by Lippmann, who re-

[50] Wilson to Cushing, July 5, 1918, Baker, *Life and Letters,* VIII, 253. See Wilson to Axson, June 30, 1918, *ibid.,* p. 241.

[51] House to Buckler, Sept. 28, Buckler to House, Oct. 19, Nov. 11, 1917, House to White, July 27, 1918, House Coll. See Buckler to White, Aug. 28, 1917, Henry White Papers, Library of Congress.

[52] "House Diary", Feb. 2, 22, 1918; R. S. Baker, *American Chronicle* (New York, 1945), pp. 306, 323, 342, 346.

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ported that "among the Liberals and Radicals from C. P. Scott down . . . there is a growing feeling that the leadership of the President has not been exercised sufficiently in the last few months." Lippmann strongly recommended that the President make one of his "great speeches" before the middle of October if he was to stop the rot.[53] On September 3, 1918, House sent some of these reports to Wilson with the comment: "Do you not think the time has come for you to try to commit the Allies to some of the things for which we are fighting?" When House visited Wilson on September 22 he found that the President had written a speech to serve the purpose.[54] This was the speech delivered on September 27, 1918, at a Liberty Loan drive in New York.

Wilson described his speech as an assurance to "plain workaday people". He had put in it, he said privately, "many things . . . which will doubtless displease the Imperialists of Great Britain, France and Italy."[55] The main burden of the message was to declare that there must be "no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just." In this way the President tried to translate the essence of "peace without victory", which had been his formula for a settlement arrived at by deadlock, into a prescription which would ensure a just peace through the self-restraint of the victors. In a thinly veiled attempt to force the Allies to justify their objections to his program in the forum of public opinion he invited their statesmen to speak out if they disagreed.[56] This was Wilson's last effort as a belligerent to mobilize public sentiment in Allied countries so as to impose his war aims on their governments. For, eight days later came Germany's request for armistice. But, as we know, Wilson was to continue to employ the tactic during the pre-armistice negotiations, at the peace conference and to the end of his career.

[53] Baker to House, Aug. 10, 19, Lippmann to House, Aug. 15, 21, 1918, House Coll. As early as May 28, 1918, Baker had reported: "Mr. Wilson must often blow upon the embers of liberalism and democracy here." Baker to Polk, Polk Collection, Yale Library.

[54] Seymour, *Intimate Papers*, IV, 64-68.

[55] Joseph Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him* (New York, 1921), pp. 301-2.

[56] Text: Baker and Dodd, eds., *Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace: Presidential Messages, Addresses and Public Papers, 1917-1924* (New York, 1927), I, 253-61.

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Though faith in the people did not necessarily dictate such a diplomatic method, it was a likely strategy for a man of Wilson's political creed and eloquence to adopt. Moreover his was an era in which new facilities for communication greatly expanded the possibilities of making such an appeal to the public. But in Wilson's case it seems reasonable to conclude that when, in the first half of 1916, he found himself unable to escape his dilemma by the customary devices of diplomacy, the British radicals played a substantial part in suggesting and giving plausibility to the attempt to rally foreign peoples in a way that would bring their governments to heel. As time went on and Wilson became a war leader, he received the adulation of millions to reinforce his confidence. Soon he was compelled to appeal to public opinion if only to counter the moves of rivals such as Lenin. But even in his later maneuvers the radicals seem to have provided an especially congenial sample of opinion, perhaps deceptively selective, which never failed to support the case for another public appeal.

Not, of course, that Wilson or House ever placed all their reliance on this tactic. They did not believe that liberal opinion could win the day alone. With his tough negotiations, threats of economic sanctions and of competitive naval building, Wilson did not hesitate to bring most of the conventional weapons of diplomacy to bear on recalcitrant governments.

But the radicals and other liberals, agreeing with the President's ideals, and many bearing names famed in the history of liberalism, provided Wilson with the kind of encouragement he was much disposed to expect. As America was about to enter the war, House had written to Buckler: "I wish you would tell Mr. Massingham, Noel Buxton, A. G. Gardiner and other friends like them, how much their support heartens us here. One cannot lose hope for the future when such men as these maintain their equilibrium under such trying conditions."[57] The radicals offered evidence of the continued existence of this kind of calm, reasonable man, faith in whom was one of the main inspirations for Wilson's optimistic foreign policy.

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[57] House to Buckler, Feb. 25, 1917, House Coll.

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FORMOSA AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS IN AMERICAN POLICY, 1950-1955

FORMOSA today is of world significance. It is indeed only an island of some 14,000 square miles—but the strategic importance of a region depends upon time and circumstances. Israel and Jordan are lesser areas; events that took place in the Hawaiian Islands (6,420 square miles) in December 1941 introduced Japan, a Great Power, to disaster. Existing American ties with Formosa materially affect our Asia policy as a whole, and developments centered in the Formosa Strait have the potentiality for influencing the future of all Asia—if not of the whole world.

Formosa's principal international relationship at present is in fact that with the United States. It was molded by clashing forces in the course of the years 1950-55, and hardened in that form.

By the 1943 Cairo Declaration the United States, United Kingdom and China announced their "purpose" that "all territories Japan has stolen from China, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic of China." General Douglas MacArthur's General Order No. 1 of August 15, 1945 directed that Japanese commanders on Formosa (among other places) should surrender to Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and thus introduced Chinese post-war *de facto* rule into the island. Defeated on the mainland by the Communists, the Chinese National Government removed to Formosa in December 1949. When Chiang Kai-shek formally resumed the powers of the presidency in March 1950, he announced his plan for recovery of the mainland: "the first year for preparation, counter-attack in the second year, mopping-up in the third year, completion in the fifth year." That victorious "fifth year" would have been 1955.

The original American idea of "letting the dust settle" in China before undertaking formulation of a new policy was dropped with the outbreak of the Korean War: President Truman's Executive Order of June 27, 1950 put the United States

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7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait to neutralize Formosa (always including the Pescadores) by interdicting hostile action by either party to the Chinese civil war. This was designed to be without prejudice to Formosa's legal position, the Order stating in passing that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the UN." In his press conference of August 31, 1950, President Truman stated further that when the fighting in Korea was over there would be no reason to maintain the 7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait.

But the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean War the following October, and on May 1, 1951 a United States military mission arrived in Formosa to help rehabilitate the Nationalist military establishment. Formosa became a link in our West Pacific "island defense chain", and an American military interest in the disposition of that Japanese territory struck root. The peace treaty signed at San Francisco in September 1951 took the island away from Japan, but passed title to no one. The Cairo Declaration's intent had not been fully implemented, and Formosa and the Pescadores were left without legal owner.[1]

The matter had an American domestic aspect. The Communist victory in China had been piled on top of a traumatic disillusionment regarding our sometime Soviet ally. Then came the frustrations of the Korean War, and the feverish excitement of the MacArthur hearing of May-June 1951. Foreign affairs figured prominently in American domestic politics between 1950 and 1952. When the Republicans gained the November 1952 elections they found among their winnings some foreign policy doctrines which had been corrupted by the excesses of the political hustings and would in that condition enter into statesmanship and high strategy.

In his New Year's message of January 1, 1953, Chiang Kai-shek announced that 1953 would be the last year of preparation for the counter offensive. A month later, on February 2, the Eisenhower Administration discarded the neutralization of Formosa and "unleashed" the Nationalists. The British Foreign Office,

[1] See British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden's exposition of the British position regarding the legal status of Formosa as set forth in his written reply of February 4, 1955 to a pertinent Labourite question, with his conclusion: "Formosa and the Pescadores are, . . . in the view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty of which is uncertain or undetermined."

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informed in advance of the proposed move, had promptly communicated to Washington its view that the new American policy would have "very unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages." That judgment was soon borne out in part. Although the United Nations forces were still fighting the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea, Chiang Kai-shek did not attack the China mainland: he limited himself to welcoming the de-neutralization of Formosa. But he also made a revealing remark: "our plan for fighting communism and regaining the mainland will necessarily form . . . an important link in the general plan of the free world to combat world-wide Communist aggression."[2] This clearly meant that the Nationalist strategy was to wait for World War III.

The new Administration considered instituting a military blockade of China,[3] but strong opposition from America's UN allies in the Korean fighting caused abandonment of that idea. There ensued instead only a fitful harassment of the China Coast and international shipping by the Nationalists.

In line with Chiang Kai-shek's strategy, nevertheless, a broader understanding of containment was being developed. On July 20, 1953, as the Korean truce neared, Chiang urged the negotiation of a West Pacific security pact, to include Formosa and all other countries bordering on China.[4] That call evoked a sympathetic echo in certain American circles. Senator William Knowland on September 15, from Saigon, summoned all Asians to fight communism, observing in passing that those who failed to cooperate in the fight would receive no American aid. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committe, Senator Alexander Wiley, promptly lent his voice to the undertaking by

[2] *New York Times,* Feb. 4, 1953.

[3] See Hanson Baldwin, "A Blockade of China? Pros and Cons Weighed", *ibid.,* Feb. 15, 1953.

[4] Interview with James Reston, *New York Times,* July 21, 1953. The project for binding East Asian countries together in an anti-Communist pact would persist, and take various forms. In 1954, the Nationalists envisaged a Northeastern Asian alliance of Formosa, Japan and South Korea; after signature of the American-Formosan treaty of alliance in December of that year, they thought of substituting the Philippines for Japan; in 1955 and 1956, a tripartite alliance of Formosa, South Korea and South Vietnam was being mooted. See, for pertinent reports, *Lien Ho Jih Pao* (New York), Dec. 3, Dec. 20, 1954; Oct. 20, Dec. 24, 1955; May 19, 1956. The project ever remained barren, for want of true community of interest.

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calling for a "third great pact" for the Far East, to parallel NATO and the Organization of American States.

The signature of a mutual security pact between the United States and the Seoul government on October 1 seemingly fitted into the new scheme of things. And when President Syngman Rhee of South Korea visited Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in November 1953, the joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit called on the free countries of Asia to form a united anti-Communist front, and on other "freedom-loving nations" to back them. The United States was patently regarded as the chief of the latter group.

There were propitious manifestations on the American side. The Republican Administration began publicly to give the idea of containment a changed military meaning when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on January 12, 1954 launched the doctrine of atomic "massive retaliation". Just two weeks later, on January 26, the nature of the new American policy for East Asia was indicated in a House Appropriations subcommittee hearing where the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, was the witness. There had been some discussion "off the record", and Congressman Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., was now questioning the witness:

> Mr. Coudert. Going back to your observation about China in answer to a question of Mr. Sikes, did I correctly understand you to say that the heart of the present policy toward China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-à-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown?
>
> Mr. Robertson. Yes, sir, that is my conception.
>
> Mr. Coudert. In other words, a cold war waged under the leadership of the United States, with constant threat of attack against Red China, led by Formosa and other far eastern groups and militarily supported by the United States?
>
> Mr. Robertson. Yes.

A few minutes later, the policy was summed up:

> Mr. Coudert. . . . Fundamentally does that not mean that the United States is undertaking to maintain for an indefinite period of years American dominance in the Far East?
>
> Mr. Robertson. Yes. Exactly.[5]

[5] *U. S. Congress. House Committee on Appropriations. Depts. of State, Justice & Commerce Appropriations for 1955, 83rd Cong. 2nd Sess.*, Dept. of State, USIA (Washington, 1954), pp. 125-27.

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Taipei was of course following Washington developments closely. Nationalist Premier Chen Cheng on January 30 spoke again in favor of the establishment of an anti-Communist alliance to a group of visiting newsmen. On March 18, the Taipei National Assembly bade the United States and other Pacific Powers form an anti-Communist alliance and help the Nationalists recover the China mainland.[6]

It was at this time that Secretary of State Dulles began his efforts to form an anti-Communist front in Southeast Asia, where the Indo-China War was still in progress. But now the "unfortunate political repercussions" forecast by Prime Minister Eden began to appear. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had spoken out sharply in the Indian Parliament on March 1 against both American military aid to Pakistan and the policy voiced by Robertson. He said that "The countries of Asia, and certainly India, do not accept this policy, and do not propose to be dominated by any country for whatever purpose."

India was not alone in this sentiment. The May 2 communiqué of the Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers, representing the five Colombo Powers, stated pointedly: "The Prime Ministers affirmed their faith in democracy and democratic institutions, and . . . declared their unshakeable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external Communist, anti-Communist, or other agencies." Asian "neutralism" was taking shape under the hammering of Washington's new Asia policy.

The Administration disregarded the warning signs—or ruled them out as inadmissible. The United States Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B. Carney, in a speech of May 27 said that the United States was "approaching the fork in the road," and he sketched the choice as being between a peace ending in "oblivion" and the hard but perhaps ultimately safer road of war. Foreign criticism of the apparent belligerency of American policy increased. Speaking at Los Angeles on June 11, Secretary Dulles took cognizance of the critics: "There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume or pretend that the attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war with Communist China. That is clearly false."

The Chinese Nationalists, however, were currently engaged in guerrilla warfare against the mainland, and their actions mud-

[6] *New York Times*, March 19, 1954.

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died the assumed clarity of the Secretary's proposition. After having previously seized two Polish ships and fired on various British ships bound for China, the Nationalist Navy (supplied by the United States) on June 23—within a fortnight of Dulles' speech—intercepted and seized the Soviet tanker *Tuapse,* bound for "Communist bandit" Shanghai in defiance of the Nationalists' "blockade".

There was also outright advocacy of war in some quarters. In a speech of July 28 to a joint session of the United States Congress, Syngman Rhee proposed war against China—and against the U.S.S.R. if need be. *Newsweek* also, in its August 4 issue, declared that some American strategists had long contemplated a preventive war against the Soviet Union, and that "there are still others who believe that the U. S. should face a showdown now, if not with Russia, then with Communist China."

This latter view was expounded without equivocation by former Ambassador William C. Bullitt who, writing in *Look* on August 24, held that the United States stood in "mortal peril" because of growing Communist strength. He set forth the preventive war policy in concrete terms. The "liberation" of China, he said, would so swing the balance of power against the U.S.S.R. that the latter would not dare employ its weapons of annihilation. He proposed that the United States government therefore organize an attack on China, using the Navy and Air Force but no American troops except those in Korea, "while assigning the great burden of the ground fighting to the [South] Koreans and the free Chinese. . . ." This formula was faithfully followed by the Chinese Nationalists in their subsequent political approaches to the problem: no United States *ground* forces would be required for their proposed recovery of the mainland.

SEATO, first conceived in March as disaster loomed for French military power in Indo-China, was formed in September 1954 in the face of Nehru's warning that the West's military alliances were bringing the Cold War to India's frontiers. Warlike displays were in fact increasing in the West Pacific area. On the Double Tenth Anniversary, October 10, Chiang Kai-shek told his troops that the battle for liberation of the mainland should begin within the foreseeable future. Major General William C. Chase, head of the United States Military Assistance Group on Formosa, was present at the same military review, and after its conclusion turned over to the Nationalists the first of hundreds

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of landing craft being built in Formosa and equipped with American engines.[7] *Landing* craft obviously could be intended only for offensive purposes.

The State Department on November 6 announced that the matter of a mutual security pact with Formosa had been under discussion for nearly a year (that is, inferentially, since shortly after the Korean armistice).[8] On December 2, 1954, the United States signed the projected alliance with the Nationalist régime on Formosa.

The treaty of alliance stipulated that, for the purposes of Articles II and V (providing measures for mutual defense), the territory of the Republic of China meant Formosa and the Pescadores. An exchange of notes of December 10, made public only later, provided further that

> In view of the obligations of the two parties under the said treaty and of the fact that the use of forces from either of these [Nationalist and American] areas by either of the parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement subject to action of an emergency nature which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.[9]

That the quarrel between Peking and Taipei still fell within the realm of civil war was recognized by both parties to the dispute. Premier Chou En-lai, speaking December 8 in the name of the Peking régime, said that "The liberation of Formosa and annihilation of the Chiang Kai-shek traitorous band is entirely within the province of Chinese sovereignty and domestic politics, and no foreign country will be permitted arrogantly to interfere." On December 10, addressing the UN Ad Hoc Political Committee, Nationalist UN delegate T. F. Tsiang gave the official Taipei view: "In the eyes of Chinese domestic law, the Chinese Communists are insurgents. My Government continues to combat insurgency." Chiang Kai-shek's New Year message of January 1, 1955 was framed in the conventional terminology, and stressed the need to increase efforts "speedily to annihilate Chu

[7] *New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1954.

[8] *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1954; see also *ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1954. Even before this, a Taipei report had purported that the United States had given satisfactory assurances regarding the defense of Formosa and—although there had been no public statement to the effect—moreover clearly would block any Communist attack on such Nationalist-occupied offshore islands as Quemoy, Tachen and Matsu by use of its naval and air forces deployed in the Formosa Strait. *Lien Ho Jih Pao*, Sept. 29, 1954.

[9] *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1955.

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[Teh] and Mao [Tse-tung], and to expel [from China] the Russian robbers." Neither side admitted any legal flaw in its respective claim to ownership of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Even in November, there had been military moves in the Formosa Strait area presaging fresh civil hostilities. It was almost inevitable, now, that some development in the Chinese civil war would soon or late automatically involve the United States—and the occasion came soon. The Chinese Communists on January 18, 1955 occupied the island of Yikiangshan with one quick blow, and turned to threaten the Tachens, 200 miles north of Formosa. On January 24, President Eisenhower told Congress that there was developing in the Formosa Strait a situation which "seriously imperils the peace and our security" and asked for authority "to engage in whatever operations may be required" for the defense of Formosa. The presumed danger centered on the offshore islands occupied by Nationalist garrisons—especially Matsu and Quemoy, and the Tachens.

The new treaty had not yet been ratified by the Senate, and its provisions would not in any event have extended to the offshore islands. Congress was nevertheless stampeded into passing almost unanimously a joint resolution effectively giving the President full authority to project American military action at his discretion to the China Coast and beyond, and President Eisenhower signed the resolution into law on January 29. Under American naval and air cover, the Tachens were evacuated by the Nationalists February 6-11; but Matsu and Quemoy, and other islands, were still held.

The National Government announced at the time that it had decided to strengthen the defenses of "important islands such as Quemoy, Matsu, etc." with the Tachen forces, that it "has consulted with the United States concerning the redeployment of the forces of the Tachen area," and that "the United States has indicated to the Government of the Republic of China its decision to join in the defense of such related positions and territories which are in its view essential to the defense of Taiwan [Formosa] and the Pescadores."[10] The Nationalist Defense Min-

[10] *New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1955. Chiang Kai-shek had garrisoned the Tachens, and built up the Quemoy and Matsu positions, after being "unleashed" in February 1953. See Doris Fleeson, *New York Post*, March 29, 1955. According to columnist Joseph Alsop, Chiang "made the commitment on the islands under severe American pressure. . . ." *New York Herald Tribune*, Sept. 7, 1958. *Cf.* "Washington Letter", *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 27, 1958.

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istry currently reported that 4,000 "guerrillas" were being redeployed to Matsu and Quemoy (intended, presumably, for use on the mainland).

The extent of the American commitment to defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands remained obscure. A newspaper columnist would report later from Taipei that Secretary of State Dulles had formally promised Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh on January 19 that the President would publicly guarantee Matsu and Quemoy.[11] Chiang Kai-shek himself stated on February 14 that it had been made "perfectly clear" that the United States would defend Matsu and Quemoy as vital to the defense of Formosa. The Administration refused to confirm that position and, speaking before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on February 16, Dulles asserted that "The United States has no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal islands as such. I repeat, as such."

The matter had in the meantime become one of world-wide concern. The UN Security Council, convened January 28 at the instance of New Zealand, on January 31 voted to take up the matter as "a situation threatening international peace and security." Under British initiative particularly, strong efforts were made in the UN to get a Nationalist withdrawal from the offshore islands and thereby to achieve a tacit cease-fire in the Formosa Strait, this to lead to a broader international guarantee for the security of Formosa pending final determination of its status. The United States refused to agree to that solution, holding out instead for a simple cease-fire—which would of course have left the Nationalists in undisturbed possession of the offshore islands then occupied by them.[12]

According to the chronology given by Dulles in a later interview that was to attract world-wide attention,[13] it was during this affair, "now identified as the Formosan crisis," that the

[11] Joseph Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, April 15, 1955. A Taipei report of about the same time stated that Chiang Kai-shek on the occasion of a *later* visit by Dulles to Formosa (see below) demanded that the United States publicly announce its joint defense of Quemoy and Matsu, and upon Dulles' refusal threatened to hand control of Formosa over to Chang Hsueh-liang (held prisoner since 1936). *Lien Ho Jih Pao*, April 11, 1955.

[12] Regarding this conflict of American and British policy, see the news dispatches of Drew Middleton and Elie Abel, *New York Times*, Feb. 9, Feb. 13, 1955, respectively.

[13] J. Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War", *Life*, Jan. 16, 1956.

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United States stood on the brink of war with China for the third time. In a CBS interview filmed February 25 and shown on the Edward R. Murrow "See It Now" TV program of March 1, Chiang Kai-shek informed Senator Margaret Chase Smith that it was his people's duty "to liberate the mainland by a counter-attack," for which he expected to receive "moral support, sympathy, material and logistical support"; however, he would not need "the help of the United States ground forces." By easy inference, he *would* require the participation of United States naval and air forces in his venture.

The United States Senate had approved the treaty of alliance with Formosa on February 9. In Taipei for the exchange of ratifications, Dulles said in a formal statement of March 3 that his current talk with Chiang Kai-shek had covered Matsu and Quemoy, that the United States government was weighing the situation to discover whether the Chinese Communist military activities in the Formosa area constituted in fact the first phase of an attack on Formosa itself, and that, if the United States were to proceed on the assumption that they did, "it cannot be assumed that the defense would be static and confined to Taiwan itself or that the aggressor would enjoy immunity with respect to the areas from which he stages his offensive."

The United States now stood at its closest approach to the brink of war. At a private dinner given for newsmen in Washington on March 24, Admiral Carney again spoke on his war theme, this time to leave the impression that war with China was expected about mid-April.[14] Speaking on April 11, Secretary Dulles said something reminiscent of Admiral Carney's speech of a year before: noting the destructiveness of modern warfare, he declared that "craven purchase of peace at the expense of principle" could destroy much of the human spirit. "Peace," said Dulles, "under certain conditions, could lead to a degradation of the human race and to subjecting human beings to a form of human degradation which obliterates the capacity for moral and intellectual judgment." The American nation, he said in conclusion, "stands like a rock for certain principles. . . ."[15]

[14] Carney later denied that this was his intent. *New York Times*, April 6, 1955.

[15] *New York Times*, April 12, 1955. In a speech of March 21 before the New York Advertising Club, Dulles had described the Chinese Communists as constituting "an acute and imminent threat," and compared the "aggressive fanaticism" of their leaders to that of Hitler.

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But the force of world opinion was now coming strongly into play. The British Commonwealth countries, and France, had backed away from the thesis expounded by Dulles at the February SEATO meeting in Bangkok that war in one sector of East Asia would automatically involve the entire front (that is, all of America's allies). On February 25, Prime Minister Nehru asserted that the offshore islands were "obviously" part of China and should be evacuated immediately by the Nationalists. Canadian Minister for External Affairs Lester Pearson observed on March 24 that a distinction should be made between Formosa and the offshore islands, and said that he did not consider any conflict over Quemoy and Matsu "to be a situation requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese Nationalist regime." *Times* columnist C. L. Sulzberger reported on March 25 from Tokyo that Premier Hatoyama had informed him that "The Japanese people don't want a war and particularly they don't want a war started over those islands." French Premier Edgar Faure stated on March 30 that "the great powers, which include France, have the absolute duty to intervene and do everything to avoid the risk of conflagration, local or world-wide."

An alarmed American public opinion was also making itself felt within the United States government. On March 2, reacting to Chiang Kai-shek's appearance in martial character on Murrow's TV program of the night before, President Eisenhower had stated bluntly that "The United States is not going to be a party to an aggressive war." On March 28, after the Carney episode, Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson significantly introduced the term "war party" into the Congressional debate. In a meeting with House leaders on March 30, the President took an even more categorical stand against "war talk". This third time, too, the American nation stopped short of plunging over the brink into war.[16]

In the United Nations, the matter was deadlocked by Peking's refusal to send a delegation to discuss a cease-fire unless it received the Security Council seat occupied by Taipei's representative, by Taipei's refusal to consider either a cease-fire or

[16] For summary accounts of the rise of American opposition to United States involvement in war over Matsu and Quemoy, see "Review of the Week" section, *New York Times*, April 3, and James Reston, *ibid.*, April 7, 1955.

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withdrawal from the offshore islands, and by the collateral American position on those same offshore islands. On April 19, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold spoke against further UN consideration of the matter for the time being, saying that he felt there were other activities which should first be permitted to run their course.

After mid-April 1955, the positions of Washington and Peking both crystallized. The Bandung Conference of twenty-nine nations, descending directly from the Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers of a year earlier, convened on April 18—about the time when, according to Admiral Carney's forecast, the hypothetical Sino-American War might have begun. From that Conference, on April 23, Chou En-lai proposed negotiations with the United States on "the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." In his March 3 statement from Taipei, Secretary Dulles had gone on record: "I have made it clear", he said, "that the U.S.A. will not enter into any negotiations dealing with the territories or rights of the Republic of China [the Nationalist régime] except in cooperation with the Republic of China." In announcing April 26 the United States government's decision to test the Communists' sincerity with respect to Chou's proposal, Dulles now attached a forbidding proviso: "In doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China."

In a speech of July 30, 1955 on foreign relations, Premier Chou made Peking's position clear. The tension in the Taiwan area had been caused, he said, by the American occupation of Taiwan and American interference with "liberation" of the offshore islands. He continued: "This is an international issue between China and the United States. The exercise by the Chinese people of their sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan is a matter of China's internal affairs. These two questions cannot be mixed up." In Washington's view, however, the two were one and the same question.

The projected Sino-American talks began at Geneva on August 1, but the two sides in effect talked on different agenda. The Chinese were concerned with a "relaxation of tensions" (which would come, they theorized, through a withdrawal of American armed forces from the Taiwan area); the Americans desired a "renunciation of the use of force" in that same area (which

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would have stabilized the *status quo* on both Formosa and the offshore islands).[17]

Senator Wayne Morse had warned on February 8 that other free nations would not support a West Pacific defense line extended beyond Formosa and the Pescadores to include Matsu and Quemoy. The results of the April Bandung Conference had reinforced that warning by pointing up an important change in Afro-Asian attitudes toward the West. The twenty-nine nations had adopted a set of ten principles that contained the essence of the Five Principles (built around the concept of "coexistence") evolved by Premiers Chou En-lai and Nehru the year before. The group's final communiqué had shown incontrovertibly that majority Asian thinking currently opposed the Occident's wars, atomic or cold, and favored an ever broader economic and cultural coöperation. This was a positive expression of a matured "Asian neutralism"—the antithesis of the declared American strategy of keeping China under constant threat of attack "led by Formosa and other far eastern groups and militarily supported by the United States." The American association with Formosa's hostility against China, and the joint American-Nationalist stand on the offshore islands in particular, commanded no significant Asian support.

Indian Ambassador V. K. Krishna Menon is reported to have told Dulles at a meeting in mid-October of 1955 that Peking had entered upon an unofficial cease-fire in the Formosa Strait in the belief that it would lead to a negotiated settlement of the Quemoy-Matsu problem, and to have warned the Secretary not to regard the cease-fire as permanent.[18] It had been reported that, at the March 1955 conference of American ambassadors at Baguio, General J. Lawton Collins and Admiral Raymond A. Spruance both deemed Matsu and Quemoy to be strategically valueless.[19] But the American position regarding the offshore islands hardened in the Nationalist mold. In a White House conference of the following March, Dulles, who had met with Nehru only a short time before, remarked that Nehru in discussion had urged withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu in order

[17] For official American statements setting forth the opposing positions in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks at this stage, see *New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1955, Jan. 22, 1956.

[18] "Random Notes from Washington", *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1955.

[19] C. L. Sulzberger, *ibid.*, April 9, 1955.

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to clear the way for solution of the whole Formosa problem, and reported:

> I made it clear the Nationalists are determined to retain those offshore positions, and that we support this policy. I further pointed out to Nehru that if the Chinese Communists will renounce the use of force in the Formosa area, a solution of this issue can be worked out. But they are refusing to do that, and until they do we are standing firm in our present policy.[20]

That unyielding American policy had to apply to conditions of rapid movement—and even great danger. Not only was the rest of Asia in motion, but the Chinese civil war remained in being, with an explosive potential. The Nationalists continued to harass the mainland with artillery fire and commando raids from the offshore islands, and with air sorties from Formosa.[21] Although the British Navy had finally intervened in early 1955 to stop Nationalist molestation of British merchant shipping, Quemoy and Matsu still functioned to blockade the ports of Amoy and Foochow respectively.

There were two minor shifts in the Nationalist viewpoint. Chen Cheng, now Vice President, speaking on a ceremonial occasion in September 1955, said that "The Government must counter-attack the mainland within two or three years. If it is still unable to counter-attack within this period, then there will never [more] be hope of counter-attacking." In his New Year's message for 1956, Chiang Kai-shek predicted that "a mighty revolution" would soon break out in China, and for the first time suggested that the Nationalist assault would be coördinated with such a domestic uprising. The basic Nationalist strategy, and with it the American policy, nevertheless remained predicated upon the disappearance of the Chinese Communist régime from the political scene.

Barring the highly improbable eventuality that some future revolutionary movement on the mainland would, with victory, welcome the return of the Nationalist régime to rule, the American-Nationalist allies were obviously in an unfavorable position.

[20] Robert S. Allen, *New York Post,* March 27, 1956. *Cf.* Dulles' comment of a few days later to the Canadian Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs. James Reston, *New York Times,* March 31, 1956.

[21] For official Nationalist scorings of annual achievements in military operations against the mainland, see for 1955 *New York Times,* Jan. 3, 1956; and for 1956, *ibid.,* Dec. 23, Dec. 28, 1956.

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The Nationalists were far too weak to engage the Communist armies in open warfare, and could only hope that the United States would fight the war on their behalf. The United States, for its part, had failed to discover other world support for a war over the offshore islands, and had become isolated from its major allies on this question—while remaining bound to them by vital commitments. The initiative, consequently, rested with the Chinese Communists and *their* ally—the Soviet Union.

In a contemporary magazine article, Canadian statesman Lester B. Pearson scanned the Cold War front and, remarking that there had still been no settlement of the dangerous situation in the Formosa Strait, said:

> No one seriously expects Chiang Kai-shek to return to the mainland. Yet if we seem to support his positions, especially on Quemoy and Matsu, a situation is perpetuated that could conceivably develop into a war. . . . Are any of us really willing to go to war to help repel an attack on these "offshore" islands? Have we merely painted ourselves into a corner here, without any obvious way out?[22]

The United States government had indeed painted itself into a corner. It would be found in that exposed position, in its original posture, when the Chinese Communists in due course made their next major move in that sector. It stands there still.

O. Edmund Clubb

New York, N. Y.

[22] "Are We Losing the Cold War?", *Look*, Jan. 10, 1956.

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MORE LIGHT ON THE ABROGATION OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

THE FOLLOWING article which attempts to interpret the British and Australasian attitudes toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its modification or abrogation on the expiration date of July 13, 1921, broadens and modifies considerably the previously accepted view of J. Bartlet Brebner, as expounded in the March 1935 issue of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, that the Canadian prime minister, Arthur Meighen, led the campaign for the abrogation of the agreement, that he urged an international conference on Pacific affairs, and that thereby the Dominion of Canada formulated a policy for the British Empire.

Resumé of the Alliance and Its Operation to 1921

On January 30, 1902, Great Britain abandoned her splendid isolation and entered into an alliance with Japan. While both Powers pledged themselves to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and to secure equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, Japan recognized the special interests of Great Britain in China, and Britain recognized those of Japan, political as well as industrial, in China and Korea. The treaty, which was to remain in force for at least five years,[1] was directed against a mutual enemy—Russia. The alliance was popular in both nations. Japan welcomed the prestige it afforded her; the treaty was "a sort of ticket of admission to the great international game."[2] England prized the Japanese commitment as security against Russia—if she should threaten British interests in China or India—or against Germany and Russia in the event those two Powers should turn on France in Europe and involve Great Britain.[3] The alliance was reframed during the Russo-Japanese

[1] G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (London, 1927), vol. II, ch. xi, final text, pp. 115-120. Hereafter cited as *British Documents*.

[2] Alfred L. P. Dennis, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (Berkeley, 1923), p. 65.

[3] Taraknath Das, *Foreign Policy in the Far East* (New York and Toronto, 1926), pp. 259, 261, quoting extracts from a memorandum of Sir Francis Bertie of the British Foreign Office, F. O. China 1501, March 11, 1901.

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peace negotiations and, as renewed for ten years, on August 12, 1905, included India in its scope.[4]

At the beginning of World War I, Sir Edward Grey, hoping to keep Japan out of Shantung and the Pacific islands, attempted to limit her belligerent actions to a naval campaign against German armed vessels in the China Seas, and to the protection of Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific;[5] but strategic requirements, military necessity, and Japan's eagerness to extend her field of operations to Shantung and to islands in the Pacific prevented the foreign secretary from achieving his aim.[6]

Throughout the war Japan proved a faithful and efficient ally. Her navy patrolled Australian waters and the Indian Ocean. Great Britain's fleet, having to guard the North Sea, the Atlantic, and, to a large extent, the Mediterranean, "was strained to the very last ship, new and old." It was impossible for that fleet, immense as it was, to guarantee safe passage for Pacific dominion forces. A real test for the alliance arose. Japanese battle cruisers convoyed or escorted 500,000 to 600,000 ANZAC forces and 1,000,000 Indian troops for protection against German cruisers still raiding the Pacific and Indian Oceans.[7] By a secret Anglo-Japanese accord of 1915 Great Britain recognized her ally's claim to the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands. At the height of the German submarine campaign of 1917 the British government approached Japan for a destroyer flotilla for operations in the Mediterranean. Japan agreed for a price, the compensation being pledges in a secret exchange of notes by which not only Great Britain but France, Italy and Russia engaged themselves to "support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference." At the same time the British understood that the Japanese

[4] For official material concerning the renewal of the alliance, see *British Documents,* IV, 120-183. Text of agreement, pp. 128-113.

[5] Memorandum of the British Chargé d'Affaires Barclay to the Secretary of State, Aug. 18, 1914, U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914,* Supplement, *The World War,* p. 171.

[6] For Japan's entrance into the war and her stated reasons, see Charles N. Spink, "Japan in the World War", *Pacific Historical Review,* vol. V (Dec. 1936), pp. 297-311.

[7] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, vol. CXLVI, col. 1710, Lloyd George speaking.

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government would "treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator."[8]

Japan emerged from the war in a position of entrenched hegemony in the Orient. With Germany eliminated and Russia demoted to a second place in the Far East, Japan took possession of all the former's holdings in Shantung as well as her islands north of the equator, gained predominant influence in Manchuria, and became more aggressive than either of her predecessors. The destruction of Tsarist Russia left Japan supreme on the shores of the Sea of Japan and in the waters of the North Pacific. The "Island Empire of the Pacific" was now one of the world's great Powers. British assistance was no longer needed for guaranteeing its integrity. Japan's danger was from militarism at home rather than from any combination of predatory nations.

At the Peace Conference in Paris, Australia's attitude toward Japan was a curious compound of apprehension and conciliation. Prime Minister William Hughes led the opposition to the Japanese request for a recognition of racial equality, fearing that it was a veiled demand for a revision of immigration legislation. He disapproved of Japan's mandate over the former German islands in the North Pacific, and ardently advocated Australia's claims, recognition of which would have required the invalidation of the 1915 and 1917 British agreements with Japan.

The political and territorial changes produced by the war altered the power balance and alignments. After the collapse of imperial Russia and Germany, Great Britain no longer needed help from Japan in maintaining the integrity of her empire. The threats to its stability were internal rather than external. In all the world there was but one Power—the United States—which could challenge Britain to combat with the remotest possibility of success. But war between these two English-speaking nations was unthinkable, considered outside the realm of possibility. Therefore, neither Japan nor Britain needed the protection of an alliance for defensive purposes. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty no longer served a vital British interest, yet the agreement threatened amicable relations not only between the United Kingdom and the United States but between the mother country and the Dominion of Canada which was in accord with the

[8] John V. A. MacMurray, comp. and ed., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921), II, 1168.

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United States attitude toward Japan. Moreover, the League of Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace was intended to supplant alliances and secret diplomacy as means of ensuring security. Consequently, Britain persuaded Japan to make a joint statement to the League of Nations concerning the treaty. On July 8, 1920, Foreign Minister Curzon and the Japanese Ambassador in London, Baron Chinda, signed and communicated to Geneva a note to the effect that their governments had come to "the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of July 13th, 1911 . . . though in harmony with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations," was "not entirely consistent with the letter of that Covenant." They accordingly informed the League that they recognized "the principle that if the said agreement be continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form not inconsistent with the Covenant."[9]

Dominion Views of the Alliance

Australia, New Zealand and Canada were directly concerned over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The tendency in Australasia was to regard the treaty as a protection against Japanese expansion in the South Pacific; even Japan understood that the agreement would not stand the stress of a vigorous immigration policy directed toward that area. Such an attempt by her would threaten to drive Australia and New Zealand, and perhaps even Canada, away from Great Britain as a partner of Japan. On the other hand, neither Australia nor New Zealand was anxious to contribute heavily to the maintenance of a military and naval force sufficient to protect her completely against a possible Japanese advance. True, a successful war by Japan against the United States would deal a serious blow to the safety of the Pacific dominions, but to antagonize Japan would be to expose Australasia to the revival of the immigration question and would thus make imperative large expenditures for the military and naval defense of the "White Australia" program. Consequently, the better policy from the point of view of these two dominions was, on the one hand, to support the renewal of the alliance in such fashion as to avoid friction with the United States, and, on the other hand, to prevent the race question from rising in an awkward or provocative way. Thus the renewed

[9] Bell to Secretary of State, July 26, 1920, USDS, *Foreign Relations, 1920*, II, 685-686.

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treaty might become a sort of insurance or guarantee against war in the Pacific. If it were not renewed, the Pacific dominions would ask those responsible for its abrogation what guarantee could be offered as a substitute for the alliance.[10]

Prime Minister William Hughes of Australia favored the continuance of the alliance with such modifications as would make it acceptable to Great Britain, to the United States and to his country. After World War I, the Commonwealth, resentful of "White Australia's" dependence on Japan, had welcomed President Woodrow Wilson's naval program as a balance-of-power device in the Pacific. When the post-war fall in commodity prices nearly ruined Australia, at the same time that Britain's economic distress afforded no relief from the depression and indebtedness, and the Singapore naval base did not materialize, Australia felt that she could not depend on Great Britain to win in a naval race in the Pacific. Only two potential allies were available, the United States and Japan. Remembering how the Japanese government had aided the empire's cause during the war, and aware of the withdrawal of the United States from participation in plans for world security, the Pacific Commonwealth elected to stand by the alliance.

The reason for Australia's action was certainly not a desire to assist Japanese expansion in the Pacific, but the sure knowledge that the treaty was her safeguard if or when Japan and the United States sprang at each other's throats. Otherwise, the first rush of the Oriental onset, taking the Philippines and Guam in its stride, would fall on Australia. The United States was far away and American battleships, for strategic reasons, would be almost powerless to help at the beginning.

Hughes outlined his policy and enunciated Australia's position regarding the alliance in a speech delivered in the House of Representatives on April 7, 1921, which contained the following:

> What is the hope of the world? As I see it, it is an alliance, an understanding, call it what you will, between the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples. Now here is our dilemma. Our interest lies in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Yet that Treaty is anathema to the Americans. We read almost every day of disturbing rumors of great navies, the world longing for peace resounds with the clanging of hammers, nations fervently building more and more war ships, and there is rivalry openly expressed between those two great nations, the United States of America and

[10] *Cf.* Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

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> Japan. America has said she must have the greatest navy in the world; that she must have a navy sufficiently strong to defend herself. To defend herself against whom? She has left the world in no doubt, or in very little, as to whom on this point. All these things concern and disturb us greatly. For we not only have no quarrel with America, but we have no quarrel with Japan. We have our ideals; Japan has hers. There is room in the world for both of us. We want to live on terms of amity with all the nations of the earth. . . . I am in favour of renewing the Treaty in any form that is satisfactory to Britain, America, and ourselves.[11]

In an interview with a *Times* correspondent on May 25, 1921, Premier William F. Massey of New Zealand said:

> As to the Japanese Treaty, so long as we insist on, and maintain, our right to choose our fellow-citizens in this country we have much to gain, and nothing to lose by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. The Japanese were perfectly loyal to us during the war. When we were sending away our main body of the Expeditionary Force the presence of the big Japanese cruiser with the British cruiser made their going, as far as the sea voyage was concerned, perfectly safe. We owe them a debt of gratitude, and it is well to remember this fact, and to endeavour to repay them when opportunity offers.

The prime minister's view was that

> . . . so far at least as New Zealand is concerned, the old dread of yellow immigration, though still as real and deep-seated as ever, is for the present rather latent than active. Though the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance raises issues of the profoundest possible concern to Australasia, it can not be said that the people of New Zealand are at all seriously exercised about it. . . . New Zealand has no objection whatever to the renewal of the Japanese treaty in its present form, nor is she in the least excited by the alleged endeavours of Japan to remove the bar against Asiatic immigration into Australasia. And the reason is that she is fully satisfied that they will not succeed.[12]

The position of the dominion had been ably and succinctly stated by her high commissioner, Sir James Allen, in a single sentence: "New Zealand has no quarrel with or fear of Japan, and views the Treaty as an ample safeguard of her good faith."[13]

[11] Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Represenatives, vol. XCIV, p. 7267. *Cf. ibid.*, vol. CXVII, p. 11635; *The Times* (London), Supplement, Empire Number, May 24, 1921.

[12] *The Times*, May 27, 1921.

[13] *Ibid.*

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The press of Canada generally came out against renewal, the outstanding exception to general disapproval of the treaty being the *Montreal Star,* an ultraconservative paper.[14] British Columbia, a province facing the Pacific, was inclined to favor renewal of the alliance if Canada specifically retained control of immigration. As early as December 28, 1920, the *Toronto Globe* expressed its opposition to the treaty. An editorial of that date emphasized that neither Japan nor Britain needed the protection of an alliance for defensive purposes. That should be sufficient reason for ending it. Under the circumstances the *Globe* believed

> the interests of world-peace would be advanced by the cancellation of the alliance between Britain and Japan. There could be no doubt then as to the intention of the Britannic peoples throughout the world to preserve absolute neutrality in the remote but possible event of the friction between Japan and the United States leading eventually to hostilities. Canada assuredly—treaty or no treaty—would feel under no obligation to come to the help of Japan against the United States and so open her own borders to invasion and to all the horrors of modern war. The statesmen of the British Empire who are engaged in the work of safeguarding Britain's interest in the Far East doubtless understand that Canada can be no party to any international agreement which involves even remotely a risk so great.[15]

The Alliance and the Conference of Prime Ministers, 1921

In June 1921, an Imperial Conference of all the prime ministers of the British Empire convened in London. Of the three principal topics discussed therein—foreign policy, imperial defense, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty—the commitments under the alliance were considered the most pressing by Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The ministers were concerned with evolving a policy of peace for the Pacific. The discussion of tranquillity and security in that ocean centered on the alliance and a limitation of naval armaments in the area. The conference had been forewarned that the treaty would come to an end on July 13, 1921, on the ground that the Anglo-Japanese memorandum of July 8, 1920, addressed to the League of Nations,

[14] J. Bartlet Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. L (March 1935), pp. 49-50.

[15] *Toronto Globe,* Dec. 28, 1920.

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concerning the alliance's incompatibility with the League Covenant amounted to a denunciation. The three months' extension requested by the British government was intended to afford the conference an opportunity of considering the question of renewal; but the assumption on June 20, the first day of the conference, was that in three weeks the alliance would expire if the prime ministers did not arrange for its renewal.[16]

The notification was regarded by British legal experts as constituting a denunciation of the treaty as provided in clause 6, which stipulated that twelve months' notice should be given for termination. The question before the conference when it turned to the discussion of the treaty was whether it should be renewed in a form consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations or be allowed to lapse.

In his opening speech before the conference, Prime Minister David Lloyd George referred briefly "to one of the most urgent and important of foreign questions—the relations of the Empire with the United States and Japan," and asserted:

> there is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to maintain peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competition of armaments than in the Pacific and in the Far East. Our Alliance with Japan has been a valuable factor in that direction in the past. We have found Japan a faithful Ally, who rendered us valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need. . . . We desire to preserve that well-tried friendship which has stood us both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions in the Far East, where Japan has special interests, and where we ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the open door.[17]

The British cabinet, including Foreign Secretary Curzon, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, and Arthur J. Balfour, representative for League of Nations Affairs, publicly favored renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In the second meeting of the conference, June 21, Prime Minister Hughes delivered his first speech, in which he took occasion to set forth the attitude of Australia toward the Anglo-

[16] Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Representatives, vol. XCVII, p. 11635. *Cf. The Times*, July 26, 1921, p. 10.

[17] Great Britain, House of Commons, *Sessional Papers*, 1921, vol. XIV, Cmd. 1474, *Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India held in June, July and August, 1921*, p. 13. Hereafter cited as *Conference of Prime Ministers*.

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Japanese Alliance. He pointed out, "we have not a clean slate before us. If we had to consider for the first time whether we should have a treaty with Japan, the position might be very different. We have not." The treaty, though modified, had been in existence for many years. It could not be renewed precisely in its present form, for it must conform to the requirements of the League of Nations. "But the case for renewal is very strong, if not indeed overwhelming. To Australia . . . this treaty with Japan has special significance." Hughes continued:

> Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal. But there are certain difficulties which must be faced. One of these arises out of the attitude of America towards this Treaty. I am sure I state the opinion of Australia when I say the people have a very warm corner in their hearts for America. They see in America today what they themselves hope to be in the future. We have a country very similar in extent and resources, and it may be laid down as a *sine qua non* that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United States of America. It ought to do this specifically, but if not specifically then by implication so clear and unmistakable that he who runs may read. It is perfectly true that the present Treaty does this by implication, but not so plainly as to preclude misinterpretation. In any future Treaty we must guard against even the suspicion of hostility or unfriendliness to the United States.[18]

The Australian prime minister suggested a conference to include the United States and Japan.[19] He indicated that disarmament was related to the renewal or nonrenewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but stated,

> in any case we must have such naval defense as is necessary for our security. The War and the Panama Canal have shifted the world's stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the future is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters. Peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world.[20]

William Massey considered the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as one of the most important subjects on the agenda of the conference. With whatever modifications might be necessary, he was quite prepared to support its renewal. In saying this he was guided by Japan's coöperation during the war, when the Pacific and Indian Oceans were not safe, and at a time when there were twenty-eight

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

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or more Australian and New Zealand ships in the latter ocean carrying twenty-eight thousand troops. Massey observed:

> But supposing Japan had been on the enemy side, one result would have been quite certain, that neither Australia nor New Zealand would have been able to send troops to the front, neither could we have sent food or equipment—equipment for the soldiers and sailors or food for the civil population of Britain. It would not have been possible. These things have all to be remembered in connexion with the renewal of the Treaty. I am prepared to take the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any wrong impression on that point.[21]

The prime minister, however, made clear that his support of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty did "not in the very slightest affect the fact that in New Zealand we stand by our right to choose our future fellow-citizens."[22]

Thus Massey's views were similar to those of Hughes, his *alter ego,* with whom he generally agreed. But behind the scenes before the conference convened, Sir John Findlay, a distinguished New Zealander who, with Sir John Ward, had represented the dominion at the Imperial Conference of 1911 and had again returned to London on February 6, 1921, took a radically different position. The visitor had made a special study of the problems of imperial policy in the Pacific Ocean and was experienced in framing the legislation of the young country. During the premiership of Richard Seddon there was scarcely an important act placed on the statute books which was not drafted by Findlay, who, though not a member of the government, was treated by Mr. Seddon as an unofficial counselor. After the premier's death, Sir John was not only appointed attorney general and minister of justice, but was also made leader of the Legislative Council, or upper chamber of the New Zealand legislature. According to the *Times:*

> Whether in or out of office, Sir John Findlay, the leading K. C. in the Dominion, has been the *deus ex machina* whose intervention has often turned the course of events into new channels, sometimes with far reaching consequences not only for New Zealand, but for the Empire. He it was, for instance, who inspired the dramatic offer of a Dreadnought from the Dominion to the Imperial Government in 1912, at the time of the trouble with Germany over the Agadir incident in Morocco.[23]

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 31. [22] *Ibid.*
[23] *The Times,* Feb. 7, 1921.

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Findlay remained true to form in London. In an article of February 10, 1921, which was in reality an interview, he was reported to have asserted that

> New Zealand and Australia, while appreciating Japan's assistance in the war, have resolved to remain white men's countries. They had prepared plans for a big scheme, firstly of Imperial, and secondly of European immigration, barring Germans and Russians. The scheme will presently be launched. They object emphatically to a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which is unjustified, since the German and Russian menaces have been removed, and America is ready to make common cause in the event of a Japanese peril. The question must be properly thrashed out at the coming Imperial Conference.[24]

Thus William Massey and Sir John Findlay were in open disagreement over the alliance before the conference assembled. The premier in his May 26 interview stated that neither the original nor the amended statements made by Findlay on February 10 and 24 on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty "really fit the facts."[25]

According to an article in the October 6, 1921 issue of the *Daily Express*,[26] Findlay came to London to acquaint the British government with the position of the New Zealand people. The attorney general informed the writer of the article that just prior to the Imperial Conference "the feeling in New Zealand was so strong against the Anglo-Japanese treaty that unless England showed herself as determined to resist all Japanese demands, the people of New Zealand were in favor of separating themselves from the British Empire and asking the United States to assume a protectorate." He added: "This will not be printed in the British newspapers and it will not be liked by the British government, but that is the way we feel."[27]

However, the prime ministers of Australia and Canada respec-

[24] *Wellington Evening Post,* Feb. 25, 1921.

[25] *The Times,* May 27, 1921.

[26] The *Daily Express,* London, owing to Lord Beaverbrook's close personal relations with Lloyd George, might be credited with having access to some authentic information on important political proceedings.

[27] Enclosure in confidential letter of N. C. Twining, naval attaché to the American Embassy in London, to the Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 12, 1921, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, RG 45, Office of Naval Intelligence File, Register no. 14865-A, Subject File 1911-1927, OY Limitation of Armament Conference, declassified Feb. 1948, Navy Dept., Archives of the United States. Hereafter cited as Naval Intelligence File.

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tively led the fight in the conference for and against the retention of the alliance. On June 29 the Canadian minister expressed his government's opposition to the renewal of the treaty in any form on the grounds that the reason for its existence had expired, that such entanglements were incompatible with the League of Nations' principles, and that both the United States and China regarded the alliance with mistrust as implying benevolent neutrality toward Japanese aggression. The preceding February Arthur Meighen had urged Lloyd George to invite the United States, Japan, China, and the empire to a conference on Pacific affairs to settle outstanding issues. Canada feared her own involvement in an American-Japanese conflict which was contrary to the basic principle of her foreign policy—maintenance of the best possible relations between Great Britain and the United States. Therefore Meighen resisted the renewal of the alliance for he feared it threatened amicable Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations, upon both of which Canada depended for her security. He reminded the delegates that good Anglo-American relations were the cornerstone of British policy and the hope of the world.[28] The Canadian people half-consciously shared their minister's feelings, and a majority of the press believed he expressed the opinion of his countrymen.[29]

William Hughes's retort to Meighen that "The British Empire must have a reliable friend in the Pacific" set off a series of sharp exchanges. Lloyd George sensing the fervor of the two ministers and their unyielding positions calmed the tense atmosphere by declaring that the July 8, 1920 joint Anglo-Japanese note to the League of Nations did not constitute a valid denunciation of the treaty, which, therefore, would continue in force until it was really denounced. This was the prediction that had been made

[28] Brebner, *loc. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

[29] *Cf. The Times,* May 24, 1921, Supplement, Empire Number, p. vi, "Canada and the U. S. A.—Ideals in Common". *New York Times,* Nov. 9, 1921, p. 13, Nov. 11, p. 12. However, in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times,* signed "Canuck", Trochu, Alberta, Dec. 8, 1921, the view was expressed that Meighen did not speak for Canada nor have a mandate from the Canadian people to act on their behalf, that he not only played to the gallery and to the United States in denouncing the treaty, but also created a false impression abroad to the effect that the dominions were so slightly joined to the mother country that anything advocated by them which ran counter to England's wishes would result in their breaking away altogether and setting themselves up as independent states on the idea of self-determination of small nations. *New York Times,* Dec. 25, 1921, VII, 10:5.

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over a year earlier by the *Peking and Tientsin Times* which had carried on a consistent campaign against the continuance of the alliance and had declared that the treaty would not be renewed in July 1921, but that a *laissez faire* policy would be adopted.[30]

By July 1 the Canadian minister had convinced Jan Smuts, Curzon and Lloyd George of the importance of taking a chance on American willingness to collaborate on a Pacific agreement. The Marquess Curzon then surprised the conference by outlining a procedure for a Pacific conference which would include the United States as a party to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as proposed by Arthur Meighen. This action, according to J. Bartlet Brebner, represented the first notable occasion of a British dominion formulating a policy of the empire.[31]

The proposal was now put to the test. Tokyo was noncommittal;[32] Washington expressed disapproval of the treaty's renewal but interest in an agreement on Pacific affairs. As early as August 1914 the United States had discreetly sounded the attitude of the belligerents upon the question of maintenance of the *status quo* in the Far East and throughout the Pacific generally. Great Britain then found such a suggestion impractical for she had already launched operations against Germany in the Pacific.[33] Historically, the United States took no exception to the alliance and only after the World War was it seriously regarded in Washington as constituting a potential danger to the country. The United States government, however, made no authoritative declaration in regard to the treaty. American distrust of the alliance centered on its relation to Japanese imperialism on the continent of Asia rather than on the possibility that it might involve England in a war with the United States. The State Department looked upon the treaty as a political instrument harmful to its policies in Eastern Asia.[34]

[30] *Peking and Tientsin Times*, June 24, 1920; Dennis, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[31] Brebner, *loc. cit.*, p. 56.

[32] For Japanese opinion toward the renewal of the alliance, see Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-68, 91-93; A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), pp. 278, 288, 298; *The Times*, July 26, 1921, p. 10, "The Pacific—Plain Words from Japan", and Aug. 16, p. 8, "Japan Doubts—Public Dislike of Conference".

[33] USDS, *Foreign Relations, 1914*, Supplement, pp. 162, 165-166.

[34] For the attitude of the United States toward the treaty and its renewal, see Griswold, *op. cit.*, pp. 275 *et seq.*, and *The Times*, Sept. 16, 1921, p. 8.

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During the course of the Imperial Conference, on July 21, Mr. Hughes addressed the American Luncheon Club, and among other things said that "unless, and until, the Pacific problem is settled, it is obvious that the prospect of the great naval powers coming to an agreement on a practicable scheme is remote." Therefore, he advocated a preliminary conference or meeting to discuss Pacific questions at which Australia and New Zealand should be represented.[35]

The prime ministers at London neither renewed nor abrogated the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but the proposal to hold a Pacific conference received their unanimous support and was considered at great length. On July 11, Lord Curzon suggested that a preliminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs be held in London during the first part of August. The American Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, objected because China, Japan and the United States could not make suitable preparations by that time, and he felt that postponement of the conference on the limitation of armaments would create an unfavorable American public reaction.[36] The Conference of Prime Ministers closed on August 5 and six days later President Warren G. Harding issued formal invitations to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament and Far Eastern Affairs to convene at Washington on November 1, 1921. Secretary Hughes remained adamant on the question of a preliminary meeting—even one at Bar Harbor, Maine—to prepare the agenda on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs, not because he was unwilling to consult with the dominion premiers, but because in his solicitude for the success of the conference he did not wish to have freedom of discussion limited by any preliminary deliberations on the part of a particular group.[37]

Prime Minister Hughes, after returning home, reviewed Australia's position before and at the Conference of Prime Ministers in a lengthy speech delivered to the House of Representatives on September 30. He warned: "If we cannot secure a satisfactory Treaty, then it is obvious that any adequate scheme of naval defence will involve us in much greater expenditure, and at a

[35] Australia, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. XCVII, p. 11639.

[36] Secretary Hughes to Ambassador Harvey, July 13, 1921, USDS, *Foreign Relations, 1921*, I, 28-29.

[37] Harvey to Hughes, July 27, 1921, in *ibid.*, pp. 46-47; Merze Tate, *The United States and Armaments* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 125. See pp. 122-126 on the genesis of the Washington Conference.

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time when our resources are strained to the uttermost."[38] The prime minister was for an immediate declaration of intention to renew the alliance upon terms that would at once be compatible with the League of Nations Covenant, which would give the United States ample opportunity to be consulted officially, and which would "exclude specifically, and in set terms, the possibility of our being ranged in hostile array against America by virtue of that Treaty." That was his position, and he ventured "to say that a further postponement will, and can, place us in no better position than we are today."[39]

Meanwhile, on August 18, Lloyd George reported to the House of Commons on the Conference of Prime Ministers. Referring to the Japanese treaty he said: "The Alliance is an existing Alliance, and until 12 months' notice is given that Alliance continues." He reviewed the operation of the agreement during the war and asserted that no man could "come to any other conclusion than that it was loyally and faithfully interpreted and carried out by our Japanese Allies."[40] Then he asked:

> Is it to be suggested that we should now turn round and say to them, "You stood by us in trouble, but we do not need you any longer, so goodbye"? Would anyone behave like that in business? The British Empire must behave like a gentleman, and when you come to deal with a country that has stood by you in trouble—stood well by you—are you to bring the alliance to an end when the trouble is over? I say that would not be becoming of the British Empire in dealing with a faithful Ally. And let me say this: I do not believe there is any country in the world, whether it likes the Japanese Alliance or does not like it, that would think any better of the British Empire if we broke off the alliance—not one. They might appear to be glad at the moment that we had done it, but in their hearts they would despise us for doing it.[41]

Instead of abrogating the alliance, the prime minister suggested a new combination of Britain, Japan and the United States, emphasizing particularly that the "cardinal principle of British policy" must be to "act in as complete accord with the United States of America as any two countries can." The idea of such a triple entente was not novel, for it had come up in the discussions in the Imperial Conference and had been voiced in

[38] Australia, *Parliamentary Debates,* vol. XCVII, p. 11635.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 11636.

[40] Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates,* House of Commons, vol. CXLVI, col. 1710.

[41] *Ibid.,* col. 1711.

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the British press and in the House of Commons. In reporting Lloyd George's speech, the *Times* concluded: "If the Alliance with Japan could merge in a greater understanding with Japan and the United States of America in all the problems of the Pacific that would be a great event which would be a gallant deed for the peace of the world."[42]

Between London and Washington

During the summer and early autumn of 1921 there was a noticeable change of attitude in the United Kingdom toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A year earlier, in the summer of 1920, when the *Peking and Tientsin Times* was predicting nonrenewal of the agreement,[43] the (London) *Times* correspondent in Tokyo was reporting that it was taken for granted that the alliance would be renewed.[44] Throughout the winter of 1920-1921 there was comparatively little in the British press regarding the subject. This was not the case, however, by the following autumn. Rear Admiral Nathan C. Twining,[45] naval attaché to the American Embassy in London, reported that the history of the psychology of the situation in regard to the alliance was remarkable. When the treaty first came up for renewal "the whole atmosphere was apparently calm and clear, no tangible opposition appeared, and it seemed to be taken as a matter of course, in default of any better way out, that the Anglo-Japanese treaty would be renewed, with the understanding that it did not apply in case of trouble between the United States and Japan."[46]

During the Conference of Prime Ministers the British government had heard strong and plain language from the representatives of Canada and New Zealand. In the meantime sentiment had developed in the United States, and the press generally expressed the opinion, that renewal of the Anglo-Japanese pact would be considered a distinctly unfriendly act toward the United States. Press extracts conveying this idea were taken

[42] *The Times,* Aug. 19, 1921.

[43] *Peking and Tientsin Times,* June 24, 1920.

[44] Dennis, *op. cit.,* p. 73.

[45] Rear Admiral Nathan Crook Twining, Jr., served as Chief of Staff to Admiral William S. Sims during World War I. He was the uncle of General Nathan Farragut Twining, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force in the first Eisenhower administration and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the second.

[46] Twining to Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 12, 1921, Naval Intelligence File.

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from the American papers and printed throughout the United Kingdom.

Moreover, three distinguished Britishers came out publicly in favor of revision, enlargement, or abrogation of the agreement. As a result of the conference of premiers David Lloyd George openly and earnestly proposed an Anglo-American-Japanese triple alliance.[47] Although he felt that the arguments in favor of renewal were stronger than those in favor of denouncing the alliance, he hoped that the true line of advance lay "not in denouncing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but in transforming it into a Pacific triple entente, which the combined liberal forces of Great Britain and America could effectually prevent from ever becoming aggressive or acquisitive."[48]

Lord Northcliffe,[49] returning from the antipodes where he had urged dominion participation in the Washington Conference, declared in an October 25 interview with a Reuters correspondent in Hong Kong his opposition to the treaty. He gave as his reason that it placed the United States "outside of the very definite arrangements for the control of China." For two years he had been gradually coming to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had outrun its usefulness. "Japan faithfully carried out the compact during the war, and she had been well rewarded for her services." The purpose of the Washington Conference was to reach a mutual agreement, but the United States was handicapped by an existing arrangement between Japan and Great Britain concerning the chief problem of the Pacific. Northcliffe concluded: "A prolongation of the alliance only serves to irritate public and official opinion in the United States, merely humiliates China and adds nothing to the prestige of Great Britain in Asia."[50]

Viscount Bryce, who had just returned from a visit to the United States, contributed to the *Times* of October 18 an article

[47] *New York Times*, Oct. 14, 1921.

[48] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1921, VIII, 4. This opinion was expressed to Professor C. H. Van Tyne, of the History Department of the University of Michigan, in a letter written "by a man of international reputation, who now occupies one of the most important positions in the British Empire."

[49] Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe, was a newspaper proprietor who served as chairman of the British War Mission, 1917-1918, director of propaganda in enemy countries, 1918, and of the Civil Aerial Transport Committee in 1917.

[50] *New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1921.

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on the Washington Conference in which he referred to the American attitude toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in these words:

> It has been pointed out over and over again that there is nothing in that treaty to affect the United States. Nevertheless, nine men out of ten in the United States continue to repeat that England is the ally—the exclusive ally—of Japan, and that the effect of the treaty has been and is to make Japan think she has a comparatively free hand and may adopt policies of aggression on which she would otherwise fear to embark.[51]

Lord Bryce observed that no explanation seemed likely to remove this impression from the American mind. It remained even when Englishmen pointed out that their own interests in securing not only the open door for commerce in China but the political independence of China were exactly the same as the interests of the United States. He concluded that there was no reason whatever for any divergence between the British and American policy as regards China and the possible action of Japan there.

Admiral Twining reported that by October the whole situation so far as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was concerned had changed "from one of obvious, inevitable and peaceful procedure leading to the renewal of that treaty" to one in which the British government was faced with a tremendous problem which affected "the internal arrangements of the British Empire and its most important relations with the United States." There was a desire in the United Kingdom that the government should escape in some way from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The general impression there was that the United States and Japan would be at war before many years, and the disturbing question was the position Britain would occupy in case of such an event. There was no question as to the sympathy of the English people; "in case of a white race against a yellow race the English would side with the white race" and the universal desire of Englishmen and the most pressing need of England was for "close and most friendly relations with the United States."[52]

From conversations with various people in minor government positions and in the army and navy, Twining received the clear

[51] *The Times*, Oct. 18, 1921.

[52] Twining to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Nov. 19, 29, 1921, Naval Intelligence File.

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impression that a termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be distinctly welcome, provided it could be reached without any actual or apparent bad faith toward the Japanese. Individuals freely expressed the opinion in private that they disliked the Japanese and regretted that political necessity had brought Great Britain into alliance with Japan.

From newspaper articles and from conversations which Twining had with people not in official life, there was also evidence of a strong sentiment in the country against the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; but in November, after the Washington Conference assembled, British opinion was not entirely certain whether the abrogation of the alliance would be favored in case of failure of the conference to produce some agreement or understanding which would in effect accomplish the same purpose as was supposed to be accomplished by the alliance. There seemed to be a very general opinion in Great Britain that the existence of this alliance was a source of irritation to the United States, and that its abrogation would tend to strengthen the Anglo-American entente, which was almost universally desired.[53]

In addition to the anxiety over the treaty as a political instrument distasteful to the United States, and the feeling that the agreement had served its purpose, there was dissatisfaction with the alliance among British mercantile and financial interests alarmed over the increasing competition of Japanese commerce in China. They were also concerned that their business relations with the Chinese might suffer because of Britain's apparent approval of her ally's methods. Significant articles by prominent Englishmen in the Far East voiced these anxieties.[54] For instance, Robert Young, editor of the *Japan Chronicle,* considered that the alliance had "failed to preserve the independence of Korea or strengthen the integrity of China." It had "aroused the deepest resentment in China and intense suspicion in America." It was the cause of much of the ill-feeling that prevailed between China and Japan. Young concluded:

> The militarists of Japan and of Britain, supported by their respective Foreign Offices, favour the Alliance, for it carries out the unexpressed objects for which it was really framed. But the agreement is wholly against the real interests of the British and Japanese

[53] Same to same, Nov. 29, 1921, in *ibid.*

[54] Dennis, *op. cit.,* pp. 63-64.

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peoples, which consist in the establishment of good relations and friendship with all nations.[55]

Even in Japan there appeared to be an unofficial *volte face* on the question of the renewal of the treaty. The correspondent of the United Press in Tokyo reported that by November the editorials and semiofficial comment in the newspapers had suddenly turned against a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The substitution of an American, British and Japanese understanding was being urged as highly desirable.[56]

The Washington Conference

In Washington the spokesmen of the Pacific dominions, while claiming to favor the renewal of the alliance, were less determined in their support of it than had been Prime Ministers Hughes and Massey in London. Now there appeared a willingness on the part of the delegates of both countries to search for a satisfactory tripartite agreement as a substitute for the bilateral alliance. In a press conference of November 22 Senator George Foster Pearce[57] made clear that even though Australia had nothing to do with the initiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the war peril had passed which led her to endorse the treaty in the council of the empire, held in London in 1911, his government was in full accord with the rest of the British Empire with regard to the treaty. He gave a lucid explanation of the circumstances surrounding the Labour party's attitude on the subject of the renewal in 1911, when the party believed that, in the interest of Australia, the treaty should be renewed. The war demonstrated that Japan was an honorable ally who faithfully fulfilled her obligations under the treaty, and "it would not be fair treatment for us to be the first to say that the treaty shall now go into the waste basket." He wanted, however, to see the Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed in such a form that was completely acceptable to and in no way directed against the United States. He also stated that the American proposal for a limita-

[55] Robert Young, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance", *Contemporary Review*, vol. CXX (July 1921), p. 19.

[56] *Sydney Morning Herald*, Nov. 21, 1921.

[57] In the conference documents Pearce is officially designated as "Minister of Defence", but in the *Times* (London), the *New York Times*, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, and the *Wellington Evening Post* he is always referred to as Senator Pearce.

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tion of naval armaments, "which was hailed with lively enthusiasm by the people of the Australian Commonwealth, had materially strengthened the sentiment there in favor of a 'triple entente' in the Far East."[58]

New Zealand stood beside Australia in favoring the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty at least until "a more comprehensive system" for guaranteeing the peace of the Far East had been devised. Her spokesman, Sir John William Salmond, was reported as saying:

> We see no justification for scrapping that alliance without substituting something for it. Japan gave us faithful and valuable service in the dangerous time of war and we owe her our gratitude for it. It is not the English nor the American way to turn our backs on a friend. If and when some more general agreement can be entered into for the preservation of the peace of the Pacific, New Zealand and Australia will welcome it as a substitute for the present imperfect system.[59]

In fine, by the time the Washington Conference convened, the opinion of all the dominion representatives appears to have been that expressed by General Jan Smuts in the Conference of Prime Ministers when he stated that South Africa was "opposed to any exclusive alliances." To him it seemed "clear that the only path of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk together with America."[60] Moreover, the New Zealand delegate insisted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not applicable against the United States, stating that a recent speech of Lloyd George in the House of Commons expressed sufficiently New Zealand's point of view.[61]

At the Washington Conference the most dramatic achievement was the Five-Power Treaty to limit quantitatively and qualitatively capital ship and aircraft carrier construction at a ratio of 5-5-3-1.67-1.[62] Japan accepted a position of capital ship inferiority in accordance with the 5-5-3 ratio only on condition that Great Britain and the United States agree not to build new fortifications in the Pacific during the life of the treaty. Consequently,

[58] *New York Times,* Nov. 23, 1921; *Sydney Morning Herald,* Nov. 24, 1921.

[59] *New York Times,* Nov. 24, 1921.

[60] *Conference of Prime Ministers,* p. 24.

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] *U.S. Senate Documents,* 67 Cong., 2 Sess., no. 126, *Conference on the Limitation of Armament,* pp. 252-254, 875-876.

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there was incorporated in this treaty Article XIX, an agreement to maintain the *status quo* of certain specified naval bases and fortifications in the Pacific.[63] This article aimed to make the Pacific truly pacific.

With the menace of attack by one of the Pacific naval Powers against another removed, the way was prepared for the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The representatives of the British Empire, Japan, the United States and France entered into a Four-Power Treaty on December 13, 1921, under the terms of which the signatories agreed that if there should develop between any of them a controversy arising out of "any Pacific question and involving their said rights" which was not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and was likely to affect their harmonious accord, they would refer the whole subject to a joint conference of all the high contracting parties "for consideration and adjustment." If the said rights were threatened by any other Power, the contracting parties agreed to communicate with one another "in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation."[64] The agreement of ten years' duration was limited in its application to "insular possessions and Dominions in the Pacific Ocean," including the mandated islands.

This was a four- not a three-Power treaty as originally advocated. Secretary Hughes insisted upon bringing France into the agreement, not only to soothe her somewhat ruffled pride over the naval ratio of 1.67 vis-à-vis the same for Italy, but undoubtedly as a deliberate policy of generalizing the responsibilities of a treaty that might otherwise appear to be a departure from the traditional American policy of avoiding entangling alliances. The agreement called merely for consultation, not arbitration, and even this was limited by a supplementary proviso so as not "to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers."[65]

This mild denatured agreement to refer disputes to consultation met American objections to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 875.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103, 890.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 892. For a discussion of the Four-Power Treaty, see Tate, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-133.

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and was a cheap price for the United States to pay for the abrogation of that alliance and a new pledge of respect for the integrity of the Philippines. In the words of A. Whitney Griswold: "It substituted a four-power agreement to talk for a two-power agreement to fight."[66]

The delegates of both Australia and New Zealand were satisfied, in fact pleased, with the results of the conference. From Senator Pearce's point of view the Four-Power Treaty was the most valuable of the agreements concluded at Washington. Sir John Salmond felt that the quadruple agreement ensured peace in the Pacific Ocean for at least ten years. Pearce, in a statement to the Australian Press Association on February 6, 1922, observed: "The Four-Power Pacific pact does not involve any interference in purely domestic questions, therefore it does not in any way involve our independence in respect to local questions." Referring to the remarkable results achieved at Washington, the statesman concluded that "the success of the Conference is beyond the wildest anticipation of the most hopeful," and he invited critics in Australia who foretold its failure to review their criticism.[67]

At the Washington Conference a Japanese diplomatist is alleged to have remarked to his British colleague: "At any rate you gave the Alliance a splendid funeral!" and the Englishman is not reported to have disagreed.[68]

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[66] Griswold, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

[67] *Sydney Morning Herald*, Feb. 8, 1922.

[68] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923*, published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs (London, 1925), p. 490. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance actually came to an end on August 17, 1923, the date on which the ratifications of the Four-Power Treaty were deposited.

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JAN 8 1960 INDEXED

THE RÔLE OF NONMILITARY DEFENSE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY

WHILE Russia's ostensible military objective is defense of the motherland, her political objective is the destruction of the capitalistic systems of the world. From the Russian point of view, this latter objective is the correlative political goal of war. In this article it will be shown that the preparation of adequate American nonmilitary defense is not only important for the prevention of war with the Soviet Union and the winning of such a war if we are forced into it, but also of major significance in the calculation of Russia's chances of destroying the American economic and political systems if such a war occurs.

Anyone who has examined carefully the nonmilitary defense of the United States must be most sympathetic with those working on what is in fact a massive complex of problems. These problems are as complicated and interdependent as are the American economic, political, military and social systems themselves. The oft-repeated criticism that the nonmilitary defense program is little more than the issuance of statements of good intentions is not well founded today. Recent developments, particularly since the combining of the Office of Defense Mobilization with the Federal Civil Defense Administration, justify a somewhat more optimistic view.

Some of the difficulty of the public in assessing this effort stems from a misunderstanding of the real mission of nonmilitary defense. This mission is more than a combination of resources mobilization for fighting a World War II type of war with the civil defense function of protecting lives. Today's mission is no less than the preservation and continuation of the United States under conditions varying from the current Cold War through a Korean type of conflict to a limited war with nuclear weapons and ultimately to a ferocious massive nuclear war. Today's most compelling necessity is to accomplish this mission, not only if the United States is to survive war but also if its military policy is to be effective and its foreign policy believable and effective in the preservation of peace.

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The National Academy of Sciences, in a recent report,[1] stated that an adequate nonmilitary defense would involve planning and programming in: (1) the management of facilities and manpower of the country; (2) preparing for the preservation of our political and economic institutions after an attack; (3) meeting the social and psychological demands for surviving the disruption of an attack; and (4) establishing a broad, economic basis for long-range peacetime reconstruction and progress following attack. This would include such diverse matters as public morale and behavior; continuity of government; relations with other nations; reconstruction of banking and credit systems; stabilization of prices and wages; rationing of foods, goods and shelter; maintenance of income; rehabilitation of destroyed plants; production of items basic to national survival; post-attack movement of people; provision of relief to the injured, displaced and unemployed; and management of resources. These are multidimensional problems; in considering them we must think not only of how they can be solved but also of when, and of the order of priority in which they are to be placed.

All who have given serious study to this problem—the Gaither Committee, the Rockefeller Committee, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Planning Association, and innumerable government and government-contractor study groups, including the RAND Corporation and Stanford Research Institute—have stressed the necessity of a sound and continuing nonmilitary defense as essential to America's military defense. That little has been done about this is due not only to the complexity of the problem but also to the failure to understand the ultimate bearing of nonmilitary defense on our military strategy, on the exercise of our foreign policy, and eventually on our capacity to determine national policy affirmatively and to impose our national will.

The goals of our foreign policy are to preserve peace and "our way of life." These goals require us to present effective resistance to overt military aggression from our enemy's present capacity and from his possible future capabilities. The preservation of peace and probably of civilization as well rests on the calculated, intelligent and daring use of spiritual, political,

[1] *The Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-Military Defense*, 1958.

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psychological and military force. This includes the capacity to wage varying types of war successfully.

The only legitimate function of the military enterprise is to support the execution of national policy. The Clausewitz statement, "War is a continuation of policy by other means," emphasizes the only justifiable use of military force. Though this has been reaffirmed recently—for example, in the British White Paper of 1957—the slogans of World Wars I and II such as "total war", "victory" and "unconditional surrender" have at times become in some minds goals in themselves. Today's slogans are equally meaningless. "Two scorpions in a bottle" and "mutual annihilation" describe a policy of mutual suicide, a policy which neither we nor the enemy can logically adopt.

The fact is that there is considerable confusion between our national goals and the proper and justifiable use of military force. It has been stated that no comprehensive study of the whole military function has been undertaken for over one hundred years and it is interesting to note that it is the Air Force, in a little-known report,[2] which now proposes an examination of the entire military enterprise and asks whether the weapons which we brandish are the kinds that can exert the optimum international influence. Here the questions are raised as to what constitutes military advantage, what constitutes victory, and what are the limits to meaningful military power.

American military strategy now consists in maintaining a variety of forces that are designed for use in the different situations that are most likely to arise. It has been described in the popular press as the maintenance of forces for "limited war", for "massive retaliation", and for "graduated deterrence". The last term is attached to the doctrine that we should make ourselves able to fight both a "total war", which will be unlikely to occur as long as we are ready for it, and a "limited war", which is very likely to occur.[3]

The international strategic and economic-political implications of "massive deterrence" are many. The more we emphasize the use of nuclear weapons and reduce conventional weapons, the more we indicate to the enemy that we are not going to use

[2] "Development Planning Note", 58 *DAP* 2, by the Research and Analysis Division under the Deputy Chief of Staff, 1958.

[3] See Robert Strausz-Hupé, "Back to Sanity", 84 *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 23, May 1958.

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the latter. If we emphasize the total war concept, we may induce our allies to reduce their contribution of men and conventional weapons. The more we emphasize the use of nuclear weapons, the more we are placing ourselves in the position of having to use them or to back down from our stated policy. Once we have backed down, is it not probable that we will have to back down in future cases? If we use our nuclear weapons in such cases, we have initiated nuclear war; if we hold firm and wait for the enemy to launch a nuclear attack on our homeland, we may be destroyed.

On the other hand, emphasis on conventional weapons in the face of the enemy's development of effective capability for delivering nuclear attack invites destruction in war and nuclear blackmail in peace.

The theory of graduated deterrence which calls for preparation for massive nuclear war is, of course, most difficult to apply in real situations. NATO's function is to inhibit the adventurer and to prevent, if possible, a situation arising where we or the enemy would be forced to use nuclear weapons. If this fails, the questions are many. Can nuclear war be confined to Europe? Are nuclear weapons of any value in South East Asia, Africa and the Middle East? What of the danger of radiation to friendly and innocent peoples?

There are no easy solutions to these massive military and political problems of our times. But one proposition is clear—we must retain the capacity to wage total war. We cannot stop with any combination of forces that does not include real capacity to destroy the enemy; and if this capacity is to be real, not only must it exist as a military fact but both our enemies and our allies must know that it is a fact. Nor is it enough even that both our allies and enemies know that the gun is loaded, they must know also that we have the national will to fire it. Therefore we need to look not only at the military capacity of the United States but at the type of war the American people and the American economy are prepared for or can be prepared reasonably to wage.

The key to defeating an enemy lies in the destruction of his will to wage war. Our own strategy of deterrence is based squarely on the enemy's fear of massive destruction. This, we argue, prevents his attack. If we turn this proposition around to the United States, we then have the problem of brandishing

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the sword without buckling on our shield. If we find ourselves in a crisis that is acute, but in which no bomb has yet fallen on American soil, the question arises whether we will have the will to order an all-out attack on the enemy in the face of the certain destruction of many millions of Americans.

Or look at it this way. If we assume that our military power is superior or roughly equivalent to that of Russia's at any given time, then we have reached what may be a significant and possibly, under some circumstances, controlling factor in the launching of an attack on either side: a realistic appraisal of the comparative ability of the Russian and the American populations to survive a nuclear interchange better.

Here there are many factors to be weighed such as Russian attitudes toward human life, the greater dispersal of Russian cities and of buildings within cities, and generally the more primitive level of Russian life, including more primitive methods of carrying on agriculture and mining, and the lower development of water supply and minerals. These we have generally considered as limiting the Russian capacity to wage war. If, however, these factors are looked upon as they relate to survival under primitive post-nuclear attack conditions, then they may be positive factors in Russia's favor. Take Soviet and American agriculture, for example. With 30 per cent more acreage, Russia's production is about one-half as great as ours and her output in animal products was about one-fifth of ours in 1956. The availability of tractor power is only 15 per cent as high as ours, truck capacity only 11 per cent as high, and electric power only 12 per cent as great. The quality of Russia's labor force is low. There are 50 million persons engaged in agriculture in the Soviet Union; two thirds are women, children and old people.

Although these factors of dispersed resources, limited mechanization, primitive transportation and a tradition of forced labor are limiting factors in the waging of a conventional type of war like World War II, they could very well become positive factors for survival, particularly when coupled with what is reported to be greater emphasis on shelters and other nonmilitary defense measures in the USSR.

What we are saying, then, is that the United States may very well need greater shielding because of its more advanced economy if it is to retain the capacity to take decisive military action and if it is to survive a nuclear attack. A failure to recognize

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this fundamental need of the shield as well as the sword, of the castle as well as the knight, not only can be a hole in our theory of deterrence but can make our foreign policy ineffective to the extent that the enemy takes advantage of our reliance on it. This in turn weakens the chances of keeping the country out of nuclear war—the main object of our national policy.

Are we not driven to this same result if we take the other reasonable view open to the enemy? If we assume that the American military posture is believable and we know that our bases are essentially unhardened, that they are close to centers of civil population, and that our civil population is unprotected, this can be accepted rationally by the enemy as indicating that we are better prepared for offense than for defense. The enemy might therefore logically conclude in some future time of extreme tension that our vulnerability would make immediate attack on us less risky than further delay. Such a decision would be a result of measuring the gain, to be expected by both nations, from striking first against the loss to be expected from retaliation. Where delay would give us an opportunity to strike the first blow or improve our ability to survive an attack, the enemy might well conclude that self-protection required him to exploit the advantages gained by being the aggressor. Thus, the lack of an adequate nonmilitary defense program may heighten the probability of surprise attack on the United States.

It seems to me that three main courses must be followed:

(1) The massive retaliation concept must be strengthened and made more believable by hardening the Strategic Air Command bases and the missile bases so that, no matter how many aircraft and missiles are destroyed, there are enough left to destroy Russia. Further, these bases must be moved from close proximity to unprotected population centers or, as suggested by the Navy, our retaliatory forces should develop invulnerability through true mobility. Probably some combination of these concepts should be developed.[4]

It is suggested that the submarine-based Polaris is but one aspect of true mobility. Nuclear-powered aircraft as mobile missile launchers may soon be developed which could remain airborne around the clock. Such mobile striking power, in the war of the future, may offer the greatest hope of putting war

[4] See "Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation" by P. H. Backus, *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1959, page 23.

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back on the battlefield and away from the cities. To the extent that our weapons are located at sea, in the air or in outer space, the enemy will be forced to expend his weapons attacking ours rather than our homeland.

(2) While it is true that we must be prepared in some measure to meet a number of different hostile situations, we must, nevertheless, make an over-all determination of the war that we are most likely to have to fight and are most likely to be able to win. Having made that determination, our main effort must be to achieve maximum readiness for our task. Failure to make this determination and to take this action will result in diffusion of effort, blunting of the military instrument, and waste of material and manpower for civilian survival.[5]

(3) It must be made clear to our allies and to the Russians, beyond any possible misunderstanding, not only that America has the capacity to destroy Russia but that she can continue as a nation even through and beyond a nuclear war—a nation with economic and political institutions that are still American and with a standard of living that will be adequate within ten or fifteen years after a nuclear attack upon her. These last points are of great significance because in so far as they are true they remove the political objective of Russian attack, namely the destruction of the competitive free enterprise system. They are true, however, only if real work is done on nonmilitary defense, especially in the provision of fall-out shelters.[6]

Let us not forget, too, that the decision to unleash a nuclear attack or to stand firm against the threat of one is a political decision to be made by the President, not a military one to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So it is that an examination of America herself and the state of her war readiness plans must be undertaken.

In 1958, the National Academy of Sciences report[7] presented the conclusion that, while the national plans could be called adequate for the Cold War or a Korean type of conflict or for another World War II, they were grossly inadequate for nuclear warfare. Since this report was published, much progress has

[5] "Pick Your War—Then Plan for It" by James Baar, from *Missiles and Rockets*, August 10, 1959.

[6] See footnote 1, *supra*.

[7] See footnote 1, *supra*.

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been made. A new National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization is in existence. It is now only in the early stages of implementation, however, and it is much too soon to attempt any judgment on its adequacy.

Certainly it is clear that we must do more than make America ready for another conflict similar to World War II. Our problem is nothing less than that of how to keep the United States going as a living enterprise. This is an economic problem, a legal problem and a political problem. This is the ultimate and unbelievably massive problem that must first be recognized and then grappled with if the United States is to be capable of making up and enforcing its national will in a world full of grave danger to its national life.

To solve that problem we must abandon some concepts and assumptions that are fundamental in American political and social thought. For example, we cannot assume that the executive branch of government will be able to exercise central control and management in the period after attack. Instead, plans must envisage the possibility that executive authority will be wiped out for long periods of time because of breakdowns in communication and transportation. Such government as may exist will be on regional and local levels. It is very questionable, too, if we should assume that existing political and geographic divisions are a rational and realistic base for planning or that the present structure of government and separation of powers could be maintained in the event of total war. In making plans, we must assume a serious breakdown in procedural, technical and personal communications and coördination. Indeed, we cannot make plans on the assumption that either communication or transportation will be available in any degree for a considerable time.

Moreover, the assumptions on which we base our preparations must not be so rigid and restricting as to make our plans unworkable if the events that do occur are different from those that were expected. For example, plans cannot safely be based on the assumption that there will be a single massive attack without follow-up strikes and invasion. Nor is it enough to plan for enemy use of nuclear weapons alone. It is necessary to envisage attacks by nuclear weapons combined with biological, chemical and psychological warfare, sabotage and economic blockade. Plans must envisage the use of techniques of war that are not now employed. In the economic sphere, finally, we must

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avoid making plans on the assumption that those who survive into the period after the attack will have the same needs and desires as are present in a peacetime economy.

While these ideas are accepted at the highest levels in most current federal planning, they are still not widely understood; and very little has been done so far to implement them in such a way as to achieve real readiness for attack.

What we are saying, then, is that America must be hardened so that if nuclear war comes and millions are killed; if millions more are sick and dying of radiation exposure; if the nation is fragmented into islands of survival with remnants of federal and state and local authority, here a Naval District Commandant, there a member of the Federal Reserve Board; if food, power and transportation are inadequate; if commands are confusing and conflicting and come from enemy as well as from American authority; if invasions occur or are expected; if final annihilation is expected momentarily by those who have thus far survived—then the incredibly difficult mission is not only for the military to prosecute the war successfully, but for the civilian survivors to pull the United States together and start the long process of rebuilding it segment by segment into a nation.

Safety, I believe, does not lie in abandoning our capacity to wage nuclear war but only in improving it, in making it more real, in making the threat a greater factor in our foreign policy and in the capacity to enforce our national will. This requires vast courage to lead us to face up to a danger greater than any in our history—to lead our political, business, labor, educational and scientific leaders to insist on today's sacrifices to harden America to provide better for her national survival. This is today's business! Any thought that hardening can be undertaken during a period of limited war or even of heightening national tension is unrealistic. This will be the very time that "digging in" will be resisted because of the danger of doing anything which, in the minds of American political leaders, could cause a limited war to flare into a massive nuclear war. The obligation to harden America is our obligation today. To meet this obligation, America must produce a quality of leadership first developed in the founding of the Republic itself. Let us hope that we have it today.

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JAN 8 1960 INDEXED

GERMAN NATIONALISTS AND EUROPEAN UNION

I

UNDERLYING the conservative nationalist and national socialist revolt of the 1920's was the rebellion against impotence, internal and external. All the strands of thought and political activity which were involved in that revolt can be summed up as representing drastic attempts at locating and tapping sources of strength which would lead to a "reawakening", or "renewal". All of them found strength in unity, whether that unity was produced by the creation of a naturally harmonious order of historically rooted social groupings or was the product of a politically imposed order.

The search for unity as a precondition of strength also characterizes nationalist thought and action in post-war Germany—all the more so because Germany is not merely figuratively and internally divided, but also actually and externally. Internally, of course, strength through unity is still demanded in terms of a basic harmony or of a compelling order. The attacks on liberal political institutions, the party system, and the free economic market are still attacks on the divisive, and hence emasculating, struggles for individual or group benefits which are said to characterize the liberal political and economic system. Externally, however, the situation in which the several parts of Germany find themselves and, in fact, in which the entire European continent finds itself, has rendered inappropriate the ideal of an autarchic, imperialist nation-state. If the traditional conservative revolutionary and national socialist search for strength through unity is to have any hope for success, then it must necessarily extend to units other than the nineteenth-century nation-state.

It is in response to this need that the nationalist forces in post-war Germany have developed the conception of a *Nation Europa.* The post-war nationalist still projects his feelings of personal weakness and insecurity onto the larger community—but that larger whole is no longer exclusively his own country. In the face of the super-Powers, East and West, he cannot expect safety from any one European nation. Strength, in the mid-

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twentieth century lies only in continental Powers. Hence, the importance to the nationalist of a continental Nation Europe.

The internationalism of much post-war nationalist thought, especially in Germany, is thus an attempt to adapt unvarying and fundamental ideological commitments to novel circumstances. At the same time, it also represents the persistence of a nationalist and romantic Pan-Europe ideal which had long animated certain conservative revolutionary circles—especially those close to or in the *bündische* youth movement. Part of this Pan-European romanticism found its way into the SS and has been preserved since 1945 in the organizational efforts of SS veterans inside and outside Germany.

II

The repudiation of what many German nationalists now contemptuously call "chauvinism", namely a blatant policy of national egotism and economic autarchy, rests largely on three basic attitudes which appear either singly or, more often, in various combinations. These are the attitudes of romanticism, geopolitical scientism and *real*-political opportunism. It may clarify our later discussion to begin by describing the background and nature of these attitudes.

The Hitler movement, though calling itself "nationalist" and being accepted as such, operated not so much with the concept "nation", as with that of "folk". The difference was not merely theoretical but had important practical consequences. The entire program of the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP) was designed to bring about a reawakening, not so much of the German nation, as of the biological entity of the Germanic race.[1]

While the racial concept of Teutonism was politically opportune for Hitler's immediate aim of domestic revolution, its revolutionary foreign implications were concretized only relatively late in the development of the movement, in the late 1930's, and even then were not universally accepted by the top leadership of the régime. The "breaking of the fetters" of Versailles and the requirement of national equality and a "place in the sun" for Germany, in short the *nationalist* demands of Nazism, could not

[1] In this respect see Hitler's interesting admission to Herman Rauschning as reported by R. Wulle in his "Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen" (mimeographed), Fortsetzung, No. 2, August 1946, p. 5.

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serve as adequate rationale either for the "crusade" against Bolshevism or for a new European order which would involve some kind of unification and German hegemony. Thus only with the creation of the Anti-Comintern Pact and especially with the occupation or control of all of Western continental Europe from Hammerfest to the Pyrennees arose the need for emphasizing the concept of an *Abendländisches Reich Germanischen Blutes.*

The propagandistic success of this notion was considerable. In the first place, it reconciled a large variety of conservative revolutionaries and members of the youth movement who in one form or another longed for that larger unity, the all-embracing order, that *Ordnungsmacht,* which had always been their chiliastic goal, the real Third Reich. Secondly, it made possible ideologically and propagandistically the incorporation into the SS of volunteers from many countries. Under the *Europäische Zentrale* (which Himmler renamed *Germanische Zentrale*) the anti-Bolshevist volunteers with their *Schulmeister-Romantik* could think of themselves as the sword-bearers, the élite, of a united, reawakened, purified Europe.

This racial, authoritarian, anti-Bolshevik Pan-European ideal is still alive today in many a former SS man inside and outside of Germany. To the extent to which he still moves in the romantic world of ideas of the old SS, the liberalistic, United States–oriented efforts of NATO and Strasbourg cannot help but fill him with contempt. He is certain that these efforts are vain because liberalism can supply no binding principle of order and the pure negativism of personal egotisms will provide neither the cement that holds together the several parts of an international army nor a theory that can prevail against the positive insights of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, SS romantics have not given up their own version of Pan-Europe and are clearly interested in reactivating the connections between the various national groupings of SS veterans. It is these interests and these lines of connection which constitute a *part* of what is known as the "International of nationalists".

The concept of the *Nation Europa,* the drive toward a larger political organization on the basis of culturally autonomous folk units, is further nourished by a full appreciation of the most inescapable geopolitical fact of the twentieth century: the shift of power from Europe toward its peripheries East and West.

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In the face of the overwhelming might of the United States and the U.S.S.R., no European, however megalomanic, could even dream of his nation as strong enough to challenge successfully the two giants of the contemporary world. Under these circumstances, what is more logical than that those who long for such a challenge, who wish to regain control over their own fate, unaffected by alliances born of weakness, whose orientation and political convictions are as anti-American as they are anti-Bolshevist, should insist on the creation of a third power-bloc which would be large enough to be independent of both the East and the West and thus play the vital rôle of a "Third Force" in the hitherto bisected world? Such a power-bloc—it is argued—can be only a united nationalist Europe, a *Nation Europa.*

It should also be obvious, in the third place, that these considerations and tendencies would be particularly marked in the Western part of a divided Germany. Reunification can be achieved only as a result of negotiations with Russia or of a successful war against her. But as an anti-Soviet war, even if successful, would reunify only the depopulated, charred and radioactive earth of what used to be Germany, negotiations remain the only course. That, further, the Soviet Union would have no interest in negotiating with a part-Germany that is integrated into an openly anti-Russian alliance is quite understandable. Hence, only a neutralized Germany would have any chance of achieving the longed-for reunification. Could such a neutralized Germany persist in a divided Europe, could she defend her neutrality in the face of a challenge? The answer to both questions must be "No." Does not then *Realpolitik* insist on the only tenable solution of a cancerous post-war problem; namely, a neutral Germany as a part of a federated neutral Europe, a well-armed, self-reliant, creative *Nation Europa* of some 250 to 320 million souls?

SS romantic, Third Force geopolitics and the *Realpolitik* of reunification supply partly the motives and partly also the ideological arguments for the organizational efforts of a considerable sector of the "national opposition" in post-war Germany. It will be the task of the following sections to show this in some detail.

III

The initial impetus for the reëstablishment of an international Fascist front had not unnaturally come from Italy where—in the

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absence of foreign occupation—a neo-Fascist party, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), had shown early signs of revival. Having established contact with former functionaries of the NSDAP in West Germany, with fascist groups in Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, South America and the Near East, the MSI organized a European Study Center and began publishing its own international organ, *Europa Unita*.[2]

The first really intensive canvassing of the possibilities of increased and effective joint activity took place in March 1950 in Rome. Present at this discussion were, besides representatives of the MSI and the Spanish Falange, Sir Oswald Moseley, the British Union Movement leader, friends of the Swiss national socialist Guy A. Amaudruz,[3] members of the initially secret German élite order *Bruderschaft*, and the French nationalist bankers and politicians Georges Albertini and Guy Lemonnier.[4] It was there decided to call a conference of delegates from all West European nationalist and folkish organizations and parties to meet in Rome.

This conference, which was held on October 22-25, 1950, attracted delegates from France, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Germany and representatives from Belgium, Switzerland, Portugal, Albania (emigrants) and Rumania (emigrants).[5] Most prominent among the ten-man German delegation were Karl Heinz Priester and Uwe Wehlen, the counter-intelligence chief of the *Bruderschaft*. Priester, a former Hitler Youth leader in his late

[2] *CrP Informationsdienst*, August 1956, p. 9. *Cf. Die Brücke*, Auslandsdienst, IV. Jahrgang, Folge 14, August 1957, p. 2.

[3] Amaudruz was co-founder of the People's Party and Editor of its organ *l'Appel au peuple*.

[4] Both Albertini and Lemonnier had been close collaborators of the French nationalist leaders Jacques Doriot *(Parti Populaire Français)* and Marcel Déat *(Rassemblement National Populaire)*. Déat had been Minister of Labor and Solidarity in the Vichy government. See *Deutscher Informationsdienst*, Nr. 593, September 15, 1956, pp. 2-3. *Cf.* Actuel Service, *Das Organisationsnetz der antidemokratischen Kräfte in der Bundesrepublik* (Copenhagen, no date), col. 5; and *Deutscher Informationsdienst*, Nr. 46, January 20, 1951, p. 1.

[5] *Die Europäische Nationale*, 1. Jahrgang, Nr. 14, November 1950, p. 5. According to dpa Inf. 957, June 11, 1954, there was also present Edward A. Fleckenstein of Weehawken, N. J., the president of the so-called "Voters' Alliance for Americans of German Ancestry", a totally insignificant group of Yorkville bigots, but curiously overrated in German nationalist circles.

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thirties, had become widely known through his part in fashioning a spectacular local election victory for the *Nationaldemokratische Partei* (NDP) in 1948 and later on in leading the NDP's radical natonalist wing until the party's split in December 1949. Representing himself as speaking for the German front-generation, Priester set the tone for the Rome Conference:

> While Russia is trying to bolshevize Europe, the West is colonizing us. We who have been defamed for years because of our soldierly stand against Bolshevism are being asked to defend a foreign world as dishonored mercenaries! This the front-generation is not in the least inclined to countenance. In order to offer resistance to the oppressors of Europe and Germany the front-generation is holding out its hands to the nationalist forces of all countries to work together to make Europe a third great force in the world. To do this the front-generation in all countries must destroy the barriers of parochial nationalism and of alien interpretations of democratic principles. This will to work and fight and sacrifice for a *Nation Europa* on a folkish, nationalist basis will not be sidetracked by the Strasbourg efforts. . . . [For] the more some "yes men" hasten to turn into a colony not only our motherland, Germany, but also our fatherland, Europe . . . through such devices as the Council of Europe and "European Union" . . . the more quickly will grow the determination of all honest and independent Germans to accompany us on our way from nationalism to *Nation Europa*.[6]

Clearly, this represents an old thought—typical of the conservative revolutionary, more specifically Right-wing *bündische,* movement of the late 1920's—adapted to the exigencies of the post-war years. The startling survival potential of these sentiments becomes evident if we compare them, for instance, with those expressed by *jugendbewegte* romantics thirty years ago:

> It is for Germany today of quite particular importance not to forget that all foreign affairs are conditioned by the great opposition between Russia-Asia on the one side and the Anglo-Saxon world on the other. . . . Germany will eventually have to decide either to choose between the two or to confront these antipodal blocs with her own image of a state and world order which has the dynamics to kindle the imagination. [If Germany cannot choose the latter alternative] . . . she will be ground to pieces internally and externally in the conflict to which the development of advanced capitalism is clearly leading the world and which we have to weather if we wish to achieve the New Europe.[7]

[6] *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* Nr. 593, September 15, 1956, p. 1.

[7] *Deutsche Freischar,* I (1928), 110, quoted in H. Pross, *Nationale und soziale Prinzipien in der bündischen Jugend,* Doctoral Dissertation, no date, pp. 130-131.

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At the Rome meeting of October 1950, the MSI representatives, supported in particular by Spanish Falangists, argued for a centrally administered Europe and for coördination of the efforts of all nationalists and Fascists to bring this about. Both the MSI and Per Engdahl, a fervent admirer of Hitler, and chief Scandinavian ideologist of the SS conception of a folkish Pan-Europe, submitted plans for the organization of *Nation Europa*. That of the MSI seemed to represent the thinking of at least some of the conference participants:

1. The task of the state is to educate the European élite so as to make it cognizant of its responsibility to tradition.

2. The Constitution of the Nation Europe has a hierarchical structure. It is the organic expression of the European soul. . . .

3. The government is the expression of the European élite. It is independent and not responsible to the Chamber of Corporations. . . . The Chamber of Corporations . . . will represent proportionately the interests of the various occupational groups. . . . The Chamber is purely advisory. . . . The economy, finances, production, and capital will be governed by a technical special council. . . . The Chief of State . . . is both president of the Senate and Chief Justice. . . .

4. Coöperation with other continental groups will be on the basis of the undeniable traditional and cultural superiority of Europe. . . .

5. The fundamental legal norm is: Every one has his own judge. Therefore there is to be created a separate law code for the various citizens—according to their various functions. Greater public responsibility carries with it more severe punishment—both in criminal and civil law. . . .[8]

A second Congress was held in Malmö, Sweden, the home of Per Engdahl, in May 1951.[9] In the course of this meeting the organization adopted the name *Europäische Soziale Bewegung* (ESB) and decided that its highest executive organ would be a Study Commission which was to consist of one representative

[8] *Hamburger Brief*, Sondermaterial, Anlage 1, "Das Program des italienischen Neofaschismus", pp. 1-2.

[9] Priester and all other 26 German delegates with the exception of the Member of Parliament Dr. Franz Richter (*recte* Fritz Rössler) were refused entry visas by the Swedish government. Priester charged that the denial of visas was entirely due to the combined pressure of Adenauer and Francois-Poncet on the Swedish Parliament.

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each from Scandinavia, Germany and France, and of the Secretary General of the MSI (Italy).[10]

The committee reports which were presented and unanimously approved at the Malmö Congress clearly revealed the orientation of the ESB. For example, the report of the program committee said:

> [Europe's] independence means that Europe belongs to neither the democratic nor the Soviet bloc. . . . Democracy which is currently supreme in the European countries is incompetent to rally those material and moral forces which could make Europe a third factor in the development of world politics. The goal of the Congress is a united and independent Europe. But this goal presupposes that each country will have carried out its social and national revolution.[11]

The specifically German argument for a *Nation Europa* emerged most clearly in a brief pamphlet written by K. H. Priester himself and entitled *Germany as an East-West Colony or an Equal Partner in a Free Europe?* The argument of this brochure can be summarized briefly. Germany and Europe, it runs, have been degraded to the rank of pawns or colonies of the super-Powers.[12] The "Strasbourg system" with its Schuman Plan is merely a fig leaf that conceals the continued exploitation of the vanquished by the victors. This alone explains why it continues to exclude from coöperation those now scorned and tortured SS volunteers who had idealistically fought Bolshevism in the recent war and who could now bring about the only real and organic unity of Europe, namely, the unity of front-line soldiers.[13]

Unlike the "Strasbourg system", Priester's argument continues, the new *Nation Europa* will assure the realization of the *Reichs-*

[10] Report of the Organizational Committee. See also *Hamburger Brief*, II, Nr. 89, September 11, 1956, Sondermaterial, "Rechtsradikalismus in Europa" (II).

[11] *Hamburger Brief*, Sondermaterial, Anlage 4, "Die Vorschläge des Programmausschusses".

[12] *Deutschland Ost-West Kolonie oder gleichberechtigt in einem freien Europa?*, Schriftenreihe "Die Europäische Nationale", Ausgabe Nr. 1, pp. 1 and 2.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 4. *Cf.* the final resolution at the Rome Congress which rejected the Strasbourg conception of a united Europe as being a thin veil for American-Jewish exploitation and which rejected just as strongly any remilitarization in the interests of extra-European Powers and under foreign command. See, e.g., *Die Europäische Nationale*, Nr. 15, January 15, 1951, p. 2, "Hat Daladier eine schwarze Brille?"

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gedanke. In fact, that conception could not be achieved in any other way. The wheel of history cannot be turned backward. Absolute national sovereignty is no longer a useful concept.[14] To work for the unity of Europe is not to betray the *Reichsgedanke,* but to serve it.[15]

Of course, the institutions of this new and larger *Reich* of the future will be very different from those of the West Germany which was created after World War II on the advice of men "who had left Germany before or after 1933 and who thus had betrayed the German youth."[16] The party system must be extirpated; and a true democracy must replace the present "licensed" system which is only a *Demokratur.*[17]

In foreign affairs, finally, Germany must not be sacrificed in a premature crusade against the Kremlin. To remilitarize West Germany under prevailing world conditions, Priester argued, would merely be a provocation of the Soviet Union. Instead, let the defensive armies first be furnished by those peoples who have not been bled white in battle with Bolshevism.[18] Only when this has been done and, in addition, only when "far-seeing statesmen have come to the fore in all nations" and when the Germans themselves have once again embraced an ideal which is worthy of defense—only then will it be permissible to ask the German people by a plebiscite if they are willing to take up arms to defend the freedom of Europe against *both* the West and the East.[19]

To some forces inside the ESB, however, the resolutions at Malmö and the argumentation of Priester seemed to be lacking in virulence. They regretted in particular the reluctance of the ESB leadership to adopt a clear-cut racist plank in its political program. This led to frictions within the various member-organizations of the ESB. The first open break occurred within the French extreme-Rightist organization, *Comité National Français.* Réné Binet, author of *Théorie du Racisme* (1950), pre-war Communist, collaborationist, SS volunteer, violent anti-Semite, and editor of the fanatic *La Sentinelle,* insisted that race purity be made a keystone of the ESB. Maurice Bardèche, former professor of literature at Lille, ardent pro-Fascist and strong anti-Semite, demurred on grounds of practical politics in

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 13.
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 14.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 10.
[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 6-7.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 21.
[19] *Ibid.*

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post-war Europe and left the *Comité National Français.* Binet in turn promptly broke with the ESB and called for a meeting of all those who wanted to see Europe "reborn" on the basis of a complete racial program. In this he was warmly seconded by Guy Amaudruz. On September 28-30, 1951, the rebels held a meeting in Zurich at which the New European Order (NEO) was founded. Calling for a war against Bolshevist mongols and capitalist Negroes, the conference saw the distinctive task of Europe in the support of the white man in his fight for racial survival and *Aufartung* (!).[20]

Over a year later, in January 1953, at the Third Congress of the NEO in Paris, delegates from Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy and Spain decided to form a European Liaison Center of the National Forces—*Europäische Verbindungsstelle* (EVS). A permanent secretariat was established in Lausanne under the direction of Amaudruz. As his deputy, one of the two German delegates, Michael Schenk-Dengg, County Chairman of the radically folkish and nationalist *Deutscher Block,* was elected.

In the years 1953-54, the newly constituted EVS and its parent organization, the NEO (which continued a quasi-independent existence, even though the membership was practically identical), became astonishingly active. Of the numerous meetings which were held only one—held at Lörrach on December 12-13, 1953—need detain us here, for it reflected the growth of the EVS. Besides the leading French groups, headed by Binet and Achart, and the Swiss People's Party represented by Amaudruz, Erich Vollenweider (Editor-in-Chief of the *Volksruf*) and Ernst Schmid,[21] Belgian, German and Austrian organizations were also represented. The presence of the Turkish General Rifat Atilhan, the MSI leader Tullio Abelli, and the Spanish Falange representative, Albinana, added prestige to the meeting. Among the German participants the *Deutscher Block* was most strongly

[20] *Cf. Die Brücke,* Auslandsdienst, IV. Jg., Folge 14, August 1957, p. 5, and *Demokratische Gesellschaft 1952,* "Nationalistische Neutralisten aller Länder —vereinigt Euch!" June 1954, p. 2. See also Actuel Service, *op. cit.,* col. 10.

[21] The last two more especially represented the European Workers Movement which they, together with Amaudruz, had created in December 1952. Schmid was also the leader of a nationalist youth group called *Junge Garde* which maintained close contact with Etzel's *Jugendbund Adler* and Matthaei's (later Nahrath's) *Wiking Jugend* in Germany and with Konrad Windisch's *Bund Heimattreuer Jugend* in Austria. See *Feinde der Demokratie,* Jg. III, Nr. 9, August 5, 1954, p. 31.

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represented. In addition, the meeting was attended by Max Herzog, the faithful member of the Socialist Reich Party,[22] the Berlin nationalist-activist Erwin Schönborn, and the notorious former member of the *Bundestag,* Wolfgang Hedler.[23] Of interest to us is also the participation of former Major General Fritz Brehm of the SS, Domestic Editor of the Soviet-financed, nationalist-neutralist paper *Deutsche National-Zeitung* and co-publisher of the equally suspect *Nation.*[24]

The EVS viewed the United States and Soviet Russia as sharing identical aims and policies. Both wish to divide the world into two spheres of influence which they could then exploit without fear of interference by the other; both, therefore, are imperialists on the grandest scale that know only colonies or satellites, not allies. Europe can escape the horrible fate of perpetual slavery only if the national forces in each country succeed in removing the so-called "democratic" oligarchy and if they then join in a coalition of national armies. To do this the servants and accomplices of the occupying Powers, East and West, must be done away with and the Moslem peoples must be gained as allies in the fight against the West and East blocs.

Despite brave talk all was not well within the EVS. For some time the perennial South Tirolean problem had again begun to poison the atmosphere of mutual tolerance and respect prevailing in the "International of nationalists". The Austrian delegation passionately accused the MSI not only of tolerating the enslavement of German folk units in South Tirol, but of positively furthering it. In August 1955 Karl Meissner, chairman of the extremist nationalist *Deutscher Block,* declared that it

[22] Concerning Herzog see letter of former SRP functionary Karl Theodore Förster to General Remer, December 5, 1952. Herzog was made Deputy General Secretary replacing Schenk-Dengg who was ousted on grounds of "inadequate activity".

[23] Hedler had been pardoned only a few months earlier, after having served approximately half of a nine-month sentence for anti-Semitic remarks and defamation of the men of July 20, 1944.

[24] Brehm had been instrumental in organizing the *Arbeitskreis Nationaler Gruppen* (Working Association of National Groups) (ANG) in which were prominent the *Hitler Jugend* ideologist Gottfried Grismayr, the veteran Kapp *Putschist,* Wilhelm Kiefer, along with nationalist-neutralist and partly even East-oriented activists such as Rudolf Jungnickel, General Schrank, Major Baier and Wolf Schenke. The lines of contact between ANG and the *Gauleiter* group around Werner Naumann and the *Hitler Jugend* leader group around Jurczek, Zantek, Axmann, and others, were direct.

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would be unthinkable for national forces in Germany to collaborate with the MSI as long as the latter was guilty of abetting the flagrant and constant violation of the regional autonomy of South Tirol.[25] This attitude was shared not only by the Austrian delegates, but also by Vollenweider's Swiss *Volkspartei* and by the *Wiking Jugend* organization. All four affiliates resigned from the EVS.

The indications of rapid disintegration which characterized the EVS during the summer of 1955 had no doubt been welcome signs for its rival organization. Yet, the ESB was hardly in any position to exploit the discomfiture of the EVS. While the ESB had so far avoided a showdown with the MSI, there were many other national jealousies which strained the organization. In the autumn of 1956 there occurred finally a rupture in the restive front of the ESB which was not unlike the clash that had wrecked the EVS the previous year. Priester had been invited to attend (on November 24-26, 1956) the fifth congress of the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* in Milan. What he heard and saw there persuaded him to call, in his newspaper, for an open break with the MSI.[26] Clearly the leadership of the MSI had become more interested in the practical business of maneuvering within the Italian parliamentary structure than in bandying brave words about the ideal of a folkish and élitist Europe with would-be politicians from other lands who seemed to have no real expectations of being taken seriously in their own countries. "It is high time", closes the report of the disappointed and jilted Priester, "that those national forces of the people of Europe which are collaborating within the European Social Movement decide at long last to replace the Italian representatives with Italian fighters who are more interested in the future of our peoples and of our bedevilled continent than in propaganda speeches."

By 1957 the once lively bustle of meetings, proclamations and radical talk in and around the ESB and its German section (DSB) had become muted. Other forces had come to the fore inside Germany and elsewhere and soon began to play a more energetic rôle in the "nationalist International".

[25] *Die Brücke, loc. cit.;* also *Politik und Wirtschaft,* September 2, 1955; *Deutscher Informationsdienst,* Nr. 506, October 4, 1955.

[26] "Die entscheidende Stunde versaeumt. . . .", *Die Europäische Nationale,* 6. Jg., Nr. 71, December 1956, p. 4.

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IV

Ever since the Treaty of Versailles there existed a movement in the newly acquired French area of Alsace which proclaimed the autonomy of this area as its minimum demand. This Alsatian Folk Movement provided much of the material and ideological basis for a so-called *Europäische Volksbewegung* (EVB)–*Mouvement Populaire Européen* (MPE), an organization founded in 1951 by Frédéric G. Becker, a professor in a Strasbourg college of agriculture. From its very inception, the EVB was meant as a protest against, and an alternative to, the European Movement which Churchill had resuscitated in his famous address at the University of Zurich in September 1948 and which had found institutional expression in the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. To Becker and his followers, Strasbourg was but a transparent veil vainly attempting to hide the age-old game of France's "Richelieu politicians".[27] As against this sham and duplicity, the EVB called for a real peace between Germany and France, free of mutual resentments and on the basis of full equality.[28]

In the by-laws of the EVB and in the speeches of its leaders, the recurrent demands are almost identical with those which we by now recognize as characteristic of the *Nation Europa* syndrome. The political unification of Europe into a federal state for purposes of creating a unit strong enough to be an equal of the two existing super-Power blocs formed the basis of the demands of EVB just as it was the basis of ESB and EVS demands. This federated Europe, having achieved the power to extricate itself from the grip or influence of both the United States and the Soviet Union would—under the slogan, "Europe for the Europeans"—represent a Third Force of absolute neutrality between the alien and inimical Powers in the East and the West. This status of Third Force, of mediator between the Eastern and Western extremes, would also find its reflection in the economic system of the new federal *Nation Europa*. Feeling an equal abhorrence for the finance capitalism of the United States as for the state Bolshevism of the U.S.S.R., the EVB, precisely like the ESB or EVS, advocated a national, true socialism

[27] See Frédéric G. Becker, "Die Europäische Volksbewegung im Kampf mit der 'Europa-Heuchelei'", *Europaruf*, 1. Jg., Folge 8/9, September 15, 1957, p. 2; *cf. Die Brücke*, II. Jg., Folge 12, December 1955, pp. 1-2.

[28] *Ibid.*

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as a solution to the unresolved problems which bedevil both capitalist and Marxist economies.[29]

The organization of the EVB rested very largely on France and Germany although some feeble attempts had been made to provide it with a broader international basis. In France, apart from Alsace, its main strength lay in the so-called *Phalangue Française* in Paris, a radical, rabidly antiparliamentarian organization under the leadership of Charles Luca[30] and Roland Cavallier. Secretary General of the *Phalangue,* Henri Roques, was at the same time Secretary General of the French section of the EVB and maintained close connections with the *Wiking Jugend*[31] as well as with the *Jugendbund Adler*[32] and with the Austrian *Bund Heimattreuer Jugend.* All three, it will be remembered, were in close contact with the EVS in 1954-55. Militant and pugnacious, the *Phalangue Française* rejected parliamentarism in favor of a corporative order which in accordance with the fascist model gave representation to the various occupational estates.[33] The spirit of this organization was said to be characterized by the following quotation from Charles Luca: "Our chiefs have made mistakes but we never speak of that. To criticize the leaders is the beginning of anarchy. . . ."[34]

In the beginning of 1956 Ernst E. Stockinger (of Urach), a prominent member of Otto Strasser's circle of followers, took over the leadership of the German section of the EVB which has its headquarters in the bordertown of Kehl. Later, Strasser's former disciple and collaborator, W. Wadsack of Munich, became Chairman of the German section.[35] This close personnel interlacing of the EVB and the Strasser movement in Germany was carefully emphasized in the organization's publicity which

[29] For these demands see EVB handbills entitled "Aktiv für Gesamt-Europa", no date, but probably 1955, and "Europäer, aufgewacht!", no date, probably also 1955. *Cf.* Frédéric G. Becker, "Eine deutsch-französische Europa-Front muss entstehen um den Europa-Gedanken auf die rechte Bahn zu bringen!", an address before the Founding Party Convention of the *Deutsche Soziale Union (Strasser-Partei),* Miltenberg (Hesse), June 17, 1956, reprinted as "Sonderdruck aus 'Ziel und Weg'" (June 1956).

[30] Luca recently organized in Paris a self-avowed "Fascist Party".

[31] See *supra,* pp. 573 *et seq.*

[32] This, for all intents and purposes, is a part of Meissner's *Deutscher Block.* See *supra,* p. 573.

[33] See *Die Brücke,* IV. Jg., Folge 14, August 1957, p. 7. [34] *Ibid.*

[35] *Die Brücke,* III. Jg., Folge 2, February 1956.

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also stressed the conservative revolutionary heritage of the nationalist Pan-Europe idea:

> On our route of march toward the goal of a united Europe we are being accompanied in Germany by the *Deutsche Soziale Union* under the leadership of Dr. Otto Strasser. This man proclaimed the Pan-European idea not only today or yesterday, but as long ago as several decades—as for instance in his brochure *Europäische Föderation* which appeared in Zurich in 1934.[36]

After the death of the German honorary co-president of the EVB, Dr. Hugo Eckener, the Zeppelin pioneer, the honorary presidency was conferred upon Dr. Otto Strasser. While the EVB had largely accepted the foreign political analysis which had led Strasser in 1934 to the demand for a European confederation, this only served to obscure an important divergence in goals. In Strasser's brochure *Europäische Föderation* (1934) and again in the second edition of his *Deutschlands Erneuerung* which he concluded in the latter part of 1945, he urged a European confederation which would collaborate "with the other world confederations such as the British Commonwealth, the Pan-American Union and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" as well as with the peoples of the Middle and Far East. But Strasser emphasized that Europe's only chance lay in a confederation *without* a central government.[37] The EVB, on the other hand, envisioned a federal European government, that is, a central government, with binding governmental powers and authority.[38]

For the time being, these differences in goal were buried under more immediate and important concerns which the EVB shared with the Strasser movement. One was opposition to United States–oriented policies which were designed to create a Western military alliance under American leadership and in unmistakable opposition to the Soviet Union. The Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were seen—not as contributions to an eventual

[36] Contained in a handbill entitled "Aktiv für Gesamt-Europa", no date, most probably 1955.

[37] See summary of Strasser's political views in *Demokratische Gesellschaft 1952*, "Der Politiker Dr. Otto Strasser", November 1954, p. 4. In an article entitled "Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben!" Strasser demands "European confederation, *not* integration: units, or rather entities, peoples, tribes, races (and that means boundaries, hierarchy, contours) are God-given. Only a confederation allows for this fact for which allowance must be made." Quoted in *CrP Informationsdienst*, February 1957, p. 20.

[38] Interview with W. Wadsack, Munich, July 3, 1957.

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European Union—but as fig leaves concealing the exploitation of German natural resources and human war matériel by the West. These Plans were, in the eyes of Strasser and of the EVB, little else but euphemisms for the continuation of the Morgenthau Plan by other means.[39] Not integration with America, but neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union was Strasser's goal—in 1955, no less than in 1928 or 1934—just as it was the goal of the EVB.

Strasser's opposition to parliamentarism and to party democracy, as well as his rejection of liberalism and the capitalist economic system, also agreed with the views of the EVB on these matters. Thus on the occasion of Strasser's acceptance of the honorary co-presidency of the EVB, the Information Service of the EVB (in its German edition) commented:

> We greet in Dr. Otto Strasser the genuine Socialist who . . . believes with passionate heart in the ideal of a social new order. . . . We greet in Dr. Strasser the realist who sees in an independent, socially governed, and neutral Europe . . . the only possibility of overcoming the fatal division of the continent and especially of Germany.[40]

With the phenomenal rise of the Poujadist movement in France, the attention of Frédéric Becker and Strasser turned to it. Speaking repeatedly before the *Parti Social Français* and the Italian *Sezione Poujadista,* Becker attempted to bring them into the EVB. These efforts were seconded by Strasser who entered into close collaboration with the founder and chairman of the Poujadist "International of the Middle Class", the Roman lawyer Vittorio Ambrosini. At the founding of Strasser's new party, the *Deutsche Soziale Union,* June 17, 1956, in Miltenberg (Hesse), Ambrosini graced the speaker's table together with such other foreign dignitaries as Becker and Henri Roques. These contacts with the Poujade movement established also points of contact with the ESB, especially through Poujade's chief lieutenant in the French National Assembly, Tixier-Vignancourt, the former Vichy Propaganda Minister, who was also a member of the Executive Committee of the French section of the ESB.[41]

[39] *Cf. Europa von Morgen!,* Ständedemokratischer Solidaristischer Pressedienst, Berlin, February 1952, pp. 3-4, with Frédéric G. Becker, "Die Europäische Volksbewegung im Kampf mit der 'Europa Heuchelei' ", *loc. cit.*

[40] Reprinted in *Die Brücke,* II. Jg., Folge 8-9, September 1955, pp. 9-10.

[41] On the political past of the guiding spirits behind Poujadism see *Hamburger Brief,* II, Nr. 87, September 1, 1956, and Nr. 91, September 19, 1956, Sondermaterial.

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Yet a closer working relationship between the German section of EVB and ESB was impossible because of the profound mutual dislike of Strasser and Priester.[42]

If the EVS had split upon the rock of nationalist egotisms on the South Tirolean issue in 1955, and if the ESB also foundered, a year later, on a conflict with the MSI, the EVB, in turn, was not spared internal tensions which eventually led to serious schisms. The difficulties in the EVB were twofold. In the first place the close interlocking of its German section with the Strasser movement displeased not only those "loyalists" who saw in Strasser primarily the sworn enemy of Hitler, but also those who stressed the incompatibility of the position of the EVB's international leadership, and its emphasis on a European federal government, with that of Strasser who feared the consequences of any supranational authority.

The second difficulty was here again a problem of conflicting nationalisms. In this case the bone of contention was not South Tirol, but French North Africa. On the one hand some *Nation Europa* forces, especially in Germany, saw their interest, and that of the Third Force Europe, as intimately tied up with a strongly pro-Arabic, anti-Israeli, anti-"Western imperialist" bloc of neutralist Powers. French nationalists, on the other hand, clamorously demanded the maintenance of French interests in North Africa. "France's renunciation of Algeria would mean the ruin of the white race", cried the *Phalangue Française*. "[It would mean] a defeat for European civilization, the end of Eurafrica and, beyond that, the end of European mutual understanding."[43] Thus, when the international headquarters of the EVB declared, "We support—without any mental reservations—the North African peoples in their struggle against capitalist colonialism",[44] a rupture with the *Phalangue* was inevitable. In the spring of 1957 the *Phalangue* declared its corporative withdrawal from the EVB.[45]

[42] See *Die Europäische Nationale,* 6. Jg., Nr. 66, July 1956, p. 9, and 6. Jg., Nr. 71, December 1956, p. 4.

[43] *Die Brücke,* IV. Jg., Folge 14, August 1957, p. 8.

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

[45] To be sure, the *Phalangue* permitted its individual members to continue their membership in the EVB, if they so desired, and Henri Roques, the Secretary General of the *Phalangue,* chose to retain his position as Secretary General of the French section of the EVB. *Ibid.*

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Thus, by 1957 the field of "nationalist internationalism" lay strewn with shattered hopes, futile efforts and broken organizations. The EVS had disintegrated, and the ESB, having proved unable to mobilize any appreciable sector of the extreme Right in European politics (and especially in Germany), became moribund. The EVB had lost the support of its vital basis in Paris and the radical, petty bourgeois "ham and eggs" movement of Poujade lacked the ideological conceptions to unfold an international dynamic. Strasser, finally, possessed the confidence neither of the former SS activists nor of those who wanted a strong centrally governed federated Europe. Under these circumstances, the ground for a realignment—and a new attempt at a rally—of the folkish nationalist forces that spoke for a neutralist *Nation Europa* was well prepared by 1956-1957. The realignment was attempted in 1957 by the so-called *Sozialorganische Ordnungsbewegung Europas* (Social Organic Order Movement of Europe).

V

In 1948 an Austrian court found Theodore Soucek, aged 29, guilty of having belonged to—nay, of having been the master mind of—a band of daredevils who had successfully engineered the escape from English and American prison camps of prisoners who were awaiting extradition to the Soviet occupation authorities. The court imposed the death sentence which was later commuted. During his prison term, Soucek wrote a book which purports to be both an analysis of the deeper roots of the political and socioeconomic crises of post-war Europe and a program for remedial political action. Entitled *Wir rufen Europa,*[46] the book has become what Hitler once had called Gottfried Feder's *Der deutsche Staat,* "the catechism of the movement".[47] The movement in this case is the Social Organic Order Movement which was officially founded on July 6, 1957 in the Upper Austrian city of Graz. *Wir rufen Europa* is a mixture of conservative revolutionary ideas, national socialist conceptions and folkish-organicist vocabulary. To these are added the lessons of the last

[46] Wels und Starnberg, 1956.

[47] München, 1924 (3. Anflage). See "Geleitwort Adolf Hitlers", p. 3. *Cf.* Erich Vollenweider, "Europa, hilf dir selbst", *Europaruf,* 1. Jg., Folge 8/9, September 15, 1957, p. 3: "[Soucek] hat in seinem Buch *Wir rufen Europa* ein Konzept entwickelt, das . . . den Katechismus einer Bewegung darstellt. . . ."

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twenty years, namely that chauvinistic nationalism would prove fatal in post-war Europe, that folkish policies must not deteriorate into genocide, and that authoritarianism must not pave the way for a totalitarian dictatorship.

After having explained the European crisis, the threat of Bolshevism and the failure of parliamentarism, Soucek sets forth a program for future action. The humiliating decline of Europe can be reversed only by the formation of a unified government which will again procure for the continent the position of world preëminence to which it is entitled by its cultural superiority and by the superiority of its human material. Such unification, however, can never come about without a general, binding commitment to a transcendent system of order. Soucek has provided that system: The social-organic idea of order based upon a conservative "socialism".

The contrived terminology of "social-organicism" cannot conceal the ancient vintage of the conception. Clearly Soucek has simply revived and adapted to post-war conditions what was common coinage among *bündische* youth and revolutionary conservatives in the late 1920's. When an organ of the youth movement declared at that time, "nationalism and socialism are identical for us; they are only different expressions for the one thing of supreme importance: The requirements for the life and the future of the nation",[48] it was saying no more than Soucek. And when in 1929 a suggestion for a *Nation Europa* came from the same political quarter, it was made in terms on which Soucek could hardly improve:

> The isolation of nations is as deplorable a legacy of the nineteenth century as is the isolation of the individual. The peoples—like individuals—must combine into groups, and the groups into leagues, into a spiritual whole, which possess the scope and the creative leadership typical of the medieval West. [They must combine], . . . not fuse into each other formlessly, but, on the contrary, to bring to the highest folkish flowering their particular potential and form, just as the individual requires the shaping law of the community to realize himself most fully.[49]

As the past has clearly shown that European unification will not come about through the agency either of the various national political parties or of the governments, Soucek argues that the

[48] *Deutsche Freischar*, III/7, p. 247, quoted in H. Pross, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[49] Deutsche Freischar (Herausg), *Englandfahrt 1909 und 1927* (Potsdam, 1929), p. 5, quoted in Pross, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-123.

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only remaining effective force is the peoples of Europe themselves. The first order of business remains then the organization of a grass-roots movement which by pressure from below will enforce the popular demand for unification through a plebiscite.

Despite many similarities in ultimate goals, such as a *Nation Europa,* antiparliamentarian, authoritarian and folkish in orientation, and a Eurafrican federation, armed and neutral between the two other great-Power blocs, Soucek's conception differs considerably from those of the ESB, EVS and the EVB. The main differences lie in Soucek's economic blueprint and in his attitude toward the Strasbourg experiment. Sharing with all other toilers in the vineyards of a folkish Pan-Europe a profound hostility to liberalism, Soucek also shares their contempt for a free market economy. His preferred remedy, however, is not some kind of corporativism, "solidarism" or fascism, but a social-organic economy, which turns out to be essentially a system of bureaucratic collectivism that receives its élan and direction from a managerial dictatorship. Clearly, this conception is far closer to the actual practice of National Socialism than the various estate or corporative theories which were adopted by a large number of the conservative revolutionary groups before 1933 and which are again the hallmark of most post-war rightist movements in Germany.[50]

Besides rejecting solidarism and corporativism as appropriate forms of non-liberal economic organization, Soucek also differs from his fellow nationalists in his attitude to official liberal efforts toward European integration. Unwilling to join their extremist vituperation against the Council of Europe and the Schuman and Pleven Plans, Soucek assumes an attitude of almost benevolent moderation in this regard. In fact, he goes so far as to interpret Strasbourg functionalism as a harbinger of the kind of European federation he envisages.

Soucek's uncompromising attitude in calling for a centralist, supranational European government was bound to make a favorable impression on those among the nationalists who saw in strong European leadership the guarantee for independence from

[50] For a critique of bureaucratic collectivism see Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York, 1942), pp. 222-228. In recent times, Soucek seems to have abandoned the demand for the direct control of the market through price and wage controls. See, e.g., *Europaruf,* "Droht eine Weltwirtschaftskrise?", 2. Jg., Folge 5, May 1, 1958, p. 1.

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the United States. The same circles could also be counted on to support Soucek's suggestion of a European plebiscite which would decide, over the heads of the several governments, on the unification of Europe and the creation of a central government. Therefore, when in mid-1956, following the publication of his book, *Wir rufen Europa,* Soucek launched a series of "Europe rallies", the response gave fair promise of providing new energy to the ailing and faint nationalist efforts on behalf of a folkish Pan-Europe.[51]

Soucek started the necessary organizational work in Austria, but soon took up negotiations with friendly forces in other countries, particularly with the radically folkish Swiss *Volkspartei* and its leader, Erich Vollenweider. These negotiations resulted in a journalistic partnership to which Vollenweider, as owner and publisher of the *Volksruf,* brought a monthly organ of opinion, and Soucek, his ideological baggage and skill as Editor-in-Chief. In January 1957 the paper appeared for the first time under its new title, *Europaruf.*

By the middle of 1957 the preparatory activity of Soucek and Vollenweider had been sufficiently fruitful to permit the organization of a founding meeting which took place in Graz, Soucek's home town, on July 6, 1957.[52] The new organization assumed the name of *Sozialorganische Ordnungsbewegung Europas* (SORBE) and accepted a program which was clearly derived from Soucek's catechism of the movement. The program was an acknowledgment of Europe as the cradle of the highest culture, of the *Schicksalsverbundenheit,* the indivisible unity, of all European peoples, and of the "social-organic interrelationship of all parts within the whole". SORBE demanded "the political, economic and spiritual unity of Europe", "the introduction of an economy of social-organic productivity" and the safeguarding of the "biological substance of all parts of the population". As an immediate, tactical program, SORBE called for the organization of a plebiscite which would create a European government and elect a European president.[53]

SORBE was founded; but would it be able to attract the many, frequently competing groups that propagandized for a

[51] See F. Peham, "Europas Jugend zur Vereinigungsidee", *Europaruf,* 1. Jg., Folge 4, April 15, 1957, p. 2.

[52] See *Europaruf,* 1. Jg., Folge 7, July 15, 1957, p. 1.

[53] *Ibid.,* p. 1.

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folkish Nation Europe? To judge from the contents of *Europaruf*, the answer was clearly "Yes." Apparently unwilling to insist on a specific doctrinal editorial line, lest they prejudice their chances of rallying the several groups, Soucek and Vollenweider seemed anxious to establish their paper as a common organ for all nationalist-folkish forces in the *Nation Europa* field. This results of course in a host of uncertainties and ambiguities. Thus, for instance, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the tone of the front page which is almost invariably reserved for a long and often studiedly moderate article by Soucek himself, explaining the various facets of his proposals for the unification of Europe, and that of the rest of the paper in which shrilly antidemocratic, anti-American, anti-Semitic, and other racist sentiments abound. The ambivalence extends even to policy matters. While in one breath the common European market and Western efforts toward that end are hailed as progressive steps[54] and the opponents of these attempts are pilloried as "conspirators against Europe",[55] H. R. Potthof, the General Secretary of the German section of the EVB, calls, in the very next breath, for "an end to the Strasbourg idyll!"[56] and Frédéric Becker, the head of the EVB, warns that European integration *à la* Strasbourg is nothing but "imperialism under a 'European' flag".[57]

A glance at the contributing authors appearing in the columns of the *Europaruf* bears out the initial estimate of the measure of success achieved by Soucek and Vollenweider in rallying uncommitted or hitherto unsuccessful *Nation Europa* boosters. In October 1957, *Europaruf*[58] was able to report that the EVB with both its German section (under Potthof) and its French section (under Henri Roques) had corporatively joined SORBE and accepted its program in full. Equally significant is the connection of SORBE with one of the founders of the ESB, the French nationalist pamphleteer and *quondam* professor of literature, Maurice Bardèche.

When EVB joined SORBE, thereby unmistakably severing its ties to the Strasser movement, the way seemed clear for a *rap-*

[54] See, e.g., *Europaruf*, 1. Jg., Folge 4, April 15, 1957, p. 1; Folge 5, May 15, 1957, p. 7.

[55] See Maurice Bardèche's article in *Europaruf*, 1. Jg., Folge 7, July 15, 1957, p. 7.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 4. [57] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[58] 1. Jg., Folge 10, October 15, 1957, p. 1.

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prochement with the *Phalangue Française,* though divergent attitudes toward France's colonial policies may again prevent harmonious partnership. A measure of renewed collaboration at least was evidenced by the appearance in *Europaruf* of an article by Roland Cavallier, one of the leaders of the *Phalangue.*[59]

Soucek's efforts to profit from the legacy of the all but defunct ESB by attracting foreign and German SS-veterans organizations into his fold were crowned by a measure of success. The Flemish collaborationist Piet van Rossem, the former leader of the *Vlaams Blok,* and his party colleague, Senaeve, were hospitably received in the columns of the *Europaruf,*[60] and the German section of the paper was initially placed in the hands of Lothar Greil, later Secretary General of the combat-SS organization *HiaG.*[61]

On October 1, 1957 H. R. Potthof, the former General Secretary of the German section of the EVB, called a founding convention in his home town of Kehl to establish a German branch of SORBE.[62] Shortly thereafter Soucek announced plans for holding the so-called "First European Congress" of SORBE in Salzburg on December 7 and 8, 1957.[63]

Welcomed by the Mayor of Salzburg and in the presence of the Governor of the Province,[64] about five hundred delegates from many parts of Europe (and even South Africa) foregathered on December 7, 1957 to hear somewhat vague versions of the political concepts and demands of SORBE. The theoretical basis of Soucek's organization was presented in terms that revealed

[59] 2. Jg., Folge 5, May 1, 1958, p. 2.

[60] See e.g., 1. Jg., Folge 10, October 15, 1957, Folge 12, December 15, 1957; 2. Jg., Folge 1, January 1, 1958. *Cf. Die Brücke,* Auslandsdienst, IV. Jg., Folge 16, October 1957, p. 1.

[61] Greil, who has recently resigned from that position in the course of an intra-organizational controversy, gave ample space in *Europaruf* to the writings of his friend, Erich Kernmayr, the former Editor-in-Chief of the Right-radical *Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung* and of the *HiaG* journal, *Der Freiwillige.* The influence of the Kernmayr-Greil combination in the first six issues of *Europaruf* was very great. Thus, for instance, in the April 1957 number these two alone filled almost one third of all available space. In the current factional battle inside *HiaG,* Greil and Kernmayr are the leaders of those who reject any *rapprochement* with the Bonn Republic and its major parties, especially the SPD.

[62] *Europaruf,* 1. Jg., Folge 11, November 15, 1957, p. 3.

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] See *Europaruf,* 2. Jg., Folge 1, January 1, 1958, p. 1.

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clearly its close connection with the conservative revolutionary movement. "Materially sound and organic, not materialistic and chauvinistic",[65] the "social-organic" economy was described as based upon the *biologische art- und schicksalsmässige Verkettung* of the individual with the family and his "folk".[66]

The application of biology to social problems was even more clearly demonstrated by a South African guest speaker, Jan Marais, who underlined the importance of Europe's support for its "pioneers" in Africa. *Eurafrica* depends on strengthening "Europe in Africa", that is, the Union of South Africa, as a frontier post of the white race in its struggle for existence.

Henri Roques's address advocated Europe for the Europeans, a neutral Third Force, free from domination either by East or by West, a theme which also underlay Soucek's speech that followed Roques's. After blaming the West for the preëminence of Soviet Russia and calling the 9th of May, 1945, the wreath on the tomb of European freedom, Soucek turned to the substantive problems of European integration. He demanded a uniform currency, removal of all customs and tariff barriers, and the creation of a European-African common market. Finally, after calling for a social-organic economic system, Soucek demanded in the name of SORBE the withdrawal of all occupation troops, free elections in all states including those of Eastern Europe, and the declaration of armed neutrality for all of Europe.[67]

In 1958 SORBE continued its organizational activity, exhibiting special solicitude for SS-veterans organizations and—in Germany—for the victims of denazification. This emphasis became especially noticeable in a series of well-publicized and well-attended meetings and rallies in Zurich, Frankfurt, Nordhorn, Amsterdam, Paris, Baden-Baden and Osnabrück. At the same time, Soucek was equally anxious to establish contact with official, government-sponsored groups for European unity with a view toward "coördinating and unifying all existing organizations for a United Europe". In March 1958, at the Osnabrück rally, Soucek publicly raised the question of collaboration, a suggestion which met the approval not only of his audience, but

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[66] This wording is not reprinted in *Europaruf* but is reported in *Die Brücke*, IV. Jg., Folge 20, December 1957, p. 2.

[67] *Ibid.*

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also, implicitly at least, of the local press.[68] According to Soucek, talks in Osnabrück with the president of the Lower Saxony chapter of the "European Union" led to a formal discussion on October 21, 1958 with the Secretary General of "European Union" in Bonn.[69]

In the meantime, preparations were made for the Second European Congress of the Social Organic Order Movement which was to take place in Salzburg on November 15 and 16, 1958. The invitations left no doubt that the Congress was actually to be turned into an international meeting of SS veterans from Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Norway and of Italian Black Shirts together with veterans of the Spanish Blue Division. As a consequence, the Austrian government prohibited the meeting and on October 25, 1958 ordered the dissolution of the Austrian section of SORBE.[70] Only at this point—if we are to believe Soucek—did the Secretary General of "European Union" think it desirable to deny vigorously that he had had any negotiations with SORBE concerning possible modes of coöperation, let alone fusion, and to state publicly that he would refuse to negotiate with an organization which was "indubitably neo-fascist in character".

VI

The preceding pages have sketched a number of variations on the theme of the persistence and adaptation of national socialist, fascist and conservative revolutionary ideological commitments and doctrines. As the core of shared effort, the *Nation Europa* emerges—depending on the group which uses the term—either as a form of SS Europe in which Germany, or at least the Germanic race, plays the decisive leadership rôle, or as a federation of equals in which the unifying cement is provided by the folkish, authoritarian "structure of order" which will have replaced the liberalistic-parliamentary régimes in the West and the Bolshevik dictatorships in the Eastern European states.

In actual fact, of course, one of the unifying bonds is the shared resentment against the victorious Allies of the Second World War—especially the virulent hatred of the United States—

[68] *Feinde der Demokratie*, Jg. VIII, Nr. 1-2, January 15, 1959, p. 20.

[69] *Europaruf*, 2. Jg., Folge 12, December 1958, p. 2.

[70] *Ibid. Cf.* H. Jaeger (ed.), *Bulletin on German Questions*, vol. X, No. 226, December 3, 1958, p. 12.

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which characterizes all of these movements. The usefulness of anti-Americanism for "European" nationalists is of course great, particularly as "America" stands as the symbol not of one but of all the evils which the nationalist sees as besetting this world. America stands for liberalism with its hypocrisies and sham freedoms, for plutocracy and for crass materialism, for the social rule of the mass man, and the destruction of all higher values which that involves, for the outstanding example of a decadent, mongrelized people in which the Jew and the Negro can play their corrosive rôle.

The unity of the folkish federation of Europe rests, however, not only on resentment, but also on a positive vision of strength. That strength is identified with a posture of armed European neutrality and Eurafrican autarky. Neutrality, under present conditions, represents a declaration of political independence, as autarky reflects economic independence. In the writings and speeches of some of the *Nation Europa* enthusiasts one can read and hear overtones which go, almost imperceptibly, beyond independence. There is the confidence that political and economic independence would once again in fact mean (by virtue of the biological superiority of the European) the primacy of Europe, its values, its political control and its trade.

The importance of the forces which have labored hard and long in the vineyards of *Nation Europa* does not lie in their immediate successes. The vintage produced so far has had relatively few buyers. Their importance lies rather in the fact that they are exploiting resentments and hopes which are shared, in greater or lesser degree, by a very considerable part of the West German population, regardless of their present faithfulness to the Christian Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party or some other democratic political group. In short, *Nation Europa,* currently in the hands of the discredited extremists and bitter-enders, is built upon fears, hopes, resentments and illusions which are widespread and which under certain conditions could well propel their spokesmen or symbolic leaders into seats of power.

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Detachment and the Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker. Edited by PHIL L. SNYDER. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958.—xvi, 240 pp. $3.50.

Carl Becker's Heavenly City Revisited. Edited by RAYMOND O. ROCKWOOD. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958.—xxxii, 227 pp. $4.50.

To a degree unmatched by any other American historian of his time, Carl Lotus Becker (1873-1945) has become the center of a cult. "Cult" and not "school" is the proper word, I think. For, unlike Frederick Jackson Turner, Becker never propounded any interpretive thesis capable of directing and shaping numerous treatments of a major area of history. Furthermore, unlike Charles A. Beard, he declined to rally historians to any particular notion of their calling's social uses. On occasion he did suggest that he and his colleagues should acknowledge their rôle as witch doctors charged with periodically reworking the tribal myths, in order to keep them up-to-date; but it would be difficult to organize a school on that basis. Instead, Carl Becker has attracted interest, admiration and animosity because of his own highly personal performance. He was a quietly challenging teacher, a poser of shrewd and disconcerting questions, and the master of an urbane, witty, paradoxical style of writing. The two volumes reviewed here set some examples of these qualities beside a striking confrontation of the cult and the now apparently mounting opposition to it.

The essays and letters, under the title of an article Becker published in 1910, actually deal with a wide variety of topics. After an editor's preface and a short introduction by George H. Sabine, the reader comes upon a cluster of discourses on historical knowledge, all previously printed elsewhere, together with several letters to fellow historians. There is little news in this section for anyone acquainted with Becker's skeptical relativism. However, an article first drafted in 1926 and entitled "What Are Historical Facts?" contains a particularly extreme formulation of what can only be called historical nominalism: "If the people of the United States had been incapable of enduring memory . . . would the assassination of Lincoln be now doing work in the world, making a difference? If everyone had forgotten the occurrence after forty-eight hours, what difference would the occurrence have made, then or since?" A good deal

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of difference, right then, to Andrew Johnson. As much difference, since then, as many other occurrences of which the people of the United States really do have no memory, but which, as links in causal chains, are still "doing work in the world".

The remaining two sections of the Becker volume are considerably less controversial, but more worth while. One is concerned with education, the other with democracy. In the latter set of selections are an excellent essay on Tocqueville, hitherto unpublished, and the superb tribute to Jefferson, delivered in 1943.

The companion volume, *Carl Becker's Heavenly City Revisited,* derives from an all-day symposium held on October 13, 1956, at Colgate, in connection with the annual meeting of the New York State Association of European Historians. The three groups of chapters comprise, respectively, papers delivered on that occasion, informal remarks made from the floor or platform and subsequently summarized for publication, and a final set of four reflective essays apparently written especially for this book. As the title indicates, all portions bear on the reassessment of Becker's most famous work, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers,* twenty-five years after he delivered the Yale lectures from which it grew.

Thus, in Part I, "The Critique", are found the symposium contributions of Henry Guerlac, Peter Gay and Walter L. Dorn. Speaking gently, with affectionate references to his boyhood as a Cornell professor's son, Guerlac nevertheless reveals how imperfect was the treatment of early modern scientific thought in *The Heavenly City.* Essentially, however, Guerlac is less interested in criticizing Carl Becker than in reviewing, as he does with great skill, the strides taken during the past quarter-century in the history of science. Dorn too cites post-1931 scholarship to suggest that if Burckhardt had brilliantly overstated change, the break with the medieval world, in his delineation of the Renaissance, Becker's portrayal of the Enlightenment was just as exaggerated in its insistence on continuity. Many readers of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY are already acquainted with Peter Gay's remarks, which were first published in this journal in June 1957. Suffice it to say here that Gay's essay is a sharp, judicious and, in my opinion, long overdue antidote to *The Heavenly City.* Smooth and engaging as the book unquestionably is, in seeking to make the *philosophes* just some more men of faith—now timid, now naïvely confident, but always closer to Thomas Aquinas than to us—it merits Gay's conclusion (p. 51) that it has "every virtue save one, the virtue of being right."

The present compass makes it impossible to summarize the panel discussion remarks of Geoffrey Bruun, W. H. Coates and

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Louis Gottschalk and of Misses Beatrice Hyslop and Gussie E. Gaskill, or the reflections written later by John Hall Stewart, Ralph H. Bowen and Edward Whiting Fox. In general, these comments range from variegated tributes to Becker by the former group and by Stewart to remarkably acid condemnations by Bowen and Fox.

It is not easy to strike a note which will do justice to the memory of one of our greatest historians, taking his life's work as a whole, and will yet bear witness to the dangers and weakness in his best-known volume. Perhaps the fairest concluding estimate should combine R. R. Palmer's remarks at the 1956 symposium with Leo Gershoy's subsequent reflections. Palmer's admiration for the witty charm of *The Heavenly City,* mixed with increased misgivings on each rereading of its pages, is shared, I imagine, by very many of us. His suggestion that Becker's outlook was in certain important respects not historical at all is disconcerting, but it fits the evidence. That being the case, we are indeed risking charges of carping professionalism if we criticize the book for not being something its author never intended it to be, a balanced analysis of the Enlightenment—or for being precisely what he did intend it to be, an impudent, suggestive juggling of familiar materials.

Yet Palmer does not let Carl Becker off that easily, nor can any other historian who seeks through care and honesty to approximate, as closely as obvious human limitations will permit, something he must be naïve enough to call the truth. At his best, Becker was a fine writer and a relentlessly incisive commentator on the foibles of the past, the present and, inevitably, the future. At his worst, he let his justified caution about "facts" become outright contempt, producing bad history and a question-begging methodology. After all, if one argues that there is no such thing as objective evidence, he is free to support his argument with whatever sort of evidence happens to suit him best. The most serious charge that can be made and, I believe, sustained against *The Heavenly City* is that it is an anti-historical work disguised as a work of history.

Just here Leo Gershoy's defense of Becker becomes extremely important. What Gershoy does is to remind us that the pessimistic Pyrrhonist who in 1931 wrote both *The Heavenly City* and "Everyman His Own Historian" was not the Becker who eventually acknowledged his debt to the *philosophes.* It took Nazi Germany to convince him that there was, after all, something to the liberal value system he had inherited from the eighteenth century; but no one who reads the works of his last years can doubt that he was convinced. Becker, master of humor through

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paradox that he was, might even agree that his own career featured a paradoxical twist, though not a very humorous one. In the early 1930's, he was depressed over democracy's patent flaws and over his personal inability to find solid intellectual footing for a profession to which he was committed. He seems to have been at odds with his calling, but no less so with himself. Hence the paradox that his two most cleverly written and most widely known statements—one a book, the other a presidential address—were products of a period in his philosophical development marked, if not by sterility, at least by something close to despondent cynicism.

FRANKLIN L. FORD

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Nehru: A Political Biography. By MICHAEL BRECHER. London, New York, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1959.—xvi, 682 pp. $8.50.

Much of the story of modern India centers on the life and work of Jawaharlal Nehru. It is surprising that such a towering and conspicuous public figure has been so badly served by his biographers. No one has provided insights into his character and basic beliefs remotely comparable to those which he has himself furnished in his writings and speeches. The first reasonably adequate biography of Nehru was published by Frank Moraes only a few years ago.

Professor Brecher's full-length treatment of Nehru is the first biography which really does justice to the subject. As such, its appearance is a major publishing event. It is certainly the best life of Nehru that has been published, and it is perhaps the most readable and comprehensive single volume on modern India.

As the subtitle suggests, the author has deliberately written a *political* biography. His is a "life and times" approach. The justification for this approach is that Nehru played a central rôle in these happenings. After all, he has had little private life for more than two decades. His occasional efforts to retire from his post as prime minister have provoked anguished pleas from his associates and from the country generally.

Professor Brecher has obviously fallen under Nehru's spell. He regards Nehru as the voice of the Indian revolution, as "the embodiment of an intelligentsia constantly in turmoil" (p. 596), as "India's nation-builder" (p. 629). He does not gloss over Nehru's weaknesses, but he holds that they are "the weaknesses of a giant" (p. 629). He realizes that Nehru has so dominated

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the Indian scene that the questions, "After Nehru, Who?" and "After Nehru, What?", have a particular urgency. He does not minimize the dangers of political fragmentation, or of some form of Hindu or of Communist authoritarianism, but he believes that India will remain united and will not succumb to extremism. "Nehru's passing will certainly put a severe strain on Indian unity, but it is not likely to be catastrophic. . . . The basic problem is to substitute loyalty to institutions for loyalty to a man" (pp. 637, 638). Obviously Professor Brecher does not regard the continuance of the Indian National Congress in power as a prerequisite for India's survival as a democratic state. Indeed, he writes, "it would certainly not be a surprise if the Congress is removed from power within a decade" (p. 637).

The weaknesses of the book are largely inherent in the "life and times" approach. Frequently even Nehru is lost in the detailed accounts of major historical events. Somehow, for all the wealth of detail, Nehru as a person does not emerge clearly in these pages. Much of the material is familiar to any student of modern India. The book could have been more tightly written, for there is a great deal of repetition. Among the remarkably few errors is the characterization of Rajagopalacharias as "the first and last Governor-General of the Dominion of India" (p. 86). Misleading or questionable statements are more frequent. It is certainly misleading to state that partition "was a voluntary choice by Nehru, Patel, and their colleagues" (p. 375), and it is questionable that "Gandhi lacked Nehru's vision" (p. 619).

Although this is more a portrait of a period than of a man, a great deal of fascinating information is presented about Nehru himself. Particularly interesting are the analyses of Nehru's relationships with Gandhi and Patel, and the story of the shifting composition of "the inner circles" about Nehru since 1947.

This book is a physical as well as intellectual *tour de force*. It is the product of painstaking research, supplemented by interviews with some 400 persons. The author was permitted to accompany Nehru on a three-day tour in 1956, and he had lengthy discussions with the Indian Prime Minister on at least two other occasions, the latest in the spring of 1958.

Professor Brecher has not wholly succeeded in his formidable task, but he has come closer to success than any of the previous biographers of a man whose many-faceted life and complex personality cannot be treated adequately by any writer, however perceptive he may be. After all, Nehru has often confessed that he baffles himself!

NORMAN D. PALMER

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

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New England State Politics. By DUANE LOCKARD. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—xi, 348 pp. $6.00.

This is really two books—a meaty yet panoramic survey of politics in each of the six New England states, and an attempt to relate major findings in this area to current problems and hypotheses about state political systems. Both these efforts the author carries off with great success.

With wit, insight and clarity Mr. Lockard, a former state senator in Connecticut who now teaches at Connecticut College, surveys the one-party factionalism of Vermont and the "low-pressure politics" of its legislature; the divisions among conservatives in New Hampshire and the poor leadership but great potential of its Democrats; Maine's multifactionalism which, like the same tendency in the South, gives added power to conservative business interests; the unusual combination in Massachusetts of disorganized parties (at least on the Democratic side) but cohesive party voting in the legislature; Rhode Island's "one-party façade and two-party reality"; and Connecticut's remarkable party system, competitive, unified and highly effective in the legislature.

Professor Lockard quite rightly stresses the rôle of ethnic elements throughout the volume and devotes also a full chapter to the subject at the end. While southern New England politics is saturated with religious and national influences, the author agrees with recent findings that ethnic affiliation alone is not a powerful political factor. He adds, however, that a man with whom Polish or Italian voters can identify with pride may get "just the added fillip needed for success." He also makes clear, though, that ethnic factors contribute further to the disorganization of state parties.

The author makes a major theoretical contribution in going beyond the ordinary division of state party systems into simply the one-party type and the two-party type. The latter he subdivides into cohesive, strong organizations (with continuous leadership, centralized control of party affairs, etc.) on the one hand, and, on the other, splintered, weak organizations (with factionalism, personal cliques, little party control of legislation). The one-party states he divides into three types: machine-led but with one faction predominant over state politics; a bifactional party structure, embracing two contesting factions with relatively continuous and identifiable sets of leaders; and, finally, a multifactional party structure, where party organizations are little more than holding companies for transient personal groupings.

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This is a far more sophisticated and rewarding tool of analysis than the usual procedure of classifying states simply in terms of party competition measured by popular or legislative voting. Yet, when applied to power structures in various states, this tool raises the question whether the author, and political scientists generally, do not overemphasize party politics as a lens through which to observe political power. Is it possible that the typical power structure can best be understood as the interaction of ever shifting constellations of leaders and followers, operating through, across and outside party formations? It is notable, for example, that the strongest party leader in Mr. Lockard's strongest state party, namely John Bailey, Democratic leader in Connecticut, is the willing supporter of *any* Democratic governor, whether the more liberal Bowles or the more moderate Ribicoff. In any event, this fruitful analysis will be an indispensable source of data and theory for further refinements in our theories of American politics.

JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Small-Town Politics: A Study of Political Life in Glossop. By A. H. BIRCH. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1959.—viii, 199 pp. 25*s.*; $4.00.

Historians and novelists of the Left have not taught us to look with a kindly eye on the Victorian millowner. Trefusis' portrait of his industrialist brother in Shaw's *Unsocial Socialist* is an exaggeration, but the stereotype is familiar: a man who is in business an exploiter, in politics a bully, in social life a snob or climber and in religion a hypocrite. Surely, one should welcome the day when he vanishes from the local scene and his functions are performed by the state and state-regulated enterprise.

The authors of this excellent study of the politics of a small town near Manchester are not so sure. Drawn from political science, psychology, history and economics, they write with the scholarly objectivity and meticulous care for fact that one expects from Manchester University and in particular from the political scientists of Professor W. J. M. MacKenzie's department, one of whom had the main responsibility for the book. Yet they are also men of the Left, sensitive to the values of democracy and to the vitality of British life at the grass roots. They are not only concerned by what they find, but also, I think, frankly puzzled. People are prosperous, government is

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efficient, distributive justice even-handed and fair. But something has been lost.

The theme of their analysis is centralization and its consequences: centralization in business, in trade unions, in the state and in party politics. "In the past half century," writes Mr. Birch, "we have moved from a society which was locally organized, with some functional organization imposed, to one which is functionally organized, with local ties cutting across this with less and less effect."

In late Victorian times, the factories of this cotton town were owned locally and managed by their owners. But not only were the millowners business men; they also set up mechanics' and literary institutes for their employees, built hospitals and baths, patronized the churches, through which schools were maintained and charity dispensed, and among themselves divided political leadership, controlling the political parties, taking turns as mayor, competing to represent the constituency in Parliament. "Their common leadership in business, social and political affairs", writes Mr. Birch, "served to unify the community."

Today the factories are owned by great national combines and run by professional managers, often transients on their way up the managerial ladder, who hold aloof from public life. At the same time, many of the functions once performed by local philanthropists, borough government, churches and voluntary associations have been taken over—and, of course, greatly extended and improved—by the central government as part of the Welfare State. In municipal politics, local tastes and conditions still exert influence. At elections to the borough council, people vote primarily for the candidate rather than the party; and the Liberals have managed to hold their position as the second party after Labour. But interest has greatly declined, the turn-out is low, and the affairs of the local community are not a focus of great concern. Parliamentary elections, on the other hand, attract far more interest and are dominated by the struggle between the two great national parties at Westminster. If the trend toward centralization in political affairs continues, according to the authors, a new mode of political organization will arise in Britain. In it there would be "no place for local self-government. All political decisions of any consequence would be taken in London, by negotiation and consultation between the leaders of two disciplined national parties and the heads of organized professions, industries and interest groups."

The authors are skeptical of the reality of a democratic control that must be exercised at a distance over Whitehall or the

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nationalized industries. They would like to see more power given to new areas of local government. Yet one senses a deeper concern. "Some people", Mr. Birch writes, "miss the sense of belonging that came from living in a community in which they could look up to a small group of clearly recognized leaders who took the initiative in nearly all spheres of activity." Can there be a lively local democracy in Britain—this seems to be the paradoxical question—unless there is a local élite?

SAMUEL H. BEER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The English Health Service: Its Origins, Structure, and Achievements. By HARRY ECKSTEIN. Foreword by James Howard Means. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959.—xxi, 289 pp. $5.50.

Professor Eckstein has written a book that makes an important contribution to a better understanding of the British National Health Service, by presenting a concise and comprehensive account of its historical background. The nonspecialized reader who is unfamiliar with the work of Titmuss and other British scholars or who has not had occasion to study the many commissions of enquiry and the Annual Reports of the Ministry of Health will here find a readable account of the evolution and the character of British health services (public and private) prior to the passage of the National Health Service Act.

The author rightly stresses the chaotic and irrational nature of the organizational arrangements for the provision of medical care (with two different and competitive hospital systems and hospitals themselves suffering from decades of accumulated neglect); the low level of general practice ("it was generally agreed that general practice was in the worst 'clinical' shape of any of the British medical services, that it fell most short of desirable scientific standards" [p. 78]); the maldistribution of general practitioners and specialists; the uneven nature of the medical services for which the local authorities were responsible. As he says, "the medical services, before the Appointed Day, had accumulated immense arrears in professional and other manpower, in grounds, buildings and equipment, in maintenance, modernisation, and extension" (p. 253). Although he tends to underestimate the extent to which the cost to the individual was a barrier to receipt of good (especially preventive) medical care before 1948, this part of the book is of the greatest value in showing both why the advent of the National Health Service

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was inevitable and why the achievements of the Service to date have been relatively modest.

But the last two chapters, which purport to evaluate the achievements and shortcomings of the English Service in operation and to assess the potentialities of planning a health service, are less rewarding. They even give the impression of having been added at a later time and, particularly in the last chapter, suggest an effort to relate the study to broader theoretical generalizations than the evidence presented would seem to justify. In these chapters Professor Eckstein reveals a more ambivalent attitude to the Service than his earlier chapters would have led one to expect. He admits that "it has succeeded in supplying free medical and allied services indiscriminately to all, without making any appreciable difference in the quantity or quality of services supplied" (p. 216). This must be interpreted to mean "no adverse difference", for he also finds that "Much has been done to rationalise the services, especially the hospital services", and gives a long list of improvements; he also admits that "great improvement has been achieved in the distribution of practitioners" and that there has been a similar but less marked redistribution of specialists, while "much has been accomplished in regard to functional and interregional redistribution" of types of specialization (p. 237). He points out that there has been virtually no interference with that vague quality "the patient-doctor relationship", that the medical profession plays a highly influential rôle in policy formation, and that if anything too little rather than too much has been spent on the Service. Yet in spite of this he regards the achievements as being "pitifully little in the light of what is needed to realise the objectives of the Service" (p. 259) and asserts that "when one recalls the visions of the founders of the Service the record of disappointed hopes and missed opportunities makes rather dismal reading" (p. 236). This gloomy note can be explained in part by the fact that his book is not, as is claimed by Dr. Means in his foreword, a study of the system "in its first decade of operation." Internal evidence (including the dating of most of the footnotes and failure to utilize in any effective way the rich material in the Guillebaud Report and in the recent work of Titmuss and Abel-Smith) suggests that most of the work was done by 1953 (after five years of operation of the Service). It seems highly unrealistic to expect that the organizational and professional weaknesses so convincingly shown in the first two thirds of the book could have been remedied in so short a time. Nor, although he mentions it from time to time, does Dr. Eckstein seem to attach sufficient weight, in his final evaluations, to the country's

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critical economic stringency during the first years of the Health Service.

His last chapter is provocative, but it is to be hoped that at some later time the author will make a more exhaustive study of the Health Service as a test of the potentialities of planning in which he will present the total picture and not merely illustrations of instances where rational decisions were not made and where he will give the evidence for his assertions of "very considerable waste" (p. 274), the tendency for makeshift arrangements to become permanent, the substitution of political for rational decisions and the like. In any future study it is to be hoped, too, that he will provide his readers with a less inadequate index. The one in this book is incomplete and almost useless.

EVELINE M. BURNS

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The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959. By WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1959.—xviii, 750 pp. $6.50.

The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), which made a glamorous entry on the European scene in 1952 but remained at the back of the stage while the European Common Market was monopolizing attention, is again in the spotlight. It is going through a serious crisis brought about by overproduction of coal, which has led to sharp rises in stocks (financed partly by the E.C.S.C.) and unemployment. Earlier this year, the High Authority, the supranational executive body of the E.C.S.C., wanted, among other things, to impose direct restrictions on coal output, but it failed to get support from member governments.

For these vicissitudes, which divide planners from liberals and supranationalists from partisans of sovereign independence of member states, Mr. Diebold's book provides a masterly background—with vast vistas on what he calls "a most ambitious, most drastic, and most novel venture in international economic cooperation." To be sure, this is not an "inside story", and personalities as well as day-to-day politics are almost entirely left out; the real protagonists are ideas and convictions. But the 750-page book is fascinating because it is vivid and full of concrete details; as the author says, "often it is only the details that show what the real issues are."

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Mr. Diebold, who is Director of Economic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, reviews the Community's experience through early 1959. Tariffs and quotas have disappeared and discrimination in prices and transportation rates has been ended, with the result that there exists, among Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, a common market for coal, steel, iron ore and scrap. The High Authority has endeavored to regulate cartels and mergers and to provide guidance of investment, among other things by requiring firms to submit investment plans and by extending credits. It has taxed and it has borrowed in the United States and elsewhere. It has established new types of relations with governments (including the United States), employers and labor. In reviewing the Community's experience, the author explains what it has meant to its members and to outsiders, analyzes the character of the coal and steel economy that has emerged in Europe, and evaluates what "partial integration" has accomplished and how it fits with the Common Market and the European Atomic Energy Community, which were established in 1958. In concluding, he draws "a very preliminary interim" balance sheet of the Community: "The main result . . . has been to begin a process"—a process that "may have no end, not even a certain direction, but it has changed Europe."

This, indeed, is the crux of the matter. As a Dutch statesman quoted by Mr. Diebold put it, the task of the E.C.S.C. was to "bring forth from l'Arlésienne, Tannhäuser, and even Ciribiribin a new symphonic poem, conceived perhaps in the style of Honegger; but I should like it if they would give us an assurance as soon as possible that this will not be a matter of be-bop."

Since the Community's establishment, Europe has learned that it is not enough to try to bring about economic integration "sector by sector"—coal and steel, transportation, nuclear energy, and so on—but that it is necessary to aim at "organic unity" by freeing intra-European trade and payments within the framework of traditional economic and monetary policies. Among the many reasons for this momentous development is the growing awareness that the "sector-by-sector" approach is more in line with ideas of economic planning than with a return to economic liberalism, and that the reduction of trade barriers and reliance on the price mechanism are more likely to secure the optimum distribution of resources in Europe than direct controls of output and investment. It is primarily as a result of the return to economic freedom, domestically as well as internationally, that Europe is now much stronger than at any time since 1914. Mr. Diebold is, of course, fully aware of Europe's shift from the

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"sector-by-sector" to a more "organic" approach to economic integration but he says little about it. Much of the discussion of the E.C.S.C., however valuable it may be as a self-contained account of the institution itself and of its problems and policies, thus seems to lack broader perspective.

Also, supranationalism of the type embodied in the E.C.S.C. is not any longer the order of the day. The Euratom and Common Market treaties give much less power to the federal authority and much more to the Council of Ministers from the six member countries. A new balance of forces is thus being established between supranational Powers and national sovereignty, but this crucial issue is not explored in this book as thoroughly as seems desirable from a broader vantage point.

A particularly helpful contribution is Mr. Diebold's account of United States interests in, and policies toward, the E.C.S.C. As a champion of European integration, the United States has been "for" the E.C.S.C. since the start. But American steel and scrap industries have had reservations about certain aspects of the Community's activities, and United States government agencies have been concerned over the risks inherent in preferential trading arrangements of a strictly regional body. In the end, the American support has been conditioned by the hopeful assumption that the Community will follow a liberal commercial policy. It is therefore worth recalling, among other episodes, that the High Authority and the German government tried in 1958 to postpone or avoid restrictions on coal imports from non-member countries; when at the beginning of 1959 Germany imposed a coal tariff, the State Department protested the action. Earlier, the Brussels steel export cartel was the subject of American representations. The buying practices of the scrap import cartel were modified—at least in form—as a result of State Department intervention.

Mr. Diebold's authoritative study of the E.C.S.C. during its formative years is a most helpful—and, indeed, indispensable—source for all those who wish to understand and appraise Europe's efforts to create greater economic and financial unity as well as the stake of the United States in European economic integration. At the same time, this scholarly account of coal and steel problems on the Continent and of what the Community did, or failed to do, about them helps us realize the magnitude, and the inherent difficulties, of the challenge that Europe faced in embarking upon the new path.

MIROSLAV A. KRIZ

NEW YORK, N. Y.

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NATO and the European Union Movement. By M. MARGARET BALL. Published under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs. New York. Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.—ix, 486 pp. $8.00.

European Institutions: Co-operation—Integration—Unification. By A. H. ROBERTSON. Published under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.—xix, 372 pp. $7.75.

Although European integration never had a wide popular appeal either in this country or in Europe, voluminous studies dealing with a unified Europe rapidly increase in number. The two volumes under review endeavor to present a comprehensive picture of the progress of European integration from its inception ten years ago to 1958, and since both authors are primarily concerned with institutional developments, their studies inevitably cover much of the same ground.

Miss Ball, Ralph Emerson Professor of Social Science at Wellesley College, began her investigation of intra-European agencies in 1949. Her book is a solid and dependable account of the institutional framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), Benelux, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM). With some exceptions, the treaties which provide for these agencies are long and complex documents; some of them (ECSC, EEC, EURATOM) follow the same organizational pattern. Any attempt, such as made by Miss Ball, to summarize in detail the provisions of these texts makes exceedingly laborious and, in part, repetitious reading. The nine massive diagrams depicting the organizational set-up of the principal agencies bring out clearly the forbidding bureaucratic complexities of the resulting structure, but they are also likely to add to the despondency of the reader. Those interested in finding out why and how the intra-European organizations came about will get little help from Miss Ball. She is sympathetic to European integration but shows great restraint in appraising the development which she discusses, although she expresses doubts about the merits of the supranational approach, admits the extreme difficulties in assessing the accomplishments of Benelux, and rightly believes that the EEC has a long way to travel before "the establishment of a market which will be truly 'common.' "

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As indicated by the title of his book, A. H. Robertson, a distinguished British jurist and an international civil servant (he is a member of the Editorial Committee of the European Yearbook), deals, like Miss Ball, with European institutions. His discussion covers, in addition to the major organizations listed above, a number of other agencies which he packs tightly into two chapters entitled, respectively, "The More Technical Organizations" and "The Smaller Organizations". In spite of this wider coverage, Robertson succeeds in presenting within the brief compass of some 240 extremely well-written pages a vivid and informative survey of the evolution of the European movement. This is achieved, partly, by relegating much of the indigestible factual material to the documentary appendices which fill about one third of the book. The author, moreover, supplies a great deal of revealing background information as well as incisive interpretations which inject life into, and give meaning to, the listless formulae of treaties and official discourses. He offers, for instance, a penetrating explanation of the reasons why England has kept aloof from the integration schemes. One of them is that "the British are not, as a rule, attracted by abstract ideas." In examining the functions of the intra-European agencies Robertson seldom fails to bring out their significant similarities and differences. He discusses succinctly the concepts of "union" and "unity" and states well what the much-misunderstood notion "supranational powers" actually means.

Robertson claims that in spite of many failures the accomplishments of European integration from 1948 to 1957, "by comparison with almost any other decade in recorded history, . . . were remarkable." He is nevertheless much concerned with the very real problem raised by the proliferation of European institutions. He aptly quotes Sir Robert Boothby: "In M. Herbert Luethy's vivid phrase . . . 'the foreign ministers of western Europe, like actors on the revolving stage that got out of control, keep reappearing against a different backcloth, playing a never complete first act'. . . . In the economic field an army of functionaries in Paris, Geneva, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, and Brussels is busily engaged in exchanging statistics which nobody reads, and resolutions to which no attention is paid." Both Miss Ball and Robertson make detailed proposals for the streamlining of the intra-European agencies, but the question may be asked whether these proposals go to the root of the matter. Robertson is aware that the creation of a common market of The Six (EEC) has produced much tension and a dangerous cleavage, the importance of which Miss Ball tends to underestimate. It would

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be ironical and tragic if ill-advised schemes of integration would lead to political strife and economic disorder rather than to the unification of the old Continent.

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The United Nations. By LELAND M. GOODRICH. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959.—x, 419 pp. $5.60.

Professor Leland M. Goodrich has earned the respect of students of international organization by his responsible and critical writings on the United Nations. The present study is a logical and natural outgrowth of his earlier treatises on the Charter and on problems of collective security. He views the United Nations as both "dream and reality," as a set of goals and purposes enunciated in the Preamble to the Charter and as a living institution. Both aspects are essential to an understanding of the United Nations, yet scholars and practitioners, idealists and realists are endlessly tempted to view one dimension at the expense of the other. In no field is wishful thinking or, at the opposite extreme, a hopeless cynicism more likely to seize the writer. The measure of Goodrich's contribution is his freedom from these extremes.

He considers at the outset the place of international organization in the modern world. His interpretation here is concise and illuminating although I would question whether he or any of his contemporaries has said the last word on the "theory of international organization." He makes a striking case for the factors of interdependence on the present world scene. He says less about the persistent forces that drive states to adopt policies of national autonomy. As Judge Charles de Visscher has pointed out, at the same time that economics and technology have drawn states closer together, spiritual and ideological forces have pulled them further apart. What we are witnessing is by no means a straight-line movement from nationalism to internationalism, but a constant tension between the twin trends. Furthermore, I doubt that the failure of the League can be attributed more to "the shortsightedness, the confusion and the political impotence of . . . governments" than to failure to relate international action to fundamental political forces like the balance of power. Writers like De Visscher, Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Schiffer and Erich Hula are more convincing on this count. I would hope that Professor Goodrich would examine this problem more fully in his subsequent theoretical work on the relations of international organization to foreign policies and international politics.

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My quarrel with Professor Goodrich begins and ends with this problem, for in his analysis of the United Nations he betrays almost none of the legalism or formalism implied in this criticism. He traces with clarity and precision the origins of the United Nations, the competing grand designs, the debates over structure and function, and the politics of the new organization. He approaches these issues with a sovereign understanding that few, if any, of our present-day writers can match. Having laid the foundations, he turns to examine the simultaneous evolution and devolution of the agencies and powers of the United Nations. His section on "common values" is circumspect and full of insights. His analysis of membership and the deadlock over admissions is, I feel, unexceptionable.

The core of the political analysis comes in the discussion of "The Structure of Power and Influence". This is political science at its best, for Goodrich studies the various United Nations organs over against the political forces that shaped them in ways the framers could not possibly have fully envisaged. He painstakingly points out the shift of power from the Security Council to the General Assembly, not to praise the development but to understand more clearly the problems and opportunities encouraged thereby. Nor does he see these developments as irreversible laws of history but as trends that may further unfold in as yet unpredictable ways. His discussion of the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" is cast in the best scholarly tradition, assuming neither that this was a flagrant violation of the Charter nor that the policy can be explained in narrow legal terms. His section on "Consequences of the General Assembly's New Role" should be required reading for every United Nations delegation, especially from the Western Powers.

Similarly, the central problems of the United Nations—peaceful settlement, disarmament, human rights, economic and social welfare and dependent peoples—are described and evaluated with wisdom and intelligence. Finally, his critique of the accomplishments of the United Nations and its future makes sober and informative reading. United Nations reformers will find "Why More Has Not Been Done" a healthy antidote to the ingrained American tendency to solve all problems by tinkering with constitutional arrangements. Professor Goodrich has given us a study of enduring value that every graduate and undergraduate student, professor and diplomat should peruse with the same care the author has chosen his words.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

NEW YORK, N. Y.

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A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation. By HAJO HOLBORN. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1959.—xvi, 374, xxi pp. Trade, $8.75; Text, $6.50.

It is strange but true that there is no satisfactory introduction to German history, even in German. Consequently, since reputable German historians have avoided general history and so failed to cope with primary problems of interpretation, the door has been left open to a plague of misleading pseudo explanations. One welcomes, therefore, Professor Holborn's willingness to undertake a reassessment of the last five hundred years of German history with the aim of providing the general reader not only with a reliable body of information, but with a guide to its understanding. This means combining a sufficiently detailed narrative with objective analysis and interpretation, and, if the demands of modern critical scholarship are to be met, extending the narrative to include social and economic, religious and intellectual as well as political and constitutional history, while at the same time avoiding those sweeping oversimplifications in terms of a single factor, biological, economic or philosophical, which have been the bane of previous efforts. It would be hard to find anyone better qualified for this herculean task than Hajo Holborn. He has read and thought deeply about his subject for many years. He has made himself a leading authority in two widely separated areas of it; and his is a mind and spirit, as his writings show, capable of passion and complete commitment, yes, but fundamentally calm, critical and detached.

These qualities are striking in this first volume. The reinterpretation of the course of the German Reformation from the precursors of Luther to the Peace of Westphalia is enough to try any historian's powers. Holborn goes about it so quietly that one must be alert to notice that every moment of the familiar story is being subjected to fresh and searching scrutiny, and this time nothing is being omitted by inadvertence or included because it always is, but that each item is selected and arranged in accordance with deep and subtle insights, the emphasis falling now on some basic geographical or economic compulsion, now on some institutional maladjustment or quirk of popular psychology, now on some individual's heroism or eccentricity, not for mere dramatic or rhetorical ends, but because the author is patiently showing us that this is how the complex web of history is actually woven, and that, compared to a real understanding of historical process, the understanding of the most elaborate polyphony or the most complicated sorites

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is childishly simple. The reader who follows this volume to its end will be rid forever of easy generalizations about the causes of the Reformation and its effects on German character and German destiny. If he is unable to make a complete statement about the causes and effects in much less space than Holborn uses, that is because this book, widely as it ranges, is true to its single purpose and economical in its means.

It would be pleasant to be able to say that the finish is equal to the substance and the structure, and to say no more. But it would not be true. It is easy to forgive a surface inattention which permits agricultural prices in Germany to be depressed until 1550 on page 56, to rise after 1500 on page 64, and to begin to rise after 1525 on page 78 because these inconsistencies, like the repeated assertion that France wanted to advance her "western" frontier against Germany, make no real difference to the argument. But this would not be an easy book to read even if it were always in the most lucid language, and it is not. Sometimes, perhaps, the density of the thought obliges cramped and tortured statement. But sometimes the diction is unnecessarily technical and recondite, and sometimes it is just careless. One can puzzle out the electors rendering "matriculatory" assistance to the emperor, and find the coinage inoffensive, even though it will probably remain obscure to most general readers. But what is "sodden" hatred? Besotted? Sullen? Stubborn? Surely none of the synonyms the dictionary suggests. Blemishes like these do not occur in every paragraph, or even on every page, but they are far too frequent and unnecessarily tiresome. Let us hope that, since they are easy to eliminate, they will disappear from volume two. Meanwhile, volume one amply repays every ounce of the effort it requires.

GARRETT MATTINGLY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890-1894. By J. ALDEN NICHOLS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. —xii, 404 pp. $7.50.

Caprivi as caretaker of Imperial Germany tried, and failed, to make it a "normal" and going concern. German nationalist historians have called his four-year administration (1890-1894) the "time of the Epigones"—when mediocre trustees, lacking Bismarck's genius, tried to assure the Empire's permanence and stability. Mr. Nichols' fine book is a richly detailed account of this endeavor. In it we see the essential tragedy of German unification; Caprivi, although he was an Epigone, was far from

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mediocre. His moderation, his talent as political broker, his sharpness of intellect, and his devotion to "national" interests at the time seemed quite suited to make the system work. His failure, Nichols shows, in almost extravagant detail, is more an indictment of Bismarck than of himself—even a Bismarck could not have carried the enterprise on much further. "In politics . . . society may sometimes be compelled to pay too high a price for the brilliant but ephemeral achievements of the great man."

The system, not Caprivi, was at fault. What were its essential evils? As Nichols shows, the constitutional order was incapable of Caprivi's modest aim: to balance and reconcile the aspirations of the quarrelsome social forces which Bismarck had by force assembled under one roof. The Imperial Order had not been designed for this purpose; it had been designed as façade for Prussian domination of Germany and for *Junker* domination of Prussia. Yet for it to endure, the political leadership of Germany could not evade the problem of reconciling the powerful forces of industrial society which so swiftly had arisen, and which were so successfully excluded from centers of governmental power where crucial decisions were made. Bismarck's Germany had been a trust territory, and her wards had learned the arts of politics in a climate of powerlessness. They learned quite well how to make demands against the state and against each other, but their leaders never had the maturing experience of acting as compromisers and brokers. The national interest which Caprivi—because of his central rôle—came to know was one they never learned. Bismarck's formula (which Caprivi emulated in a less authoritarian fashion) was to manipulate and mediate among irresponsibles—aristocratic, democratic, industrial, regional and religious interests—without endangering the constitutional system which itself made them irresponsible. In the Reichstag this paternalism corrupted the party system, which offered the one prospect of a new parliamentary democracy. The parties—bereft of responsibility—degenerated into special interest groups, and their rhetoric became clamorous and outrageous. Their leaders became skilled in the art of making peremptory demands, not that of compromise and adjustment.

Who would speak for the nation? The "nation" as state had been an artificial construct. While Bismarck remained Chancellor, *he* had known the national interest, because he made it. Few other men knew its intricacies. Nichols shows the dreary sequel—a landscape barren of leadership able to formulate and educate the public to a coherent concept of national interest. Like Bismarck, Caprivi ruled with a bureaucracy which was "above" politics and above parochial interests. Unlike him,

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Caprivi depended on it. His experiment in "frock-coated totalitarianism" failed because of the deep gulf which separated the bureaucratic expert from the social forces which unification and industrialization had brought into being. Caprivi's, like Bismarck's, failure lay in his attempt to use eighteenth-century authoritarian methods in late nineteenth-century conditions. Caprivi at the end seems to have recognized the impossibility of it all, but this did not help matters much. "The gods are against me," he wrote, "and I must bear my fate with as much resignation as possible."

PAUL SEABURY

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation of Political Theory and Party Practice. By ERIC WALDMAN. Milwaukee, The Marquette University Press, 1958.—xii, 248 pp. $8.00.

Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. By KLAUS EPSTEIN. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—xiii, 473 pp. $10.00.

Students of German history will welcome the appearance of these two studies. Although of course very different in scope and subject matter, they are as one in contributing to a clearer understanding of far-reaching developments that germinated in the pre-1914 era, came to a head during the First World War and its immediate aftermath, and begot varied consequences that were destined to emerge with a vengeance in the twilight years of the Weimar Republic. Waldman's concern is with the genesis, nature and significance of the Left-wing explosion that rocked Berlin only two months after the November Revolution in Germany. Epstein recounts the career of the embattled Centrist leader who helped to steer his country through one of the supreme crises of its history and who later, in 1921, paid with his life for the privilege of serving the values he held dear. The two books are admirably thorough and copiously documented. However, Epstein's is the more authoritative. Whereas it is based on all the available sources, including the Erzberger Papers and other manuscript collections in Germany, Waldman's monograph is the product of research which, albeit painstaking, has been confined to the geographical limits of the United States.

The value of both books lies mainly in the wealth of information they contain. Each has its particularly strong feature.

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Waldman is at his best when he describes the political ideas and propaganda of the Spartacist leaders. The outstanding section of Epstein's uniformly excellent biography is that which portrays Erzberger's activities during the war years. In both studies, detailed reconstruction is supplemented by essays in interpretation. Although the conclusions presented are not new, they deserve to be reëmphasized. Waldman is on solid even if familiar ground when he assesses both the immediate and long-range consequences of the Spartacist uprising. He makes the following important point:

> The outcome of the violent conflict was that none of the socialist factions was able to gain a dominant influence on German political developments. The real victor of the struggle was neither the SPD nor the KPD, but the nationalistic and reactionary forces which came to the assistance of the Majority Socialist government. Because of the divided labor movement, they were able to survive the German Revolution and eventually to re-establish their former position of political hegemony. This was most certainly one of the major contributing factors to the growth of German Fascism and the ascendance of National Socialism (p. 222).

Epstein for his part stresses the rather obvious but nonetheless significant fact that Erzberger's rise was due to two things: the character of the man and the conditions of his era. The author touches on a matter of signal importance when he points out that Erzberger's "slipperiness and adaptability in political tactics stand in sharp contrast to his unshakable conviction in fundamentals" (p. 394). The appraisal of these "fundamentals" —Erzberger's religion, his democratic principles, and his concern for social justice—is highly perceptive. Although appreciative of his hero's rôle, Epstein does not try to inflate it. After all, as he justly notes, Erzberger was not the kind of man "who can shape an entire era in his own image" (p. 398). Yet he did accomplish a good deal on behalf of the causes he championed. To this the book bears witness.

S. William Halperin

The University of Chicago

Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century. By Ludwig Dehio. Translated by Dieter Pevsner. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1959.—142 pp. $4.00.

These five essays by the distinguished editor of the *Historische Zeitschrift* are all variations on the daemonic nature of power that drives its victim to self-destruction. This, says Professor Dehio, has been the fate of all states which sought hegemony

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over Europe—in this century, Germany. Vainglorious striving for hegemony, combined with a narrow, parochial sterility in political ideas, has characterized Germany's rôle in the first half of the twentieth century. On only two occasions, we are told by the Marburg historian, has German produced ideas that have spread: the Reformation and Marxism—neither contributed anything to German politics. It is not an accident that Bismarck does not appear in these pages. *Realpolitik,* according to Dehio, has been Germany's undoing. That "peculiar Germany tendency to isolate spiritual matters from questions of political power—that lack of inner harmony" between political idealism and political realism—seems to him to be the root of the evil which twice led the Germans to the brink of complete annihilation as a nation.

The publisher of this translation—or the author himself—has seen it fit to exclude a sixth essay which appeared in the German edition. This omission is regrettable, though perhaps unimportant in the light of what I shall say below. Entitled "German Politics at the Crossroads", this essay represented a logical capstone to those which preceded, for in it Dehio sought to draw a lesson from the past he had so searchingly examined in the other five essays. Written in 1955, as Germany was once more emerging as a major world Power, it warned Germans to avoid making a false choice between "realism" and "idealism" for a third and last time. To some of his countrymen it seemed that the most "realistic" course for Germany was to seek reunification at almost any cost so that Germany might become the balancer in a world divided into two major concentrations of power. To Dehio, such a course was utter folly. Even at the risk of putting off reunification, Germans had to choose freedom. And freedom, to him, could be maintained only in close and loyal alliance with the Western Powers. In alliance with the West, so it would seem, Dehio envisioned that "inner harmony" between political realism and political idealism which he had found lacking in Germany's past.

The essays included in the volume under review all appeared in various German journals between 1952 and 1954 and were collected in one volume in 1955. One of the essays, the most important one, appeared previously in English as part of a symposium which Professor Hans Kohn edited in 1954 under the title *German History: Some New German Views.* Addressed primarily to the author's countrymen—some, in fact, were first presented in oral form—these essays are of interest primarily to the specialist in German history and politics. Available in their original versions or in German edition to the interested scholar,

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these essays are too specialized to have a wider appeal. The publisher is to be congratulated for taking this risk, but one almost wishes he had taken it instead with some unpublished scholarly manuscript, gathering dust because it lacks "commercial appeal."

LEWIS J. EDINGER

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. By ANDREW MALOZEMOFF. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958. —358 pp. $5.00.

This attractive and well-documented study of Russian Far Eastern policy in the generation preceding the Russo-Japanese war was completed by Dr. Elizabeth Malozemoff, mother of the author, who died in 1952. It was well worth the effort of preparing it for publication, as the book is distinguished by a thorough and thoughtful use of the available evidence. (Unfortunately the Japanese archives for the period were not used, and not all the Russian documents have yet been thrown open.)

What will surprise many readers is the sympathetic portrayal of tsarist foreign policy. While most historians have labeled the Far Eastern gambit a web of "shameless duplicity" on the part of Russia (to use Michael T. Florinsky's phrase), Malozemoff in effect exonerates Russia, and in particular the entourage of the tsar, of ill intent and aggressive designs. At times the author's scrupulous scholarship tends to contradict his more sweeping interpretation.

Three interrelated issues in his analysis are worth singling out: responsibility for the Russo-Japanese war; the rôle of the Bezobrazov clique; and the historiography of the crisis. In general, an "active" foreign policy is offered as a proper one for Russia to pursue *vis-à-vis China.* The "Chinese menace" forced Russia to respond vigorously; most crises in Sino-Russian relations are depicted as a matter of Chinese responsibility. Korea, we are told, was not an object of Russian expansion, all the evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

With regard to the "black cabinet", Malozemoff makes a more convincing case for the view that the Bezobrazov clique had no decisive part in determining the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war; its indirect rôle was primarily that of ousting Witte from office. The author seems to be going rather far, however, in asserting that the Bezobrazov group "in reality was never Bezobrazov's, nor was it a group or even a cabal. It was, at most, a temporary meeting of minds, a series of incidental personal contacts . . ." (p. 223).

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In tracing the Russian background of the war, no weight is attributed to the famous statement of Minister of the Interior Plehve that what Russia needed was "a small and victorious war" to reduce domestic tensions; and it is only in a footnote that one finds Plehve's other striking dictum, "It was not diplomacy but bayonets that made Russia great, and with bayonets and not diplomatic pens must we decide the questions of China and Japan." Such attitudes are ignored in Malozemoff's assessment of Russian motives and behavior.

The bibliographical essay is a very useful contribution indeed, as it takes the place of what the author would probably have developed in his concluding chapter. It amounts to a well-informed but bitter attack on the "traditional" interpretations. It takes to task both the view (exemplified by Glinsky and Langer) that Russia strove for control of both Manchuria and Korea, and that Bezobrazov was a power behind the throne; and the version more critical of Witte's performance (such as Romanov's *Russia in Manchuria*).

Malozemoff claims that, "using the same documents" as Langer did in his *Diplomacy of Imperialism*, "I found an entirely different meaning." In particular, he pins Langer's view that Russia wanted to control Korea to a mistranslation of a double negative in a Russian policy paper of 1888. Yet this fails to dispose of other evidence—unless one grants, as the author does, that on certain occasions one need not take "diplomatic verbiage" too seriously. His conclusion, in contrast with most other analysts, is then that tsarist policy was normally marked by "thoroughness, moderation, and common sense" (p. 324).

If, in this reviewer's view, the result is an unwarranted whitewashing of tsarist policy in the Far East, this volume is nonetheless a study important in its thoroughness, because of the author's familiarity with the problems he examines, and in that it constitutes a useful counterweight to the "traditional" and "pro-Japanese" schools.

ALEXANDER DALLIN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926. Volume I. By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1958.—x, 557 pp. $7.50.

Mr. Carr's monumental *History of Soviet Russia* has now reached the fifth volume, which is the first of three entitled *Socialism in One Country* and devoted to the crucial years

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1924-1926. Although he notes in the Preface that its appearance was delayed by his teaching and research visit to the United States in 1956-1957, the steady progress of his undertaking continues to be most impressive. Particularly gratifying is the fact that each successive volume shows deeper insight and a greater perception of the complexities of his subject. It might be argued that this is the inevitable consequence of cumulative knowledge and ever greater familiarity with the material, but the evidence of other multivolume works published over a period of years by no means establishes this as a rule.

As in *The Bolshevik Revolution* sequence, Mr. Carr has been faced with extremely difficult problems of arrangement. In the earlier series, he dealt first with political, then economic and finally diplomatic questions. Here, for valid reasons, after a long and provocative introductory section, he has turned first to economic issues. The second volume will cover the accompanying political struggle and the third will turn to foreign relations. No doubt, many readers will be disturbed by his division, but the alternatives would no doubt raise similar objections. It should also be noted that the separate publication of the three volumes makes the drawbacks more obvious than would otherwise be the case. There would seem to be no perfect solution to his problem when such detailed coverage is desired.

The economic revival that came with NEP was a breeding ground for innumerable dilemmas. The growing strength of the nepmen and especially of the kulaks reflected the new prosperity, but threatened the socialist sector and sharpened the controversy over the priorities to be given heavy and light industry and agriculture. Nor were these strictly economic matters of dispute. They were fundamentally related to ideological considerations, political control and personal rivalries, questions which the author can only touch upon in this volume. He does, however, make clear the essential point that political defeat did not by any means bring the defeat of the loser's policies. In fact, with certain qualifications, with reference to Trotsky it resulted in quite the opposite. These developments will no doubt be more carefully and fully delineated later, but by 1926, much of what Trotsky had been advocating was on the way to adoption, not because he had won the political battle, but to a large extent because he had lost it.

A knowledge of the economic trends and trials of those years is fundamental for an understanding of the period and its outcome. But many readers will find the wealth of detail rather hard going. On the other hand, Part I, dealing with questions of historical development and with personalities, makes lively and

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stimulating reading. The author has chosen to pause at this point in his work to give brief but most illuminating biographical sketches of the principal Bolsheviks in the party arena following the death of Lenin, to examine the attitudes toward the family, the church, literature and law as reflecting changing perspectives with the introduction of NEP and to discuss the rôle of the party, whose dominant position in the new society was a "direct outcome of the isolated victory of the proletarian revolution in a country whose retarded economic and political development failed to provide the conditions postulated by Marx and by early Marxists for such a victory" (p. 135). Of especial interest to Mr. Carr's readers will be his discussions of continuity and change, of historical causation, and of the interplay of personalities and historical conditions in the movement of events, all with reference to the Russian scene. One suspects that his conclusions at this stage of his task are somewhat different from those he might have advanced in the earliest volumes.

A comprehensive review of this work, in fairness to the author, must await the publication of the other two volumes. But it seems relatively safe to hazard the opinion that together they will constitute the most complete and scholarly account to date of a decisive era in Soviet history.

ROBERT PAUL BROWDER

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954. By RALPH TALCOTT FISHER, JR. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—xvii, 452 pp. $6.75.

Unlike youth organizations of political parties in Western democratic countries (for example, the Young Republicans and the Young Democrats in the United States), the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) in the USSR is not permitted even a subordinate rôle in policy-making. The function of the Komsomol is almost entirely that of a "transmission belt", instilling in Soviet youth (both the one third who are Komsomol members and those not formally enrolled in the organization) ideas and behavioral patterns which the party leadership regards as desirable. As Professor Fisher points out (p. 150), the Komsomol was very strictly subordinated to the party apparatus even in the earliest period of Soviet rule. During the 'twenties Stalin became suspicious of the Komsomol and of young party members because of their tendency to side with Trotsky and other opposition leaders. Consequently, in 1936 Komsomol spokesmen who

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had apparently wished the organization to "share" the party program, and thus implicitly to achieve a status comparable to that of the party, were sharply rebuked; the Komsomol was declared to be, and has remained, "a propagandistic organization" only. (See p. 183.)

Excluded as it is from the making of policy, the Komsomol remains crucially important not only as the principal instrument for indoctrinating the mass of the Soviet adolescents and young adults, but as the training ground for political leaders of the party itself. Consequently, Professor Fisher's comprehensive and objective analysis of the organization is a very welcome addition to the scholarly literature on the workings of the Soviet system. In the opinion of the present reviewer, the value of the study is enormously enhanced by the fact that its approach is chronological rather than topical. Topical analyses of the Soviet system are of course useful, and for many subjects the topical approach is the only suitable one. The virtue of the chronological approach in the examination of a subject such as the Komsomol is that it enables the author to present clearly both the drastic changes and the surprising continuities of Communist policies. Thus, on the one hand, Professor Fisher shows how drastically the "radical" social ideology of the Civil War era, which even denied that a father should feel any special regard for his own children (p. 68), differed from attitudes inculcated among the youth a decade later. Similarly, he indicates many startling changes in emphasis in Komsomol activity—for example, the prohibition of Komsomol cells in army combat units in 1920, as contrasted to the emphasis on work among the military in later years, and the curious abandoning of the anti-cigarette campaign after Stalin obtained complete control of the party apparatus. Conversely, Professor Fisher demonstrates that the changes in indoctrinational patterns following Stalin's death were far more restricted than is often assumed.

In presenting the chronological development of the Komsomol, though he draws on a wide variety of published materials, Professor Fisher relies primarily upon the records of the all-Union Komsomol congresses. For the period 1918-36, and for the post-Stalin era, these records form a reasonably satisfactory body of source material. Since, however, no congresses convened between 1936 and 1949, the author treats the intervening years—nearly one third of the period of Soviet rule—in little more than a dozen pages. As those years constituted an entire era of Komsomol activity, centering on Soviet preparation for World War II, the war, and its aftermath, numerous very important features of Komsomol activity, such as the participation of the youth

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organization in partisan and underground activities, receive scant attention. There is room for a good deal more monographic work in this area, particularly concerning the use of wartime Komsomol experiences as a background for indoctrinational materials used in the post-war era.

Aside from inadequate coverage of the war period, *Pattern for Soviet Youth* will stand for many years (unless, improbably, Soviet archives and organizational activities should be opened to direct observation by Western scholars) as the basic work on the Komsomol. The book's wealth of detail, its meticulous documentation, and its carefully phrased analysis combine to make it an outstanding example of the accomplishments of detailed research in Soviet political problems.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union. By GUSTAV A. WETTER. Translated by Peter Heath. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.—xii, 609 pp. $10.00.

The present English version of Father Wetter's conscientious survey of the origins and present state of Soviet dialectical materialism—based upon the substantially revised fourth German edition—is more accurate and comprehensive, and at the same time more concise than its Italian and German predecessors of 1948 and 1952. Though chiefly concerned with theoretical philosophy, it makes occasional (and illuminating) reference to broader questions in the philosophy of history and in social and political philosophy.

Part I of Wetter's study is intended to provide historical background for the systematic survey of Part II. It offers concise and informed discussions of Hegel, the "left Hegelians" (especially Feuerbach), Marx, Engels, certain nineteenth-century Russian radical thinkers (both Marxist and non-Marxist), Lenin and Stalin. Wetter's brief critical comments, especially those directed to the views of Marx and Engels themselves, are penetrating and to the point.

Wetter rightly points out that Soviet philosophy owes more to Engels than to Marx. This debt is evident in both doctrine and terminology. On the one hand, Engels' passing positivistic enthusiasm for a systematic "elimination" of philosophy found sympathetic echoes among Soviet thinkers, especially during the 1920's. On the other hand, Engels' consistent misuse of the term

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"materialism" to mean "(epistemological) realism", and of "metaphysical" to mean "static" or "non-dialectical", has been repeated by all Soviet writers since Lenin.

The author's discussion of the relation of nineteenth-century Russian thought to current Soviet doctrines is thorough and illuminating, although he permits himself one or two dubious Dostoyevskyan generalizations about the "extremism" and "all-or-nothing"-ism of the Russian national character (p. 110). He makes a convincing case for the doctrinal continuity linking the Russian radical nihilists of the 1860's (especially Chernyshevski, Pisarev, Nechayev and Tkachyov) to Lenin and his followers.

Lenin's philosophic views are presented in a balanced and detailed survey, which gives due importance to his later "Hegelian" period (after 1915). Lenin's stress on the unity of theory and practice, and on the "partisan" character of philosophy and science, is related—and I think rightly—to the Slavophile doctrine of "integral knowledge". However, Wetter does not consider the specific doctrine of the "partisan" character of philosophy and the social sciences put forward by Chernyshevski (in the 1860's) and Mikhailovski (in the 1870's) as a possible source of Lenin's position.

The chapters which treat the controversy of the 1920's between Soviet "mechanists" and "menshevizing idealists" are somewhat less satisfying. The prominent inclusion of Bukharin among the former, and of Trotsky among the latter, gives the misleading impression that these notorious "Right" and "Left" deviationists in *politics* were the chief spokesmen for the two *philosophic* tendencies. In fact, it was L. I. Akselrod and A. M. Deborin, respectively, who held the leading positions.

Wetter's discussion of recent Soviet developments is distinguished by the same clarity and restraint as the earlier historical chapters. Exhaustively detailed exposition—which Wetter defends as necessary to dispel the illusion of a great "depth lurking beneath the Hegelian terminology" of Soviet philosophy (p. xi)—is counterpointed by brief but incisive critical comments. For example, he convincingly shows the groundlessness of the related claims (1) that contemporary science confirms the basic doctrines of dialectical materialism and (2) that only dialectical materialism can solve the philosophic problems generated by the special sciences (p. 456).

The author lists among the positive features of dialectical materialism: its defense of the autonomy of philosophy (versus positivism), its epistemological realism (versus idealism), its intellectualism (versus "sense-datum" empiricism), its recogni-

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tion of qualitative differences in nature (versus reductionism), and its essentially sound theory of concept-formation as abstraction (versus conventionalism). All of these, he argues, are related to the dialectic; they are also—we may note—points of contact with Thomism. Wetter goes on to assert that atheistic dialectical materialism is closer to theistic Thomism than to Hegelian dialectic. Indeed, Soviet philosophy is not dialectical at all, but is essentially a "materialistic evolutionism" in the Aristotelian tradition (p. xi). On the other hand, Wetter argues that the broad outlines of dialectical materialism represent the unconscious or unexpressed philosophy of the nonreligious common man—as opposed to the un-commonsensical philosophies of pragmatism, positivism and existentialism (pp. 548-549).

Wetter's claim (pp. 182, 249, 550) that philosophy in the Soviet Union is given a central and even "autonomous" place—vis-à-vis the special sciences and politics—is largely undercut by the fact, which he mentions in passing (p. 238), that a great deal of what goes under the name of "philosophy" has very little to do with philosophy, either in the traditional Western sense, or in the Marxist-Leninist sense. It seems clear, in fact, that the Soviet indictment of "bourgeois" philosophy as subservient to politics applies with full force to Soviet philosophy. Indeed, in another context Wetter himself notes that dialectical materialism is "subordinated to practical interests, and ultimately to politics" (p. 278).

Wetter rightly concludes that Stalinism did not end with the death of Stalin. He makes clear that, with the exception of the brief cultural "thaw" of 1956, there has been very little slackening of the generally authoritarian and dogmatic character of Soviet philosophizing, and no indication, despite misleading verbal claims to the contrary, of any genuine freedom of philosophic reflection, discussion or criticism.

On the other hand, Wetter makes rather too little of the program of translation of Western philosophic works undertaken since 1953, and the greater Soviet tendency to discuss Western studies of Russian philosophy and intellectual history. In general, an increased hospitality toward the ideas of non-Marxist-Leninists is one of the few hopeful signs on the Soviet philosophical horizon.

Despite its many virtues, Wetter's study remains a product of library research—though even as such it is not complete, almost wholly neglecting the literature of the subject in *English*—which fails to reflect the specific complexities and ambiguities in the situation of Soviet philosophy and Soviet philosophers. For example, we learn nothing here of the contempt which even

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sense) appropriately defines what is meant when we speak of an individual realizing his potentialities as a human being.

In his conclusion Christian Bay appears to me to be on sounder grounds when he says: "I assume that there are certain principles of justice that are potentially acceptable to all mankind. They correspond to objective requirements pertaining to certain universal human needs and can therefore be claimed as valid, potentially at least, in all cultures that permit and encourage an expanding individual freedom" (p. 371). But he does not say specifically what these "principles of justice" are nor what constitute "universal human needs". In fact, he says, "it suffices for my argument to assume only one universal need—for self-expression" (p. 371). This would suffice, it seems to me, if he told us more specifically what he understood by the "self", but if he means by self-expression *whatever* the individual can be motivated to express, then it provides us with no standard whatsoever for distinguishing between desirable (or appropriate) forms of self-expression and undesirable (or inappropriate) forms.

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attributes" (pp. 236-237). Social freedom "means the relative absence of perceived external restraints on individual behavior" (p. 88). He says, "there is no prospect that coercion of man by man can be abolished for a long time to come. As an ultimate goal for political development . . . [however,] the abolishment of coercion is a realistic ideal on both psychological and sociological grounds, so far as our knowledge extends today. In this sense a faith in man's and society's perfectibility appears justified" (p. 312). Potential freedom "means the relative absence of unperceived external restraints on individual behavior" (p. 95). In so far as potential freedom can be increased through political means they will be utilized to improve education, encourage political controversy and strengthen the freedom for unpopular minorities to present their views (p. 367). What education is or how it can be "improved" is not discussed.

Constitutions, for Bay, "are . . . primarily instruments for the growth of human freedom by the gradual expansion of human rights" (p. 373). Since necessarily there will be a problem of determining priorities among human rights,

> let the majority of citizens . . . choose which freedoms or rights are of the more basic importance for human well-being and establish a set of general priorities—guided by the information of social scientists, but yet autonomously according to the prevailing and enduring attitudes. But let the minority of responsible rulers see to it that the more basic rights are granted under the law to all citizens without exception before conflicting and less basic rights or privileges are granted to anyone (p. 373).

The unique aspect of Bay's endeavor to restate the principles of liberalism in a language more appropriate to the twentieth century lies in the emphasis which he places upon psychological freedom—upon freedom from frustration and anxiety. But the means he prescribes are not unlike the means of an earlier liberalism, for the "security of access to regularly increasing supplies of the good things in life is for most men the ultimate therapy and the ultimate prophylactic" (p. 236). He would like to see greater attention paid, however, to "devising better techniques for enhancing the self-esteem of the average individual" (p. 236).

It may be asked of Christian Bay, as of his liberal forebears, whether his underlying view of human nature is not excessively optimistic. It seems quite possible that a thoroughly wicked man might achieve a "degree of harmony between basic motives and overt behavior" and for this reason it may be questioned whether the achievement of an "integrated personality" (in this

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agreements and disagreements which give rise to issues and controversies about matters on which objective truth is ascertainable. It is exclusively concerned with discovering those agreements and disagreements for the sake of bringing us face to face with the issues that call for resolution by further intellectual efforts" (p. xviii).

Dr. Christian Bay, who teaches at the University of California (Berkeley) and who was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1954-55, shares Dr. Adler's belief that the issues surrounding the problem of freedom call for resolution by further intellectual efforts but he would look to the social sciences for assistance rather than to philosophy or to the kind of dialectical inquiry that characterizes Adler's effort. Whereas Adler is concerned with the issue of freedom as seen by philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant and Hegel, Christian Bay is more concerned with the testimony of men like Durkheim, Clyde Kluckhohn, Harold D. Lasswell, Abraham Maslow, Robert K. Merton and Henry S. Sullivan.

Christian Bay sees danger as well as promise in the development of "the behavioral sciences" and "it is about time", he says, that behavioral scientists pay more attention to the question: "How can increased insights into human behavior be employed in the service of sheltering the growth of individuality and freedom in the modern society?" (p. 3). His motivation is admirable—to utilize the insights of the behavioral sciences to help men to *resist* manipulation—but despite appeal to an impressive array of contemporary authorities in the social sciences his presuppositions are not basically different from those of nineteenth- or even eighteenth-century liberals. He believes in the maximization of freedom for everyone and believes that this "is the only proper first-priority aim for the joint human efforts that we call political" (p. 390). Freedom, for Bay, means "self-expression, or the individual's capacity, opportunity, and incentive to express whatever he is or can be motivated to express" (p. 83). There are three aspects of freedom: psychological, social and potential. Psychological freedom "means degree of harmony between basic motives and overt behavior" (p. 83), or, to put it in other words, the free person is the one who has an "integrated personality" (p. 86) in contrast to the "authoritarian personality" who is unfree. Psychological freedom can be strengthened by "shaping institutions so that they tend to encourage expressions of mutual esteem between interacting individuals and to discourage attitudes and expressions of contempt toward individuals on account of stereotypes about role or group

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conflicting philosophical doctrines" (p. 65). Dialectic is of primary value "in defining issues and clarifying disputes" (p. 73) which presumably will then be turned over to the philosophers for "solution". Thus, philosophers are called upon "to make greater progress than has been achieved so far in twenty-five centuries of Western thought" (p. 78). The "deficiencies in the philosophical enterprise as a whole" are "to be repaired by the expedient of a division of labor" (p. 78). Dr. Adler's optimism would seem to stem from the belief that there is no issue that cannot be resolved through rational discussion provided that we know clearly what the issue is and are arguing about the same thing. The illegitimate rôle of passion in thought is more clearly recognized by Dr. Adler than is its legitimate and necessary one. That what we love as good will profoundly influence our understanding of reality would suggest that it is the whole man who reasons and not simply a part of him.

Many will question, too, whether it is legitimate to abstract "the major documents in the literature of any basic philosophical subject . . . from their historical context and pattern" (p. xix). Is it legitimate to view them "as if they were all contemporary, i.e. as if the documents represented the voices of participants confronting one another in actual discussion?" (pp. xix-xx). It is not clear what rôle, if any, Dr. Adler would assign to history. "While it is conceded", by Dr. Adler, "that history throws light on the meaning of the diverse positions men have taken on philosophical issues" (p. xviii), very little of that light is shed in his analysis of the meaning of freedom throughout Western history. He says that "our Western civilization is one among others, and is distinct from other contemporary cultures" but "at the same time, we know that its unity does not and cannot consist of a common body of beliefs, espoused in all epochs of Western history or universally shared throughout the West today" (p. xxi). In what sense Western civilization then is *distinct* is not clear.

It may also be questioned whether an idea like that of freedom can be abstracted from the totality of a philosopher's thought without losing some of its distinctive meaning for the individual philosopher. In his conclusion Dr. Adler does say that "we are brought to the realization that the dialectical treatment of a subject like freedom cannot be fully accomplished without a similar treatment of other, intimately connected subjects, such as law" (p. 618) and he proposes to subject these other concepts to a similar dialectical examination in subsequent volumes. Dr. Adler's Institute for Philosophical Research "proceeds on the assumption that the extant philosophical diversity contains

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agreements about freedom. A second volume will focus its attention upon the disagreements. *The Idea of Freedom* is a remarkable achievement, encyclopedic in scope, unique in its objective and notable for its clarity of presentation. Scholars who are concerned with the problem of freedom will find it an indispensable aid to their own thinking. It does not, of course, solve the problem of the meaning of freedom but it does clarify the controversies by suggesting that "the diversity can be reduced to a relatively small number of *typical* theories, and to an even smaller number of *families* of conceptions" (p. 586).

Adler seeks to demonstrate that three main subjects of controversy can be identified: (1) circumstantial freedom of self-realization, (2) acquired freedom of self-perfection, and (3) natural freedom of self-determination.

> In the identification of the foregoing subjects, two sets of three terms each were used. One set of three terms—*circumstantial, acquired, natural*—refers to mode of possession, i.e. the manner in which the freedom it identifies is possessed. The other set of three terms—*self-realization, self-perfection, self-determination*—refers to the mode of self, i.e. the ability or power of the self in virtue of which freedom is possessed (p. 586).

No more than these six terms are needed, Adler contends, to identify the subjects which are discussed under the name of freedom.

The methodological assumptions underlying the work will probably arouse more controversy than the substance of the work. For it is a nonhistorical study of ideas, it is a nonphilosophical approach to philosophical ideas, it strives to achieve a nonpartisan treatment of philosophical positions, it tries to approximate comprehensiveness in scope and it limits itself to what can be found in the written record of philosophical thought, but it goes beyond what can be explicitly found there by trying to explicate what is there implied or only implicit (pp. xix-xxi). Dr. Adler distinguishes sharply between the rôle of the dialectician (his own rôle) and that of the philosopher. It is the function of the dialectician to lay bare the genuine controversies that exist implicitly in the record of philosophical thought but to refrain from developing any theory of his own or from defending any theory as true. The philosopher presumably has an interest in a kind of truth which is different from that of the dialectician. Dr. Adler puts it this way: "Philosophical doctrines, when true, give us knowledge of whatever realities are the objects of inquiry. Dialectical formulations, when true, give us knowledge of the controversies that underlie the diversity of

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able whether—as the London Poles believed—a firm stand on the territorial issue could have averted Poland's political catastrophe. All evidence seems to indicate that neither suppleness nor stubbornness could have induced Stalin to a partnership in the spirit of political compromise. Only superior force could have checked the triumphant westward march of Soviet imperialism. This force the Western Powers did not possess until the very end of the war, but even then they made no attempt to assert it. After Yalta, it was Churchill who saw the rapid emergence of the Soviet Union as the new aggressor, and attempted—alas, unsuccessfully—to win over Roosevelt to his way of thinking. Indeed, Professor Rozek's belief that "Poland's tragedy was shaped by the fact that the policies of those two Western leaders and their comprehension of the nature of the Soviet designs were not synchronized" (p. 361) seems to come much closer to reality than his censure of Churchill's softness toward Russia.

The other book on Poland—written by Clifford R. Barnett in coöperation with Robert J. Feldman, John C. Fiske, Peter Malof, Florence K. Nieman, Otto R. Reischer, and Egon R. Tausch—does not raise controversial issues. It is a handbook in a new HRAF (Human Relations Area Files) series, the aim of which is, as the editor Thomas Fitzsimmons puts it, to gather and interpret scattered observations, information and analysis. Both as a reference book for the expert and as introductory reading for the nonexpert, this scholarly, well-written volume offers a wide range of solid information on Poland's past and present.

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The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom. By MORTIMER J. ADLER. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958.—xxvii, 689 pp. $7.50.

The Structure of Freedom. By CHRISTIAN BAY. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958.—xii, 419 pp. $7.50.

Mortimer Adler and his associates at the Institute for Philosophical Research have undertaken a formidable task, namely, an examination of twenty-five centuries of philosophical speculation about the meaning of freedom in an effort to clarify the controversies that are associated with that speculation, to reduce the manifold meanings of freedom to a systematic classification and to discover the areas of basic agreement and disagreement. This volume concentrates upon the variety and extent of the

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with the diplomatic aspects of the Polish case as systematically, or has used documents as abundantly, as Professor Rozek's book does. Among the documentary material perused by the author are the official files of the Polish government-in-exile and the private files of its one-time premier, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. The liberally quoted primary sources offer a mine of information for the student of the Polish tragedy.

Today, to be sure, Poland is no longer the primary symbol of tragedy. Rather, since the "Polish October" of 1956, she is a symbol of the hope that national independence is not doomed forever in Soviet-dominated Central and Eastern Europe. Poland's good luck in the Cold War, of course, cannot eradicate the memory of her tragic fate in the Second World War. Moreover, Wladyslaw Gomulka's Communist compromise with the Soviets, enviable as it may seem to the less fortunate members of the Soviet satellite empire, can hardly be regarded as a final solution of the Polish question.

The failure to solve this proverbial "Polish question" during the Second World War is viewed by Professor Rozek primarily as a failure of Western policy. He is particularly critical of Churchill, whom he calls the "main architect" of Poland's "fifth partition". The term "fifth partition" stands for the Soviet annexation of the territories east of the Curzon Line, partly by virtue of the ethnic principle, partly on the ground of the *status quo ante* (the pre-war frontiers, that is, as they existed as the result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact). If Churchill had taken a firm stand at Teheran in support of Roosevelt—Rozek believes —"together they could presumably have swayed Stalin from his determination to change not only Poland's frontiers but also her Government" (p. 163). A good part of Professor Rozek's book is devoted to the issue of Poland's eastern frontiers—in the belief, it seems, that Poland's future political status depended largely on the territorial settlement. The adamant stand of the Polish government-in-exile in defense of the eastern territories (which prompted Churchill to angry outbursts calling the Poles "absolutely crazy") is also believed to have stemmed from the conviction (which even Mikolajczyk, the most far-sighted and flexible among the London Poles, seemed to share) that capitulation to the Soviet territorial demand would doom the political future of Poland.

This is a highly debatable point. For, it is questionable whether—as the critics of the Poles maintained—a smooth satisfaction of the Soviet territorial demands in the East (coupled with the promise to compensate Poland in the West) could have led to a favorable political settlement. It is also no less question-

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rials during World War II, and (3) the complex program of stockpiling raw materials by the United States.

National policy with respect to individual raw materials, or combinations of raw materials required by certain industries—such as lead, zinc, copper, nickel, iron and steel, rubber and oil—is the theme of Chapters IV through X. The complexities, the diversities, and the conflicts in national policy, and even lack of national policy, with respect to raw materials are well illustrated by these case studies.

The final chapter is titled: "The Reform of National Policy". It ranges over a wide area and touches on various complexities. "For optimum economic growth, the nation's industries should be able to obtain their raw-material supplies at minimum real costs." This is the test applied to all policy suggestions. Many interrelated action programs need to be followed if the nation is to have a continuing adequate supply of materials over the long run. Mr. Bidwell's principal suggestion for the immediate future concerns our foreign policy. Since the nation is securing a gradually increasing proportion of total needs from foreign sources, an international trade policy facilitating and encouraging this flow should tend toward minimum real costs of materials. Valuable by-products are a greater measure of good will, genuine aid to economies that continue to be primarily extractive, and strengthened collective security.

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Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland. By EDWARD J. ROZEK. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., London, Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1958.—xix, 481 pp. $6.95.

Poland: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. By CLIFFORD R. BARNETT, *et al.* New Haven, HRAF Press, 1958.—471 pp. $7.50.

Polish-born Edward J. Rozek fought with the Allied armies from Normandy to Germany, and he went through the bitter experience of seeing his native land pass from Nazi to Soviet tyranny. Now an American professor, in the Department of Political Science at the University of Colorado, he fought through the maze of diplomatic documents to write a history of the West's failure to save Poland from Soviet domination and Communist rule. Unlike his fight for Polish freedom, his campaign in the field of scholarship was remarkably successful. The heartbreaking story of Poland in the Second World War has been told many times before. But no earlier work has dealt

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Raw Materials; A Study of American Policy. By PERCY W. BIDWELL. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1958.—xvi, 403 pp. $5.95.

The annual increment to published works dealing with the raw material position of the United States has been increasing sharply since World War II. One of the most recent studies is that by Mr. Bidwell. The objectives of his book "are to examine the more important measures of United States policy which affect the supply of materials for American industries and to suggest changes in national policies which make them better adapted to the technological advances and changes in international relations which may be expected in the immediate future." Various parts of the manuscript were read and discussed by a study group of the Council on Foreign Relations in a series of meetings during eight months of 1956-1957. Field work was carried out during April and May 1957 through interviews of individuals in raw-material-producing industries and through discussions with Committees on Foreign Relations in six cities of the Middle and Mountain West.

Chapter I summarizes the raw material position of the United States and poses problems of national policy. Our nation continues to be the foremost originator of materials in the world, but we are even larger consumers. Indeed, the fact that a gradually increasing proportion of total needs in materials is derived from foreign sources is the dominant fact of the nation's changing position in raw materials.

"National Policy in an Era of Peace and Self-Sufficiency" is the theme of Chapter II. This chapter highlights policies before World War II on land, taxes and tariffs that impinged on the production and supplies of raw materials. The composite impact was to encourage domestic production of industrial materials with little regard to effects on foreign relations and the needs of national defense.

Chapter III considers policies designed (a) to assure raw materials during World War II and the Korean crisis for national military and civilian needs, (b) to share raw materials with allied Powers, and (c) to prevent their flow to hostile Powers. It was a period of innovations in policies induced by the abnormal demands of war. Examples are (1) the Premium Price Plan designed to stimulate domestic production, (2) the establishment, following Pearl Harbor, of the Combined Raw Materials Board by the United States and the United Kingdom to coördinate policies in purchasing and allocating raw mate-

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1950, and the confinement of the nationalist phenomenon to the two southern regions. The slow-moving Northern Region, which was the show place of indirect rule and which embraces over half of Nigeria's area and people, was virtually untouched by nationalism until 1951.

The years 1945-1951 were climactic. The nationalist movement gained unprecedented strength and influence, but the regionalization of nationalism divided it into tribal compartments. Rapid constitutional development and fear of southern domination awakened the north. At the constitutional level, agreement on the regional devolution of governmental authority was both confirmation of a furcated nationalism and compromise between assertive southern nationalism and northern fear of self-government, providing a framework within which northerners were willing to adopt nationalist objectives. By the end of 1951 "the nationalist movement, divided though it was, became formally structured in political parties functioning within a political system fairly close to the threshold of independence" (p. 4). Division in nationalist ranks, formalized in the federal structure of government, now remains to challenge the achievement in Nigeria of what Coleman identifies as the second major objective of a colonial nationalist movement, "to create a modern nation-state" (p. 412).

In the years since 1945, Nigeria has experienced spectacular advances toward self-government and independence. Whether these developments were forced on the British government, contrary to its expectations, by the Nigerian nationalists or were methodically adopted by the British according to calculations of the Nigerian capacity for self-government are alternative explanations of these events which will be argued for years to come. Professor Coleman chooses the first explanation and no doubt will be reprimanded for it. Be that as it may, Nigerian independence will fulfill the professed aim of British colonial policy as well as nationalist aspirations, and the British, who are coöperating in the Nigerian liquidation with grace and dignity, will depart with impressive good will.

Nigeria: Background to Nationalism is a work of conspicuous scholarship based on painstaking research and leavened with commendable humility. The text is enriched by fifteen maps, twenty-six tables, sixteen photographs, an appended note on concepts and terms, and an exhaustive bibliography.

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Protectorate of Nigeria out of territories the British acquisition of which was completed in 1900.

Not only is Nigeria the ethnically and politically most diverse country of Africa, but, as Professor Coleman observes, "data are too fragmentary and contradictory, passions are still too intense and perspectives too distorted to permit broad generalizations and firm conclusions" (p. vii). He thus carefully labels his volume an "exploratory . . . introduction to selected aspects of the political history of modern Nigeria." Specifically, taking the period from 1900 to 1951, Coleman focuses on the social and historical forces responsible for the stimulation and definition of nationalist sentiments and on the development of nationalist organization and agitation. The main body of the study is bracketed by description of the cultural and historical setting and survey of events since 1951.

Certain major groups of factors influential in shaping nationalist sentiment—Western economic forces, Christianity, Western education, and the Westernized élite—are separately treated. Other influences are discussed in the chapters describing the nationalist movement's growth. The resultant catalogue of such factors is well-nigh exhaustive, and the author demonstrates the relevance of each to nationalism without attempting to judge their relative weights. The recital of the causes of nationalism dwells heavily on grievances, for "grievances—imaginary or real, frivolous or justifiable—constitute a major part of colonial nationalism" (p. 5); therefore, so far as British policy and practice are concerned, the study "tends to point up unimaginative policies, errors in judgment, and the human frailties of officialdom . . . while understressing, perhaps, the vision and broad humanity of many officials" (pp. 5-6). The consequent imbalance will displease some readers, in spite of Coleman's insistence that it follows from the very nature of his subject and in spite of his profession that "nationalism—the quest for self-government—in Nigeria is as much a fulfillment as a failure of British policy."

The author defines Nigerian nationalism as "sentiments, activities, and organizational developments aimed explicitly at the self-government and independence of Nigeria" (pp. 169-170). In this sense of the term, his meticulous chronicle begins with turn-of-the-century publicists and ends with the "northern awakening". The intervening years were marked by chronic disunity in the nationalist movement, the failure of a genuine nationalist organization to emerge until 1938, the overshadowing personality of American-trained Nnamdi Azikiwe from the mid-thirties, one excursion into "militant nationalism" in 1948-

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always accurately foreseen. Silcock illuminates this conclusion with a variety of fresh illustrations, although he wisely does not attempt a complete catalogue of the colonial impact.

Chapter Three explores the main development needs of the Commonwealth economies in Southeast Asia: achievement of political stability and the progressive integration of its plural societies; expansion of existing transportation systems; growth and diversification of agriculture and fisheries; industrialization; improvement of the credit structure and more effective currency control; the cultural changes required for economic growth; and the requirements of extensive research and outside technical assistance. Attention is also given to the advantages which may be derived in external political, financial and commercial relations by maintenance of the Commonwealth connection, and to the help which the Commonwealth and the United States may most effectively extend to the Southeast Asian countries.

The last two chapters are separate papers not organically dependent on each other or the rest of the book. Chapter Four is an examination of the probable effects of the European Common Market and the proposed Free Trade Area on the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. On the whole Silcock is not alarmed by the prospects, although the repercussions on certain segments of the economy may be severe. In Chapter Five, the author presents a preliminary attempt at classification of some of the main differences to be found among underdeveloped countries in characteristics significant for problems of economic development, together with some indications as to how these differences might be taken into account. This is undoubtedly the most suggestive part of the book, and is particularly useful in underlining the complexities inherent in the task of promoting economic growth in the so-called underdeveloped countries.

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Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. By JAMES S. COLEMAN. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958. —xiv, 510 pp. $7.50.

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, will become an independent state on October 1, 1960, reducing the population of Britain's colonial empire by half. This event will occur scarcely half a century after the creation in 1914 of the Colony and

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The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia. By T. H. SILCOCK. Published for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, by Duke University Press, Durham, and Cambridge University Press, London, 1959.—xix, 259 pp. $4.00.

This is another contribution to the burgeoning literature on the economic growth of underdeveloped countries. It is the most recent study to appear in the valuable series being published under the auspices of the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. The author, T. H. Silcock of the University of Malaya, has had broad experience with the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and in the conduct of economic surveys in Southeast Asia, as well as being a distinguished professor of economics. His knowledge of the economies of the Commonwealth countries in Southeast Asia is perhaps unrivaled. The present volume, which deals primarily with Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo (Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo), and to a lesser extent with Hong Kong, sheds welcome light on the special problems of development in those parts of the region long subject to colonial rule from London.

The first three chapters were originally delivered as lectures at Duke. Most of Chapter One is devoted to brief analyses of the economic structure of each of the countries being considered. Silcock drives home the point that while all are "underdeveloped" and share certain characteristics, such as heavy dependence on a relatively few primary export products and the presence of racial minorities that play a disproportionately significant economic rôle, the dissimilarities are almost equally striking. In consequence each poses fairly unique developmental problems. Growth in the Borneo lands, for example, is still inhibited by an excessively sparse population; Malaya, on the other hand, with a rapidly growing population, already faces a pressing need for diversification and industrial development.

In Chapter Two the author deals with the impact of British rule on the economic development of the countries under review. Britain acquired her far-flung empire in pursuit of no single objective, but rather of a multiplicity of them; and she never exercised governance in accord with any fixed principle or over-all policy, except that in recent decades it has been generally understood that at some future date self-rule would be restored to the colonies. Inevitably in such circumstances, the results left much to be desired. Political steps commendable in themselves often had harmful economic implications, while the long-range consequences of economic measures were not

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have moved on to later problems. In fact, colonialism and, quite explicitly, British colonialism are seen as by no means wholly evil and as having conferred real benefits. Thus the former Labour Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, who surveys his party's colonial policy and finds it good, asserts that "British colonial administrators have in the past served their territories with devotion and skill"; and other contributors share his opinion. Indeed, it is suggested that some of the colonies might have done better to linger longer under tutelage than to move so hastily into independence.

Although no one advocates the maintenance of empire and Marjorie Nicholson warns of the dangers of white settler domination in the Central African Federation created by the Conservatives over African protest, there is a pervading desire to preserve and strengthen the Commonwealth. Harold Ingrams sees a refurbished Overseas Service playing a significant rôle in holding the Commonwealth together. Eirene White proposes that a reformed House of Lords might make room for the representation of Commonwealth countries, thus providing a forum for the discussion of foreign affairs, defense, and other Commonwealth concerns. In the most vigorous and closely reasoned essay in the book Thomas Balogh makes a slashing attack on the "old-fashioned ideas" of the Tory government which he accuses of gravely accelerating the disruption of the Commonwealth which had started even before Labour went out of office. At the door of the Tories he lays also the destruction of "the potentially superb instrument of supra-national planning, the Sterling Area", and he laments the acceptance of American notions of laissez faire and free private enterprise.

For the rest, several essays, including one by Arthur Gaitskell of Sudan Gezira Board fame, explore questions of colonial and post-colonial economic, social and educational development. Lionel Elvin debates the competing claims of productive economic development, which would make larger revenues possible, and of expanded social services, which lay the foundations for effective economic development. In the international sphere Kenneth Younger, former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, surveys the international ramification of the colonial issue, and Wilfrid Benson, recently at the head of the United Nations' work in relation to non-self-governing territories, canvasses the international machinery for colonial liberation and suggests means of improvement.

RUPERT EMERSON

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The other imperialism was a reaction from continental Europe, where the balance of power was violently upset, nationalism married to militarism inflamed imperialism, and might was enthroned as right. On this broad aspect of the subject, especially the conflict between the idealist and the realist approach, Thornton is at his best. But he seems to have missed the economic reason for free-trade Britain's joining and staying in the race to appropriate new territories: the economic nationalism of her rivals, operating on the principle that trade follows the flag, which forced her in self-defense to act on the principle that the flag follows trade. There is an admirable account of how, for the sake of oil and communication with India, Britain gained a commanding position in the Middle East by the end of World War I, but how she lost it is not made quite so clear. Relatively her power had already passed its peak, and her tremendous efforts in World War II were even more exhausting. Yet this book does not end on a note of pessimism. "Not all imperialism is power-imperialism," says the author, who sees large possibilities of moral leadership uninhibited by the backing of great physical power.

A. L. BURT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

New Fabian Colonial Essays. Edited by ARTHUR CREECH JONES. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959.–271 pp. $5.00.

None of the particular questions which are raised in this new collection of Fabian colonial essays—the first collection appeared in 1945—has as absorbing an interest as the general attitude toward colonialism which the several contributors explicitly and implicitly reveal. In this year of grace, how do British socialists regard the Empire and Commonwealth which they have managed in the recent past and may well come to manage again? On the opening page Rita Hinden poses the "agonizing alternatives" which in one guise or another turn up throughout the volume: the socialists found themselves the heirs of the massive legacy of empire, but socialist principle, she declares, forbade them to enjoy it. Should they reject it outright, following the anti-imperialist creed, or should they accept it and develop it for the rightful owners until the latter come of age?

This is decidedly a post-colonial book in the sense that it assumes the victory—and the basic rightness—of anti-colonialism, but with no illusions that the achievement of independence ushers in a golden age. The old-style denunciation of colonial oppression and exploitation barely figures in these pages, which

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explain "those changes in attitude towards the British Empire which have been adopted by men in power, by men out of it, and by public opinion in general during the past hundred years," and to examine the influence of these various attitudes "on the role played by Great Britain in world affairs."

The sources used for this study are so voluminous and variegated that the author has refrained from supplying a bibliography, but he has carefully cited his sources in footnotes. "Practically any book or article, written between 1860 and 1959 and concerned in any way with British domestic or international development, expresses attitudes and views which have been pressed into service here"; and "plays, poems, and novels have all contributed to the store." *Hansard* has been drawn on most heavily for the whole period, and the *Round Table* for the years following the launching of this quarterly in 1910. The writing is spirited, and the wrong date for the beginning of Mackenzie King's premiership (p. 259) is one of the few factual slips.

The first of the seven chapters, each of about fifty pages, deals with the revival of British faith in the Empire from its nadir in the middle of the nineteenth century, and opens with an account of the famous debate of 1850 on the Don Pacifico incident. The issue in debate, the use and abuse of British power in foreign affairs, is the dominant theme of the book in accord with its subtitle. The result is a very partial treatment of the subject suggested by the main title.

There is no mention of the fact that there were really two imperialisms of diverse origin, character and purpose. One began as a reaction against the widely held notion that the self-governing colonies were heading for complete independence and that the government of the day would cast them adrift as useless burdens. This peculiarly British imperialism sought to reconsolidate the existing Empire, not to expand it, and had a distinct bearing on power and prestige. Yet there is no reference to the Royal Colonial Institute; the Imperial Federation League appears only as a name; and though there are many quotations from the *Round Table* the Round Table movement itself is completely ignored. This particular omission entailed another of crucial importance: the turning point from the older idea of Empire to the new Commonwealth conception when the American entry into World War I, coinciding with the resolution of the Imperial Conference that still contemplated a collective foreign policy, destroyed the condition that had made the Round Table argument unanswerable.

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completed, thus providing support for the statement of a colleague that history books are now written only to be thrown away.

As to specific content, one might argue with the choice of topics, but within the framework provided by the editors, the work is extraordinarily comprehensive. To have covered so much ground is remarkable, particularly if one bears in mind the complexity of the subject matter. Since about 1870, Britain's position in the world has, as is well known, been deteriorating in terms of economic, naval and other forms of power. Meanwhile, imperial statesmen have had to grapple with increasingly serious problems of nationalism first in the English-speaking and then in the non-English-speaking possessions. On all topics it is sufficient to say that the volume is immensely instructive. The assumption underlying the treatment of the more delicate subjects and issues, namely, that Britons created as well as destroyed, will no longer automatically flutter even Delhian dovecotes, unless occupied by those who still consider the work of R. C. Dutt as definitive. Of all the contributions, that of Ronald E. Robinson, "Imperial Problems in British Politics", is probably the most striking. In it he breaks new ground in historical analysis. The other contributors, in what is largely a Cambridge and Oxford production, show absolute mastery of the literature on their subjects. A. Taylor Milne deserves thanks for having taken on the usually thankless task of compiling the Bibliography which contains 139 pages. His coverage includes reference to manuscript material in private and public collections as well as to the standard published literature. American historians may be interested in testing their own interpretations against those of Anthony Steel in the chapter entitled "The British Empire and the United States, 1870-1914".

This is a gargantuan book about a great subject. It should be because, as noted above, it costs $19.50.

CHILTON WILLIAMSON

BARNARD COLLEGE

The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power. By A. P. THORNTON. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1959.—xiv, 370 pp. $7.50.

This book by an Aberdonian professor of history in the University College of the West Indies is not intended to be another history of the British Empire and Commonwealth, a considerable knowledge of which is taken for granted. Its object is to

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were adopted to produce the liberal ideals of the modern world were not really the exclusive heritage of any one nation. They were not English, nor even were they French. They were in truth European."

It is to be hoped that "the manner in which English thought repaid its debt to France during the French Revolution" will be the subject of a future volume by this author, as he seems to hint in one place.

GUY H. DODGE

BROWN UNIVERSITY

The Cambridge History of the British Empire. Volume III: *The Empire-Commonwealth, 1870-1919.* Edited by E. A. BENIANS, SIR JAMES BUTLER and C. E. CARRINGTON. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1959.—xxi, 948 pp. $19.50.

It will take some time, perhaps, before the British Empire-Commonwealth will have its Gibbon, Dopsch or Pirenne to describe the import of what is now another vanished supremacy, to use a phrase of Sir Lewis Namier. Until that time comes, we will be grateful for all contributions to our comprehension of that phase of world history made by the inhabitants of the small European island at the entrance to the narrow seas. Students have long been in debt to the Cambridge University Press, for having sponsored since 1929 a multivolume history of the empire.

The two earlier volumes dealing with imperial themes now seem slightly old-fashioned, as much so as a good deal of Charles M. Andrews' "The Colonial Period of American History". An emphasis upon administrative, constitutional and even economic history satisfied the previous generation of historians but does not satisfy the present one. The emphasis, today, is different and broader. The disciplines of sociology and anthropology, among others, are now being brought to bear upon the subject with stimulating, if uneven, results. Furthermore, the perspective has changed. No longer can it be said that the writing of imperial history is primarily the preserve of historians of British or American stock. Asia, Africa and the Caribbean area either have developed or are in the process of developing their own corps of historians. It would therefore be almost superfluous to suggest that in Ibadan, Karachi or Singapore empire history will be viewed, as in Dublin, in a different though not, in the long run, in a necessarily unsympathetic light. For these reasons, it may well turn out that the Cambridge History of the British Empire was on the road to obsolescence before it had even been

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extent to which seventeenth century Englishmen consciously adapted French theory and example to their needs."

Since "the reasons for English dependence upon French example were primarily religious" at this time of an international struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism, the author is to a large extent concerned with the political implications of religious controversy in the seventeenth century. In his exposition, however, of this aspect of the subject, he does not show as clearly as he might the political effect of the religious schism which was, in the words of Professor McIlwain, "to give new life and new content to the old theories concerning tyranny," thus weakening respect for all government. This result was more important than the author's view that "Protestant theology" as such "facilitated the growth of an individualistic system of politics."

In his discussion of the adaptation of the opinions of Jean Bodin to an English context the author makes an interesting contribution but he does not refer to the conflict of *gubernaculum* and *jurisdictio* which was the great issue in the sixteenth century nor does he allude to Julius Hatschek's *Englisches Staatsrecht,* where the relationship between Sir Thomas Smith and Bodin is suggestively discussed.

But it was the period of the English Civil War when the "opinions of the schools represented by Bodin and the authors of the *Vindiciae* became important in the development of English thought." Here parallels could easily be drawn between England in the seventeenth century and France in the sixteenth century. French ideas became especially applicable after the break between king and parliament led to a struggle for the possession of the sovereign lawmaking power.

However, it was the glorious Revolution which "represented the culmination of the influence of the French Religious Wars in English politics." In the Netherlands exiled Whigs (Locke and Burnet) coöperated with exiled Huguenots (Abbadie and Jurieu) in the indictment of both the Stuarts and the Bourbons. But, as Mr. Salmon observes, "it is easy to exaggerate the differences between political ideas in France in 1579 and those in England in 1689." The transition from the principles of the Monarchomachs like Junius Brutus to those of Whigs like John Locke lay in the writings of Althusius, Grotius and Pufendorf, which are critically examined in this book.

Mr. Salmon, therefore, has collected the "facts which throw doubt on the belief that English problems were met and explained in a way quite unrelated to European traditions." As he wisely concludes, "the traditions of political thought which

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"official" philosophers feel for the "official" journal *Voprosy filosofii,* or of the fact that many professors of dialectical materialism (*diamatchiki,* as they are somewhat contemptuously dubbed) are among the least competent and least respected members of the Soviet academic community.

Peter Heath's generally accurate and lucid translation is marred by occasional slips and misleading renderings (which I have listed in detail elsewhere). The number of misprints is surprisingly small for so extensive and polyglot a work.

A protest must be entered against the garbled statement that appears on the dust jacket of the American (but not the British) edition, to the effect that dialectical materialism is "the theory that holds that social and economic changes are the result of materialistic forces"—whatever *that* may mean!

The book closes with a full bibliography and a detailed index, which will make this volume useful both for occasional reference and for serious study. Despite its minor shortcomings—most of which are readily corrigible—this remains the best general work on the subject in any language. We may hope that it will receive the wide and close attention which it deserves.

GEORGE L. KLINE

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought. By J. H. M. SALMON. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959.—vii, 202 pp. 25*s;* $4.00.

This book, based on sound scholarship, shows very well how "at the most crucial and formative periods of English thought, in the Puritan Revolution, the Exclusion Crisis, and the Revolution of 1688, there occurred a recourse to French history and a sudden influx of French ideas." As is so often the case in the field of political thought, there is no clear distinction to be drawn in this period between political theory and political history. In fact, "the ideas and the precedents went hand in hand."

As for his method, the author has "examined the appearance in English politics of the ideas and models provided by the French Religious Wars chronologically, rather than by the logical juxtaposition of French and English concepts." In an excessively modest claim Mr. Salmon observes that "the originality of this study does not lie in the discovery of new sources but in the cumulative weight of evidence which demonstrates the

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